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The University of Kentucky, College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education, was organized in Fall of 1973, as the first permanently
staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It endures with the threefold purpose of assisting
Kentucky lawyers: to keep abreast of changes in the law resulting from statutory enactments, court decisions and administrative rulings;
to develop and sustain practical lawyering and litigation skills; and to maintain a high degree of professional competence in the various
areas of the practice of law.
An enormous debt of gratitude is owed to those who contribute their time, expertise and practical insight for the advance planning,
the instructional presentations, and the written materials that make our seminars possible.
The Office of Continuing Legal Education welcomes correspondence and comment regarding our overall curriculum, as well as our in-
dividual seminars and publications. We hope the seminars and the materials distributed in conjunction with them provide attorneys with
the invaluable substantive and practical information necessary to resolve society's increasingly complex legal problems in an efficient
and effective manner. To the extent that we accomplish this, we accomplish our goal.
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IMPACT OF THE 1988 KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ON ESTATE PLANS AND ADMINISTRATION
Mark T. MacDonald, Attorney, CPA
Wyatt, Tarrant and Combs
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IMPACT OF THE 1988 KENTUCKY GENERAL
ASSEMBLY ON ESTATE PLANS AND ADMINISTRATION
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Acts, Chapter 90 (SB 8), Sections 6-27, and 32 contain a
complete revision of KRS Chapter 396 which deals with creditor's
I. LEGISLATION IMPACTING ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
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A. Claims Against a Decedent's Estate. 1988 Kentucky
r
f
claims against a decedent's eatate. The Act repeals all former
sections of the Chapter and replaces them with new sections
based in part on Article III, Part 8 of the Uniform Probate
Code. Paragraph 1 below contains a brief overview of some of
r
t
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r
r
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the changes made by the Act. Paragraphs 2 through 22 contain a
detailed discussion of the new sections of KRS Chapter 396.
Paragraph 23 contains a discussion of the effective date of the
Act and its implications for estates then in existence. Unless
otherwise noted, citations to section numbers of Chapter 396
refer to the new KRS sections.
1. Overview of Changes Made by the Act. The Act
generally retains the requirement that creditors must file their
claims with a personal representative, but changes both the time
for the filing of the claim and the content of the claim. The
Act prescribes the manner in which a claim is to be allowed or
disallowed and establishes a presumption of allowance where the
personal representative takes no action on a presented claim.
The Act offers additional protection to creditors whose claims
are disallowed and affords greater flexability to the personal
representative and creditors in dealing with problems associated
addition, the Act alters the priority of claims and sets forthr
r
with contingent, unmatured and unliquidated claims. In
A-I
new rules regarding both the payment of interest on claims and
the payment of claims where administration occurs in more than
one state. The Act also incorporates into a single chapter of
the KRS all periods of limitation arising on a claim as a result
of the decedent's death and establishes a uniform period of
limitation for the commencement of an action on a claim against
a personal representative, heir or beneficiary once the estate
has been settled.
2. Reguirement of Presentation of Claim.
a. All claims against a decedent's estate which
arose before the death of the decedent, if not barred earlier by
other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the
personal representative and heirs and devisees of the decedent
unless presented within 6 months after the appointment of the
personal representative, or where no personal representative has
been appointed, within 2 years after the decedent's death. This
rule applies irrespective of whether a claim is matured or
unmatured, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated,
founded on contract, tort or other legal basis. KRS
396.011(1).
Comment Former KRS 396.025 required that a
claim be "proven as reguired by law" within 1 year after the
date of the appointment of the personal representative, or where
no personal representative was appointed, within 3 years after
the decedent's death. However, KRS 395.190 authorized the
A-2
rrequired for any
of Kentucky, or any
is not
state
requirement of presentation.
(1) Presentation
personal representative to distribute the estate 6 months after
his appointment. Since it was possible for the personal
representative to distribute the estate before the ,time elapsed
for claims to be filed, the Attorney General had advised clerks
responsible for publication of notice to creditors to state in
the notice that creditors should file their claims within 6
months from the date of appointment of the personal
representative. AOG 76-215. Notices referencing only the 6
months were potentially misleading to a creditor. By reducing
the time for presentation of a claim to 6 months, the new law
eliminates any confusion which may result from varying time
periods for filing and distribution.
b. The Act provides three exceptions to the
claim of the United States, the
subdivision thereof. KRS 396.011(1).
(2) The requirement of presentation does not
affect or prevent, to the extent of the security only, any
proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, lien or other
security interest securing an obligation of the decedent or upon
property of the estate. KRS 396.011(2).
(3) The requirement of presentation does not
affect or prevent, to the limits of insurance protection only,
any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the
personal representative for which he is protected by liability
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claimant chooses toaIf( 3 )
~4
be important in
presentation of
cannot rely on
representative.
insurance. KRS 396.011(2).
Comment Since the exceptions noted in
Subparagraphs (2) and (3) above are limited to the extent of
security or insurance only, secured claims or claims which the
decedent or his estate may be partially insured against should
always be presented within 6 months of the appointment of the
personal representative.
3. Method of Presenting Claims. A claim may either
be (a) delivered or mailed to the personal representative, or
(b) filed with the clerk of the court. If filed with the clerk
of the court, the claimant must certify as provided in the civil
rules that a copy of the claim has been given or mailed to the
personal representative and his attorney. A claim is deemed to
be presented on either the receipt of the claim by the personal
representative or the filing of the claim with the clerk of the
court, whichever occurs first. KRS 396.015(1).
Comments (1) As a general rule a claim
should always be filed with the court to put the court on notice
of the existence of the claim. This can prevent an attempted
settlement of the estate without resolution of the claim.
(2) Filing with the court will also
situations where the time remaining for the
the claim is about to expire and the claimant
the timely receipt of the claim by the personal
evidence the date of receipt.
present his claim directly to the personal representative,
certified mail with return receipt requested should be used to
r
r
r
r 4 . written Statement of Claim; Content.
a. A claim must be presented in the form of a
information:
(1) the basis of the claim,r
written statement and contain at least the following
(2) the name and address of the claimant,
(3) the amount claimed,
(4) if the claim is not yet due, the date
unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty, and
r
r
r
when it will become due,
(5) if the claim is contingent or
r
(6) if the claim is secured, a description
of the security. KRS 396.015(1).
Comment The Act eliminates the former
r
r
requirements under KRS 396.010 that the claim be in affidavit
form and that the claim, if not based on an obligation signed by
the decedent or a judgment, be supported by an affidavit of a
person other than the claimant. However, see Paragrah 5 below
for the right of the personal representative to require an
affidavit of the claimant after the claim has been presented.
due will not invalidate the presentation of the claim. KRS
the nature of any uncertainty or the due date of a claim not yet
p
,
r
b. Failure to describe correctly the security,
r ~5
~6
d. If an action is pending against a decedent at
the time of his death, and the action is of a type which
survives the decedent's death, the substitution of the personal
representative for the decedent, or a motion therefor, will
constitute the presentation of the litigated claim. The claim
is deemed to have been presented from the time of substitution
or motion therefor. KRS 396.015(2).
Comment This rule eliminates the
uncertainty under prior law as to whether a claimant had to file
his claim with the personal representative in addition to
obtaining the substitution of the personal representative in the
pending action.
5. Personal Representative May Reguire Affidavit of
Claimant. Following the presentment of any claim the personal
representative may, by request in writing mailed to the
claimant, require an affidavit or other satisfactory evidence
that the claim is justly due, that no payments have been made
thereon and that there are no offsets against the claim to the
knowledge of the claimant. If any payments have been made or
any offsets exist, their nature and amount must be stated in the
affidavit or shown from the evidence. KRS 396.026.
Comment Since a claim is no longer required to
396.015(2).
c. A
court is required
396.015(1).
written statement of claim filed with the
to be in the form prescribed by rule. KRS
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be in affidavit form and the contents of the written statement
of claim have been simplified, this provision will allow the
personal representative to obtain additional information from
the claimant if needed to evaluate the validity of a presented
claim.
6. Presentment Required Before Commencement of Action
on Claim. A claimant must present his claim before bringing an
action against the personal representative on the claim. This
restriction is in addition to that provided in KRS 395.270 which
prohibits the commencement of an action against the personal
representative within the first 2 months after his appointment.
KRS 396.035.
7. Statute of Limitations - Miscellaneous Rules.
a. No claim will be barred by a statute of
limitations which expires during the first 6 months after the
decedent's death, if such claim is presented at any time within
that 6 month period. This rule does not apply to any limitation
period imposed by KRS Chapter 396. KRS 396.045(1).
Example A claim is based on a breach of
contract. The applicable statute of limitations on the claim
would expire January 1, 1989. The person who breached the
contract dies December 1, 1988. The claimant may present his
claim at any time prior to July 1, 1989.
Comment Note the 6 months under the rule
runs from the date of the decedent's death and not 'from the date
of the personal representative's appointment.
~7
A-8
the personal
stating that
396.055(1).
Comment While the mailing of notice of
allowance or disallowance appears permissive, see Subparagraph d
below as to the consequence of not giving notice.
b. After giving notice of allowance or
disallowance of a claim, the personal representative may change
his decision; but if he does so, he must notify the claimant of
Allowance or Disallowance of Presented Claims.
a. As to claims properly and timely presented,
representative may mail a notice to any claimant
the claim is allowed or disallowed. KRS
8.
b. For purposes of any statute of limitations,
the proper presentment of the claim is considered the equivalent
of the commencement of an action on the claim. KRS 396.045(2).
c. The personal representative may waive any
defense of limitations available to the estate provided that the
estate is solvent and the consent of the beneficaries whose
interest would be affected is obtained. If the defense is not
waived, no claim which was barred by any statute of limitations
at the time of the decedent's death may be allowed or paid by
the personal representative. KRS 396.065.
Query - How is a will provision directing the
personal representative to pay "my just debts" or to pay "my
just debts whether or not the same may be legally enforceable
against my estate" to be interpreted in light of this statutory
rule?
r
r
r
r
the change. An exception to this rule is that the personal
representative may not change his disallowance of the claim if
the time for the claimant to commence an action on the rejected
claim has run and the claim has been barred. KRS 396.055(1).
triggered, the notice of disallowance must warn the claimant of
action on the claim within 60 days after the mailing of the
notice of disallowance.
r
r
r
c.
disallowed will
A claim or part thereof which has been
become barred unless the claimant commences an
However, for the 60 day period to be
representative may consent to an extension of the 60 day period
or the court on petition may order an extension of the period.
unmatured, contingent or unliquidated claim, either the personalr
r
r
the impending bar.
KRS 396.055(1),(3).
In the case of a disallowance of an
Comments ( 1 ) Former KRS 396.027
r
r
r
contained a similar limitation period on a disallowed claim.
However, it failed to clearly specify when the limitation period
began to run and did not require the notice to warn the claimant
of the impending bar.
(2) If notice of disallowance
is given, but the notice does not contain the necessary warning,
the claimant may file an action on the disallowed claim at any
time prior to the expiration of 2 years from the discharge of
r
i
r the personal representative. See Paragraph 22 below for a
discussion of the 2 year period of limitation.
r
I
r
r
d. The failure of the personal representative to
A-9
A-IO
considered an allowance of the claim. KRS 396.055(2).
administration. KRS 396.075(1).
personalthe
Notice of the
againstjudgment
personal representative is authorized
A
Thea.
e.
However, the personal representative may file a petition
9. Payment of Claims.
after the time for original presentation of the claim has
permitting the disallowance of the claim.
mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for 60 days
petition must be given to the claimant. KRS 396.055(1).
with the court and upon good cause shown obtain an order
after the expiration of 6 months from his appointment to proceed
representative to enforce a claim against a decedent's estate is
expired (i.e., 6 months and 60 days from the date of appointment
of the personal representative) results in the allowance of the
against the estate. In so doing, he must pay the claims in the
to pay claims which have been properly presented and allowed
claim.
b. The personal representative may pay at any
time any just claim which has not been barred, with or without
formal presentation; but he is personally liable to any other
claimant whose claim is allowed and who is injured by such
paYment if:
( 1 ) the paYment is made prior to 6 months
for unbarred claims which may be presented, including costs of
claims already presented which have not yet been allowed, and
order of their priority, making appropriate provisions for
r
f
r
r
from the date of his appointment and he fails to require the
payee to give adequate security for refund, or
fault of the personal representative, inr negligent or
( 2 )
willfull
the payment was made due to the
r
I
such manner as to deprive the injured claimant of his priority.
r
KRS 396.075(2).
c. A claimant whose claim has been allowed but
not paid may petition the court for an order directing the
funds of the estate are available for payment. KRS 396.075(1).
personal representative to pay the claim to the extent that
representative is not authorized to proceed to pay claims until
r
r
Comments ( 1 ) Since the personal
r
r,
r
6 months after his appointment, it appears that a claimant would
not be entitled to file a petition under this section until
after the expiration of the 6 month period. Since a petition
may be filed only on an allowed claim, a claimant who has not
received written notice of allowance or disallowance of the
claim must wait until after the claim is deemed to be allowed
(2) The right to petition the
(i.e., 6 months and 60 days after the date of the appointment of
the personal representative) before filing a petition.
court for an order directing payment of an allowed claim
provides a claimant with a practical solution to the problem of
a personal reprsentative unduely delaying payment of the claim.
based on a contracta. An allowed claim not
Interest on Allowed Claims.10.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r( A-11
A-12
(2) The personal representative
should carefully scrutinize all demands for interest since the
statute is very exacting in its terms and the personal
representative could potentially be liable for an overpayment of
the claim.
11. Priority of Claims.
a. If the assets of the estate are insufficient
J
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all
of
course,
payment
of
the
matter
demand
As a
should
( 1)
claim
above rules apply in the absence of a
personal representative that provides to
The
the
comments
statements of
c.
making provision for interest bears no interest from the date of
the decedent's death until 60 days after the time for original
presentation of the claim has expired (i.e., 6 months and 60
days after the appointment of the personal representative, or
where no personal representative has been appointed, 2 years and
60 days after the death of the decedent). Interest thereafter
accrues on the claim at the legal rate provided that the
claimant has demanded the payment of interest in the written
statement of his claim. KRS 396.085(1).
b. An allowed claim based on a contract making
for interest bears interest from the date of the
death in accordance with the contract provision. KRS
396.085(2).
judgment against
the contrary.
provision
decedent's
written
interest.
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to pay all claims in full (i.e., the estate is insolvent),
claims are to be paid in the following order of priority:
(1) costs and expenses of administration,
(2) funeral expenses,
(3) debts and taxes with preferences under
federal laws and other laws of Kentucky,
(4) all other claims. KRS 396.095(1).
b. Claims of the same class are to be paid on a
prorata basis. Matured claims are not entitled to preference
over unmatured claims of the same class. KRS 396.095(2).
Comments (1) The above rules apply only
to unsecured claims. Secured claims, to the extent of the
security, are to be satisfied first.
(2) Costs of administration
and funeral expenses are no longer given equal priority. Costs
of hospital services provided within 1 year of the decedent's
death are no longer entitled to any priority.
12. Secured Claims. Secured claims are to be paid on
the basis of one of the following:
a. if the creditor surrenders his security, the
amount of the claim allowed,
b. if the creditor exhausts his security before
receiving paYment, unless precluded by other law, the amount of
the claim allowed less the fair value of the security, or
c. if the creditor does not have the right to
exhaust the security or has not done so, the amount of the claim
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b.
certain before
representative
representative
following ways:
allowed less the value of the security.
For purposes of Subparagraph c above, the value of the security
may be determined by conversion of the security into money or by
agreement, arbitration, compromise or litigation. KRS 396.105.
Comment Unless the security is worthless, it is
unlikely that a creditor will ever choose to surrender his
security even if his claim has been allowed by the personal
representative. In doing so, the creditor would forfeit, to the
extent of the value of the security, his priority for payment
over unsecured creditors.
13. Unmatured, Contingent and Unliquidated Claims.
a. If an unmature, contingent or unliquidated
claim matures or becomes certain before distribution of the
estate, and the claim has been allowed, it is to be paid as any
other matured and absolute claim which has been allowed. KRS
396.115(1).
If the claim does not mature or become
distribution of the estate, the personal
or the court on petition of the personal
or claimant may provide for payment in any of the
(1) if the claimant consents, he may be paid
the present or agreed value of the claim taking any uncertainty
into account, or
(2) an arrangement for future payment on a
happening of the contingency or liquidation of the claim may be
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made by creating a trust, giving a mortgage, obtaining a bond or
security from a distributee or otherwise. KRS 396.115(2).
under prior law of the personal representative to force ther
Comments (1) The Act eliminates the right
fill
I
r
r
payoff of an unmatured claim without the consent of the
claimant. The Act also provides additional flexability to the
parties and the court in dealing with the problems presented by
unmatured, unliquidated and contingent claims.
(2) In dealing with an unmatured,
may choose to keep the estate open until a claim has matured or
the personal representative may deduct any counterclaims which
14. Deduction of Counterclaims. In allowing a claim,
"arrangement" with a creditor.
(3) The personal representative
However, the ability of the personal
seeking court approval of any agreed
absolute.
consider
unliquidated or contingent claim,· the personal representative
becomes
representative to do this is now limited by the right of the
creditor to petition the court for a protective arrangement.
should
r
r
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r
the estate has against the claimant. In determining a claim
against the estate, a court may also deduct counterclaims and
r
r
award judgment in favor of the estate where the counterclaims
are found to exceed the amount of the allowed claim. For this
purpose, the personal representative or the court may take into
,.
,
account all counterclaims of the estate, whether or not they
arose from a transaction other than that upon which the claim is
r
,.
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counterclaim may give rise to
that sought in the claim. KRS
The personal representative should
approval of any compromise agreement
or not the
kind from
based, and whether
relief different in
396.125.
15. Execution on Estate Assets Prohibited. Property
of the estate is exempt from execution or levy. However, this
rule does not apply to prevent the enforcement of any mortgage,
pledge or lien. KRS 396.135.
16. Compromise of Claims. The personal representative
may compromise any claim if it appears in the best interest of
the estate. KRS 396.145.
Comment
consider obtaining court
reached with a claimant.
17. Encumbrances.
a. If the assets of the estate are encumbered by
mortgage, pledge, lien or security interest, the personal
representative may pay the encumbrance or any part thereof,
renew or extend any obligation secured by the encumbrance or
conveyor transfer the assets to the creditor in full or partial
satisfaction of the lien. However, the personal representative
may do so only if it appears to be in the best interest of the
estate. The holder of the encumberance need not have presented
a claim. KRS 396.155.
b. PaYment of an encumbrance does not increase
the share of the distributee entitled to the encumbered assets
unless the distributee is entitled to exoneration. KRS 396.155.
r
r Comment The Act essentially leaves the issue of
exoneration for determination under common law and the statutory
exoneration, see Merritt, 2 Kentucky Practice Sec. 1417 (2d edr
laws of contribution. For a discussion of the subject of
1984).
18. ~ecovery of Overpayment. If a personal
r
r
representative overpays a creditor or distributee due to a
mistake as to the solvency of the estate or otherwise, he may
recover from the creditor or distributee the amount of the
r
overpayment with interest. KRS 396.165.
19. Administration in More Than One State.
a.All assets of an estate being administered in
wherever appointed. KRS 396.175(1).
claimant whose claim has been allowed either in Kentucky or
then after satifaction of such exemptions and allowances, each
existing or established against the personal representative
to all claims, allowances and chargessubject
b. If the estate either in Kentucky or as a
by the law of the decedent's domicile and all claims,
insufficient to cover all exemptions and allowances
areKentucky
whole is
elsewhere is entitled to receive payment of an equal proportion
of his claim. If a preference or security in regard to a claim
determined
is allowed in another jurisdiction but not in Kentucky, theri
r
I
r
r
r
r
creditor so benefited is to receive payment out of the Kentucky
r
estate only on the balance of his claim after deducting the
amount of the preference or security. KRS 396.175(2).
r
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396.185(2).
c. If all exemptions and allowances determined
under the law of the decedent's domicile and all claims exceed
the value of the Kentucky estate and Kentucky was not the state
of the decedent's domicile, then claims allowed in Kentucky are
to be paid their proportionate share (determined under the rules
above) to the extent possible out of the Kentucky estate. Any
assets remaining are to be remitted to the domicillary personal
representative. KRS 396.175(3).
20. Liability of Personal Representative.
a. Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a
personal representative is not individually liable on a contract
entered into in his fiduciary capacity unless he fails to reveal
his fiduciary capacity and identify the estate in the contract.
KRS 396.185(1).
b. A personal representative is not individually
obligations arising from the ownership or control of
or for torts committed in the course of
unless he is personally at fault. KRS
liable for
the estate
administration
c. Claims based on contracts entered into by a
personal representative in his fiduciary capacity, on
obligations arising from the ownership and control of the estate
or on torts committed in the course of administration may be
asserted against the estate by proceeding against the personal
representative in his fiduciary capacity. KRS 396.185(3).
d. Issues of liability between the estate and
r
!'
r the personal representative may be determined in a proceeding
r'j for accounting, surcharge, indemnification or other appropriate
r
proceeding. KRS 396.185(4).
21. Right of Claimant to Proceed Against Distributees
on Undischarged Claim.
distributed, an unsatisfied creditor whose claim has not beenr
a. After assets of an estate have been
r
barred may institute a proceeding against one or more of the
distributees of the estate. KRS 396.195.
b. A distributee is not liable for amounts
amounts in excess of the value of his distribution as of the
satisfaction of the spousal exemption under KRS 391.030) or for
time of distribution. KRS 396.195.
r
r
r
received as exempt property (e.g., property distributed in
would have been entitled to receive had the claim been satisfied
entitled to contribution from each of the other distributees to
whom he had given notice of the claimant's demand. The notice
must have been given in sufficient time to allow the distributee
to join in the proceeding in which the claim had been asserted.
The right of contribution is based on what each distributee
who satisfies a claim isdistributeeAc.
r
i
r
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r
in the course of the administration of the estate. KRS 396.195.
22. Statute of Limitations Applicable to Claims After
Settlement of Estate.
a. No cause of action on any claim not otherwise
barred by (a) the failure to timely present the claim, (b) the
r
r A-19
operation of the 60 day limitation period on a disallowed claim,
or (c) the operation of any other applicable statute of
limitations, may be brought against the personal representative
or any distributee after the expiration of 2 years from the date
of the order of discharge of the personal representative. KRS
396.205.
Example The applicable statute of limitations
has not run on a claim after the decedent's death. The claimant
properly and timely presents his claim to the personal
representative or files the claim with the clerk of the court.
The claim is allowed (either by the personal representative
giving notice of allowance, or by the personal representative
failing to take action on the claim within 6 months and 60 days
of his appointment), but is not paid; or the claim is disallowed
by the personal representative, but the notice of disallowance
does not warn the claimant of the 60 day limitation period on a
disallowed claim. The claimant may commence an action on the
claim at any time prior to 2 years from the discharge of the
personal representative.
b. The above limitation does not apply to an
action by any claimant against the personal representative for
fraud, misrepresentation or inadequate disclosure related to the
settlement of the decedent's estate. KRS 395.205.
Comments (1) The statute increases the
period of limitation for bringing an action against the personal
representative after the date of his discharge from 1 to 2
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years.
(2) Because the limitation period
against the personal representative and the distributee.is now
r
t incorporated into KRS Chapter 396, the former limitation
r
r
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1
r
r
provisions of KRS 413.200 and 413.210 have been repealed.
(3) In providing that the 2 year
limitation period is in addition to all other limitation periods
imposed by KRS Chapter 396, the new statute is consistent with
the holding of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Morris v. Derry,
685 S.W.2d 199 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
23. Effective Date; Impact on Existing Estates. The
new statutes dealing with creditor's claims against a decedent's
estate become effective on July 15, 1988, and will thereafter
apply to all estates irrespective of when the decedent died.
the appointment of the personal representative to "prove" his
law will affect claims pending against such estates:
a. Under prior law a claimant had 1 year from
r
t
r
r
r
Since the
existence,
new statutes will apply to estates already in
a number of questions are raised as to how the new
claim.
claim.
Under new law the claimant has 6 months to present his
If the 6 months has already expired by July 15, 1988, is
r
r
the claimant precluded from asserting his claim? While the
answer is not entirely clear, it appears that the Kentucky
courts would take the position that the claimant would be given
a reasonable time after the effective date to present his
r
r
claim. See, Heath v. Hazelip, 167 S.W. 905 (Ky. 1914); Crawford
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v. v. & C. Coal Co., 432 S.W.2d 403 (Ky. 1968). See also, 51
Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions Sec. 38-39 (1970).
Comments (1) In determining what is a
reasonable time, a court should take into consideration the fact
that published notice to creditors already contained a statement
that creditors should file their claims with the personal
representative within 6 months of appointment. In addition, the
court should consider the fact that the public has been on
notice of the pending change in the law since March 24, 1988,
the date that Senate Bill 8 was signed by the Governor.
(2) In most cases, the issue
addressed by Paragraph a above will be moot since the creditor
did not receive actual notice of the appointment of the personal
representative. See discussion in Paragraph B below.
b. Under prior law, a claimant could bring an
action on an otherwise unbarred claim within 1 year from the
date of discharge of the personal representative. Under new
law, the claimant has 2 years in which to bring such action. If
on July 15, 1988, 1 but not 2 years has passed since the
discharge of the personal representative, maya claimant take
advantage of the extended period of limitations? The answer
appears to be no. See, Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669 (6th Cir.
1981); Kiser v. Bartley Mining Co., 397 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1965).
c. The personal representative rejects a claim
prior to July 15, 1988, but does not warn the claimant of the 60
day limitation period on the rejected claim. The new law
A-22
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requires notification of the impending bar in order for the 60
day limitation period to be effective. No action is filed on
the rejected claim within 60 days of the rejection. Is the
claim barred? Presumably the claim would be barred if the 60
day period expired prior to the effective date. The answer is
less clear when the 60 day period has not expired by the
effective date.
d. The estate is insolvent and the personal
representative has paid certain claims before July 15, 1988 in
reliance on the order of priority assigned to such claims under
prior law. The estate remains open on July 15, 1988 and the new
law assigns a different order of priority to the claims. What
affect does the new law have on the claims already paid and on
the claims remaining to be paid? The law in effect at the time
the claim is paid should govern the priority of payment.
B. Notice to Creditors.
1. Under the Kentucky statutes, the only required
notice to creditors informing them of the appointment of a
personal representative and of their obligation to present
claims against the estate within the time period allowed under
KRS Chapter 396 is by publication. KRS 424.340, as amended by
1988 Kentucky Acts, Chapter 90 (SB 8), Section 28, provides that
the clerk of the probate court shall at least once each month
cause to be published in a newspaper meeting the circulation
requirements of KRS 424.120, a notice setting forth all
fiduciary appointments made since the last publication. The
A-23
notice must contain (a) the names and addresses of the decedent,
the personal representative and the attorney for the personal
representative, (b) the date of the personal representative's
appointment and (c) the date by which claims must be presented.
-The personal representative has no statutory duty to give notice
to creditors of their obligation to file a claim.
2. In April, 1988, the u.s. Supreme Court in Tulsa
Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 56 U.S.L.W. 4302 (U.S.
Apr. 19, 1988), held in the context of a non-claim statute
(i.e., a statute which imposes a time limit on the presentment
of a claim after the death of the debtor) that notice by
publication alone does not satisfy due process.
a. The Supreme Court found that the state's
involvement in the probate process, and in particular in the
appointment by its courts of the personal representative (which
starts the running of the period of limitation for the
presentment of a claim), was a significant enough state action
to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment. "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." In the
context of a non-claim statute, the Court interpreted this to
mean that if the identity of a creditor is known or "reasonably
ascertainable" by the personal representative, the creditor must
A-24
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r be given notice of the appointment of the personal
representative by mail or by such other means as is reasonably
r
calculated to provide actual notice. The failure to give such
notice renders inoperable the non-claim statute as to that
was not to require "impractical and extended searches in the
limited insight as to what steps the personal representative
must take to identify creditors. The Court stated its intent
r
r
r
·creditor.
b. The Supreme Court opinion offers only a
name of due process". "All that the [personal representative]
must do is make 'reasonable diligent efforts' to uncover the
identities of creditors. For creditors who are not 'reasonably
r
ascertainable' publication notice can suffice. Nor is anyone
who may conceivably have a claim properly considered a creditor
Collection Services involved a claim of a collection service
entered the hospital 5 months prior to his death and died while
with actual notice to those with mere 'conjectural claims.'"
subsidiary of a hospital for medical care expenses which had
been incurred by the decedent at the hospital. The decedent had
. [I]t is reasonable to dispense
(1) The facts in Tulsa ProfessionalComments
entitled to actual notice.
r
r,
r
r
still at the hospital. The decedent's wife was the executrix
r
r
and as pointed out by the Court "of course was aware that her
husband had endured a long stay at the hospital". Yet the Court
stated that it could not be determined from the record whether
the appellant was known to or reasonably ascertainable by the
r
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executrix, and remanded the case for a determination as to
whether "reasonably diligent efforts would have identified the
appellant and uncovered its claims". What if anything can be
learned from the Court's remand as to when a creditor is
-reasonably ascertainable?
(2) A number of questions are
raised by the Court's decision. For example: What constitutes
"reasonably diligent efforts"? If the personal representative
fails to give notice to a creditor who was known or could have
been reasonable ascertained, does he become personally liable to
the estate or beneficiaries if a claim is asserted after the
period for the original presentation of the claim has expired?
What is required of the personal representative where a creditor
becomes known shortly before the expiration of the time for the
original presentment of the claim?
(3) Notice by publication will
remain essential to cut off claims of creditors not identifiable
by a reasonably diligent search.
C. Descent and Distribution.
1. Determination of Heirship. 1988 Kentucky Acts,
Chapter 90 (SB 8), Section 2 adds a new section to KRS Chapter
391 to authorize a proceeding in district court to determine
heirship.
a. Whenever real or personal property passes by
intestate succession or under a will to a beneficiary not named
in the will (e.g. to a class of beneficiaries), the personal
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representative or any person claiming an interest in the
property may move the district court for a determination of all
persons entitled to such property. KRS 391.035(1).
b. If estate administration is pending, the
motion is to be filed in the district court where the
administration is pending. If there is no administration in
process or administration has been dispensed with, the motion
may be filed in the district court of the county in which the
decedent last resided, or if the decedent was not a Kentucky
resident, in the district court of the county in which the
property or greater part thereof is located. KRS 391.035(2)(a).
c. The motion must contain all facts known to
the movant relating to the matter including the names, ages and
addresses of all persons who are or may be entitled to share in
the property and the relationship of such persons to the
decedent or to the class of beneficiaries entitled to share.
The motion must also contain a description of the property and
an estimate of its value. KRS 391.035(2)(b).
Comment Presumably, the requirement that
the motion set forth the names, ages and addresses of all
persons who are or may be entitled to share in the property
imposes an obligation on the movant to make a reasonably
diligent search to identify all such persons.
d. The statute directs that the motion shall be
served in the manner authorized under the civil rules and shall
set forth the place and time not less than 20 days from the date
A~27
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unknown
to the
of service when the motion shall be heard. KRS 391.035(2)(c).
Comment While the statute does not
expressly provide for who must be served, presumably it would be
all persons potentially having an interest in the property as
well as the personal representative.
e. At the hearing on the motion, any person
claiming an interest in the property is entitled to introduce
proof in support of his claim and the court is expressly
authorized to entertain the admission of any other relevant
evidence. The hearing may not be conducted by a commissioner.
KRS 391. 035 ( 3 ), (9 ) .
f. Any "party" may at any time prior to
or any agrieved "party" may no later than 30 days from
of the judgment of the district court, institute an
proceeding in circuit court pursuant to KRS
KRS 391.035(6), (7).
Comment Presumably, the term "party" as
statute means any person who claims an interest in
It is unclear whether or not such party must have
asserted his claim in the district court
judgment,
the date
adversary
24A.120(2).
used by the
the property.
appeared and
proceeding.
g. The statute provides that any
defendants constructively served shall be entitled
protection afforded by CR 4.11. KRS 391.035(8).
Comment Civil Rule 4.11 provides that the
Court shall retain control over and preserve for 1 year after
r
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r
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the entry of judgment any property which the constructively
summoned party has been deprived thereby. Alternatively, the
successful party or parties may execute a bond. If no
proceeding to obtain relief from judgment is instituted by the
constructively served party within 1 year of the judgment, then
the property is to be disposed of in accordance with the
judgment.
2. Intestate Succession - Illegitimate Child
a. In 1978, the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1978) declared KRS
391.090, providing that a bastard child could inherit from his
father only if he had been recognized by the father or had been
legitimized through the marriage of his parents to each other,
to be invalid. The Court's decision was reaffirmed in 1982 in
Fykes v. Clark, 635 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1982). The statute was
repealed in 1986.
b. 1988 Kentucky Acts, Chapter 90 (SB 8),
Section 3 creates a new section of KRS Chapter 391 to replace
former KRS 391.090. The new section provides that for purposes
of intestate succession or wrongful death actions, if a
relationship of a parent to a child must be established to
determine succession by, through or from a person, a child born
out of wedlock:
(1) is a child of the natural mother; and
(2) is a child of the natural father, if:
(a) the natural parents participated in
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a marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even
though the attempted marriage was void,
(b) in determining the right of the
child or its kindred to inherit from or through the father,
-there has been either adjudication of paternity before the death
of the father, or an adjudication of paternity after the death
of the father based on clear and convincing proof, or
(c) in determining the rights of the
father or his kindred to inherit from or through the child,
there has been an adjudication of paternity before the death of
the child, or there has been an adjudication of paternity after
the death of the child based on clear and convincing proof and
the evidence in such adjudication shall have demonstrated that
the father openly treated the child as his and did not follow a
consistent policy refusing to support the child on the ground of
non-paternity. KRS 391.105.
3. Spousal Exemption. 1988 Kentucky Acts, Chapter 27
(SB 77) amends KRS 391.030 to reinstate a provision making
available the $7500 spousal exemption in cases where a decedent
dies testate and the surviving spouse renounces the will. Prior
to 1974, the exemption under KRS 391.030 was available in the
event of renunciation. However, in 1974 the language in the
statute authorizing the exemption in such cases was removed. It
was reinstated in 1976 and removed again in 1982. After the
removal in 1982, there was some confusion as to whether the
removal had been intentional by the Legislature and whether the
A-30
J
J
J
J
J
J
.J
JII
j
;1
JiI
A
a'.~~
~II
J
~
~II
'.I
~
\1
iI
J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
i
r
r
r
r
exemption in the event of a renunciation could be implied from
the general language of the statute anyway. Such confusion was
eliminated by Brown v. Sammons, 743 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1988) in
which the Kentucky Supreme Court held the exemption was
unavailable in the event of a renunciation absent express
statutory authorization. The Act also amends KRS 391.030 to
make clear that the $7500 spousal exemption applies in cases
where the court, pursuant to KRS 395.455, dispenses with estate
administration and directs the transfer of the probate assets to
the spouse in satisfaction of the exemption (such a transfer can
be directed by the court without requiring the surviving spouse
to renounce the will).
D. Settlement Of Estates Informal Settlement. KRS
395.605(2) authorizes the filing of an informal settlement by a
personal representative if the settlement is accompanied by
verified waivers executed by all beneficiaries of the estate and
none of the beneificaries is under a disability. 1988 Kentucky
Acts, Chapter 90 (SB 8), Section 31 amends KRS 395.605(2) to
provide that no waiver need be obtained from a non-residuary
legatee who has received and receipted for his legacy. In lieu
of the waiver, a cancelled check or signed receipt evidencing
satisfaction must be attached to the settlement.
E. Wills Revocation By Subseguent Marriage. 1988
Kentucky Acts, Chapter 90 (SB 8), Section 4 amends KRS 394.090
to provide that a will shall not be revoked by a subsequent
marriage if the will expressly provides for the person who later
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becomes the spouse of the testator and such person is married to
the testator on the date of the testator's death.
F. Personal Representatives Actions Against. 1988
Kentucky Acts, Chapter 90 (SB 8), Section 5 amends KRS 395.270
to reduce from 5 to 2 months the period after the appointment of
the personal representative before which an action may be
commenced against the personal representative. The shortening
of the period was made in conjunction with the reduction of time
for the presentation of claims against an estate.
G. Fiducial Sale of Real Estate. 1988 Kentucky Acts,
Chapter 90 (SB 8), Section 1 amends KRS 389A.010 to clarify that
when a guardian or conservator of a person under legal
disability commences an action in district court for the sale of
real property belonging to his or her ward, a guardian ad litem
is required to be appointed to defend the interest of the minor,
and that service on the minor is to be made in accordance with
CR 4.04(3).
H. Division Of Land Between Co-Owners; Allotment of
Dower. 1988 Kentucky Acts, Chapter 227 (HB 650) amends KRS
381.135 to require that in an action for the division of land
between co-owners or for the allotment of dower or curtesy, any
survey of the land to be made in accordance with the
determination of division or allotment and any resulting legal
descriptions are to be performed and prepared by a registered
land surveyor. The Act also amends KRS 381.135 to require that
any such survey be certified by the clerk of the court along
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with the approved commissioner's report to the county clerk for
recording.
II. LEGISLATION IMPACTING ESTATE PLANS
A. Revised Model Business Corporation Act. The 1988
General Assembly enacted sweeping revisions to Kentucky's
statutes governing corporations. 1988 Kentucky Acts, Chapter 23
(HB 323) repeals the Kentucky Business Corporation Act (Chapter
271A) and replaces it with a new Chapter 271B patterned after
the American Bar Association's Revised Model Business
Corporation Act (1984). The Act is generally effective for all
Kentucky corporations on January 1, 1989. However, a
corporation may elect to be subject to the provisions of the Act
after July 15, 1988. Identifying the nature and scope of even
the most significant changes made by the Act is far beyond the
scope of this outline. However, several changes which impact
estate plans are discussed below:
1. Restriction on Transfer of Shares. The Act
expressly validates certain types of share transfer restrictions
contained in a corporation's articles of incorporation, by-laws
or in agreements between or among shareholders and the
corporation. A transfer restriction may generally be imposed
for any reasonable purpose. The types of restrictions
permissible under the statute vary from absolute prohibitions on
transfers, such as restrictions necessary to avoid securities
law violations or termination of a Subchapter S election, to
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persons, if
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as those found in buy-sell, right
agreements. Specifically, a
or registration of transfer of
c. require the corporation, the holders of any
class of its shares, or other person to approve the transfer of
the restricted shares, if the requirement is not manifestly
unreasonable, or
d. prohibit the transfer of
shares to designated persons or classes
prohibition is not manifestly unreasonable.
Authorized transfer restrictions are valid and enforceable
against the holder of the restricted shares and any transferee
of such shares if the holder or transferee has actual knowledge
of the restriction or the restriction is noted conspicously on
the share certificate. KRS 271B.6-270.
Comment Contractual agreements imposing stock
transfer restrictions are widely used in estate plans involving
stock in a closely held corporation. The Act generally codifies
the common law rules regarding the enforceability of such
contractual restraints, such
of first refusal and option
restriction on the transfer
shares may without limitation:
a. obligate a shareholder first to offer a
corporation or other persons (separately, consecutively or
simultaneously) an opportunity to acquire the restricted shares,
b. obligate the corporation or other persons
(separately, consecutively or simultaneously) to acquire the
restricted shares,
r
r agreements.
acquire the corporation's unissued shares unless the articles of
comments note that corporations having preemptive rights on the
provided for preemptive rights in the absence of a provision to
reversal of the position taken by former KRS 271A.130 which
KRS 27lB.6-300. This is a complete
the contrary in the articles of incorporation. The committee
2. Preemptive Rights. The Act provides that
shareholders of a corporation do not have preemptive rights to
incorporation so provide.
r
r
r
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r
date of the Act will not lose them until the
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effective
corporation amends its articles of incorporation and
some estate plans to assure that a shareholder maintains the
specifically eliminates such rights.r
r
Comment Preemptive rights may be important in
after the effective date of the Act, care should be taken to
qualification for certain estate tax benefits or elections.
Where this is important in the context of a corporation formed
preemptive rights are reserved in the articles of
necessary forownership
The Act eliminates the former
stockof
Stock Redemptions.
percentages
3.
threshold
incorporation.
insurer
r
r
r
restriction under KRS 271A.030 that a corporation may acquire
its shares only to the extent of unrestricted and unreserved
be satisfied before any distribution (defined to include stock
earned surplus.
First, aby a corporation.madebe
The Act imposes two tests, both of which must
mayredemptions)
r
r
r
r
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distribution may not be made if after making the distribution
the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they
became due in the ordinary course of business ("equity
insolvency test"). Second, a distribution may not be made if
after the making of the distribution the corporation's total
assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus
distribution preferences of senior equity securities ("balance
sheet test"). For purposes of determining qualification under
the balance sheet test, assets are permitted to be valued at
fair value. In the case of a redemption, the balance sheet test
is to be applied on the earlier of (a) the date money or other
property is transferred or debt is incurred by the corporation
to acquire the redeemed shares, or (b) the date the shareholder
ceases to be a shareholder with respect to the acquired shares.
KRS 271B.6-400.
Comment Estate plans often involve stock
redemptions (e.g., buy-sell agreements requiring the corporation
to purchase the shares of a deceased shareholder, Section 302
stock redemptions, etc.). Such plans must consider whether a
corporation will be able to satisfy the statutory requirements
to acquire or redeem its own shares. The new tests imposed by
the Act generally relax the qualification requirements making it
easier to redeem stock. This will be helpful particularly in
planning for the redemption of a major stockholder of a closely
held corporation.
4. Capital Structure. The Act abandons the
A-36
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traditional distinctions between "conunon stock" and "preferred
stock" and completely eliminates the concepts of par value,
stated capital and capital surplus. The Act allows a
corporation to authorize through its articles of incorporation
'''classes of shares" whose rights and preferences may vary
significantly. The flexible approach to structuring the capital
of a corporation taken by the Act permits a variety of new types
of shares such as callable conunon stock (i.e., shares of voting
stock without preferential rights which are redeemable at the
option of the corporation), "puttable" shares (i.e., shares
which are manditorily redeemable at the option of the
shareholder) and "upstream convertible" shares (i.e., shares
which are convertible into a class of shares having superior
rights and preferences or into debt securities). KRS
271B.6-010.
Conunent The additional flexibility afforded to
corporations in the planning of its capital structure offers the
creative estate planner new tools in planning for such things as
shifts in control and estate freezes through recapitalization.
B. Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. The 1988
General Assembly also enacted sweeping revisions to Kentucky's
law governing limited partnerships. 1988 Kentucky Acts, Chapter
284 (HB 582) repeals the Kentucky Uniform Limited Partnership
Act and replaces it with new statutes patterned after the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1985). As with the
Revised Model Business Corporations Act, identifying the nature
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retains
exercise
settling
including
and scope of even the most significant changes made by the Act
is far beyond the scope of this outline. However, some of the
changes which impact estate plans are discussed below:
1. Dissolution on Death of General Partner. The Act
provides that an "event of withdrawal" of a general partner will
result in the dissolution of the partnership unless (a) at the
time of withdrawal there is at least one other general partner
and the partnership agreement permits the business of the
partnership to be carried on by the remaining general partner
and that partner does so, or (b) within 90 days after the
withdrawal all partners agree in writing to continue the
business of the limited partnership and to appoint one or more
additional general partner(s) if necessary or desired. KRS
362.487(4). The term "event of withdrawal" is defined to
include the death of a general partner.
Comment Estate plans involving limited
partnerships must take into consideration the possible adverse
consequences resulting from the dissolution of the partnership
on the death of a general partner. The Act specifically
authorizes two means by which a partnership may be continued
without dissolution.
2. Rights of Estate of Deceased Partner. The Act
from prior law the right of a personal representative to
all of the deceased partner's rights for purposes of
the estate or administering the decedent's property,
any power the partner had to give an assignee the
A-38
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right to become a limited partner (note the term "substituted
limited partner" is no longer used). KRS 362.485.
Query Absent any provision in the partnership
agreement to the contrary, the new Act provides to a
'''withdrawing'' partner the right to receive, within a reasonable
time after withdrawal, the fair value of his interest in the
partnership. KRS 362.467. Since the death of a general partner
is considered an "event of withdrawl" (see discussion in
Paragraph 1 above), is the estate of a deceased general partner
entitled to excercise this right to receive fair value absent
the dissolution of the partnership?
C. ~entuckY Tax Amnesty Act. 1988 Kentucky Acts, Chapter
322 (HB 856) directs the Revenue Cabinet to conduct a tax
amnesty program during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1989.
The program, which is to run fora period of 60 to 120 days,
extends to a broad range of taxes administered by the Revenue
Cabinet including inheritance and estate tax, fiduciary income
tax and omitted intangible property tax.
1. The tax amnesty program is to apply to tax
liabilities for taxable periods ending or transactions occurring
prior to December 1, 1987. KRS 131.400(4).
2. Generally to qualify, a taxpayer must:
a. file an application for amnesty within the
time prescribed by the Revenue Cabinet,
b. file completed or amended returns for all
years or tax reporting periods as stated on the application for
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which returns have not been previously filed or for which the
tax liability was unreported, and
c. pay in full the taxes and interest due for
the periods and taxes applied for at the time the application or
amnesty returns are filed. KRS 131.420(1).
3. A taxpayer may participate in the program
irrespective of the fact that an audit is pending or the amount
due has been assessed or that a demand for paYment has been made
or that the amount due is subject to a pending administration or
judicial proceeding, but may not participate if subject to a
criminal investigation. KRS 131.410(2), 131.420(2)
4. For taxes which are owed as a result of the
non-reporting or unreporting of tax liabilities, or the
non-paYment of any account receivable owed, the state will waive
criminal prosecution and civil penalties for the taxable years
or periods for which amnesty is requested, plus 1/2 of any
interest due on the unpaid tax. KRS 131.410(1).
5. After the expiration of the amnesty period, the
Act imposes stiff penalties for non-compliance.
a. A 20% "collection fee" is imposed on "all
taxes which are or become final, due and owing to the cabinet
for any reporting period, regardless of when due." KRS
131.440(1) .
b. A 20% "collection fee" is imposed on "taxes
which are assessed and collected for taxable years ending or
transactions occurring prior to December 1, 1987." KRS
A-40
deficiency for any previous tax period for which amnesty was
available but for which the taxpayer failed to file a return
r
r
r
".
r
131.440(1).
c. A 50% "collection fee" is imposed on any tax
intent to evade tax. KRS 131.445(2)(b).
during the amnesty period. KRS 131.440(1).
f. A taxpayer who willfully fails to make a
the tax, is guilty of a class D felony. KRS 131.445(3).
imposed on any taxispenalty50%Ae.
d. A 5% penalty is imposed on any tax deficiency
the statutes or regulations but without the intent to defraud.
if any part of the deficiency is due to intentional disregard of
KRS 131.445(2)(a).
deficiency if any part of the deficiency is due to fraud or
pay taxes owing or collected, with intent to evade payment of
6. The penalties described in Paragraph 5 above are
in addition to all other penalties and charges prescribed by
return, or willfully makes a false return, or willfully fails to
law. The Secretary of Revenue is given the authority to waive
any penalty or collection fee when it is demonstrated that any
,..
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deficiency was not due to negligence, intentional disregard of
rules and regulations or fraud. KRS 131.440(2).
III. PROBATE LEGISLATION INTRODUCED IN THE 1988 SESSION WHICH
DID NOT PASS
A. Living will (HB 595).
r
r A-41
B. Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act (deleted from SB
8 in interim session).
C. Provision authorizing and establishing procedure for
proposed final settlement (deleted from SB 8).
D. Provision to increase inheritance tax deduction for
funeral expenses to $7500 (HB 33).
E. Provision to extend custodianship under Uniform
Transfers to Minors Act to age 22 (HB 499).
F. Provision to prohibit capital stock of bank or trust
company from being accepted as security for fiduciary bond where
cumulative amount of such entity's bonds exceed the net worth of
such entity (HB 529).
G. Provision to effect that submission by fiduciary of
proposed transaction for review by a court shall constitute
compliance by fiduciary with applicable standards of fiduciary
care in regard to that transaction (HB 783).
H. omnibus income tax revision including amendment to
raise minimum income filing requirement of fiduciaries to $3,000
(HB 790, HB 949).
I. Alternative provision to enacted statute under SB 8 to
establish rules for intestate succession in cases involving
illegitimate children (HB 825).
J. Provision requiring Revenue Cabinet to complete asset
appraisals within 90 days of receipt of inheritance tax return
(SB 84).
A-42
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Avoiding Malpractice Claims
That Arise Out of Common
Estate Planning Situations
By GERALD P. JOHNSTON
r
,.
f
r
r
r
r
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r
r
r
The author believes that the prudent estate
planner should learn to practice defensive law;
he offers a number of suggestions to reduce
.the risk of malpractice daims.
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I. Introduction-The Omnipresent
Threat of Malp,ractlce
The threat of legal malpractice has become
very real in the last 10 or 15 years. While all
private practitioners have an ever increasing ex-
posure to malpractice claims, estate planning is
one of the areas where risks are the greatest.1
As a consequence, the prudent estate planner
should learn to practice defensive law and take
precautionary steps to minimize the number
and extent of future malpractice eJaims. More-
over, the same malpractice risks which present
a threat to the" attorney apply with equal force
to other estate planning professionals, such as
accountants, trust officers, life insurance under-
writers, and financial planners.-
I Kirsch, "A Chanring Insurance Gante Threatens
Lawyen," S ColiftWflUJ lA:rt:1" 30,33 (July 1985); Stem
I: Felix-Retzke, if P.""ctictll Gvidt 10 Prt:'lltntill{1 Lt{/QI
Mol",«tict 13.08 (McGraw-Hili 1983); Avery I: A131Jen,
IIWanaring an £State Planning Practice to Avoid Mal-
practice," E.stlllt Pliurwillo-198J 1·404 (U. C. L. A.-Cal.
C. E. B.); llallen I: Levit, u!1ol MoI~radicc5620 (West,
2d ed. 1981); Avery, 1111 It Safe To Be an E!ltate Plan-
ner?," 16 L4w 08ic, ECOffOmicl b Aftmllgnnnzt 240 (1975):
Eckhardt, "'The £State Planning Lawyer's Problems:
Malpractice and Ethics,· 8 llitlmi IrutittIJt 01. Estatt
PlaitiNg 174.600 (1974). .
I See Zillman, "Potential Liability of Corporate F,-
duciaries for Estate Planninl Erron," 124 T,.,uts. Ct
ulllttl 28 (June 1985); Johnston, "Legal Malpractice
in Estate PlanuUlC," 67 ItnlIG Low Rt:'IIinII 629, 701.()9
(1982).
There are a number of reasons that make
estate planners uniquely vulnerable to claims of
malpractice. While many fields of law are com-
plex, estate planning cuts across many different
areas. For example. an estate planner needs to
be proficient in property law. intestacy, wiUs and
trusts, probate administration, future interests,
state and federal income taxes, and state and
federal gift. estate, inheritance and generation-
skipping transfer taxes, to name just a few of
the more obvious ones. Thus, the difficulty of
practicing estate planning is greatly increased by
the need to be competent in a wide variety of
fields of law. And, of course, the greater the
complexity, the more opportunities for mistakes
and the greater the malpractice risk.
Often, practitioners and others engaged in
providing estate planning services are their own
worst enemies in terms of fostering malpractice.
There is a strong tendency among a substantial
number of estate planners to make the.ir services
available on a cut-rate basis.' Lawyers, for ex-
ample, wilI often bilI their estate planning clients
in an amount that does not even begin to cover
their overhead. Others engaged in estate plan-
ning, such as trust deparn:nents of banks and life
insurance salesmen, will provide substantial serv-
ices without charge. There are often good ex-
planations fOf these practices. An attorney ·may
charge modest fees for work in this area in order
to be competitive; or the practitioner may be
trying to build up his or her clientele and prefer
not to run the risk of frightening potential clients
off by higher fees; and, of course, many lawyers
often, practitioners and others engaged
in providing estate planning
services are their own worst enemies in
tenns of fostering malpractice
take the "loss leader" approach to billing for
estate planning with the expectation that the fees
that they win subsequently earn probating various
clients' estates will more than compensate them
for their earlier efforts in preparing wiUs and
trusts.4 Similarly, many banks will render estate
planning services without charge in the knowl-
.edge that a sufficient number of the people that
they advise wiU name the bank as executor or
trustee, and that the fees that wiU be earned as
fiduciaries more than justify their "largess" at
the outset.
The danger with such "loss leader" practices,
at least in the case of lawyers, is that the possi-
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biIity of receiving a substantial fee for probate
work in the future does not seem to provide
sufficient incentive to devote the amount of time
and effort that is required to do a thorough job
of estate planning and drafting. Thus, the ten-
dency to undercharge for such services often
results in efforts to minimize the amount of time
spent planning an estate, or in excessive dele-
gation by attorneys to paralegals and others in
the office whose hourly rates are more likely to
be covered by the amounts billed for estate
planning work. Thus, anticipated low billings
wiU often result in a reduction of attorney time
and effort, thereby increasing the chances for
mistakes.
the danger of uloss leader" practices,
at least in the case of lawyers, is that the
possibility of receiving a substantial
fee for probate work in the future does
not seem to provide sufficient incentive to
devote the amount of time and effort
that is required to do a thorough job of
estate planning and drafting
There are other significant fae;tors· which tend
to make an estate planning practice particularty
wlnerable to malpractice claims. For example,
wiUs are generally subject to close scrutiny in
a way that other important documents, such are
contracts, are not. A will, for instance, must be
admitted to probate in order to commence estate
administration, and in that process a determina-
tion must be made as to the validity of execution
and attestation. Once admitted to probate, the
wiU; which becomes a public document, is not
only reviewed by the executor, but may also be
scrutinized by others who have an interest, such
as beneficiaries named in the document; those
who expected to be included but were not; in-
dividuals who would have been heirs if the decedent
had died intestate (or who may become heirs
if the wiU is,efor any reason, invalidated); and
creditors of the" estate. In addition to a will's
inherent validity, any of these interested parties may
raise basic questions dealing with 'interpretation
• Kram, "Estate Planning: The Public's Perceptions &
Attitudes," 8 R,al Pro,"ty Probat, IJr Tnut It'UmlJ/ 489,
493 (1973); Tim,-Litt F_ily Ltgal GfIid, 39 (1971); Suss-
man, Cates & Smith, "Will lIaking: An E.umination
of Oient and Lawyer Attitudes," 23 F/0ritJ4 L4w R,-
vinD 25, 44 (1970).
• See, e. g., Sussman, Cates lit Smith, supra note 3,
at 43-50.
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and constrUction of the will's provisions. Finally,
preparation and filing of state inheritance and
federal estate tax returns may result in a review
of the underlying testamentary documents by the
executor, the attorney for the estate, and the
revenue authorities to determine the tax con-
sequences of a will's or a trust's provisions. Thus,
for example, the wording of the marital deduction
clause, as well as other terms of the will, may
affect an estate's entitlement to the marital de-
duction. As a consequence of the review of the
will by so many different persons for so many
different purposes, it is possible, even likely, that
any mistake or error committed in drafting, exe-
cution and attestation will come to light during
administration of the estate.
Other considerations also tend to make estate
planning a rather high-risk field in terms of mal-
i: practice~ exposure. Certain difficulties may be
. encountered in an attempt to prove a malpractice
claim against an attomey practicing in some otlur
area of the law. Take the classic malpractice case
in litigation, where the plaintiff's attomey inad-
vertently failed to file a complaint within the
limitations period. Proof of negligence under
such circumstances is relatively easy, but the
.. elements of causation and dama~s may present.'·
.ubstantial obstacles. The· malpractice claimant ~
is required to try "a ease within a ease" in order
to' PFove that if the action had been filed in a
timely manner, the underlying claim would have
~.1 been successfully prosecuted and a jury verdict
rendered· in the plaintiff's favor.' Thus, the ate,
tomey's failure to file the complaint was ·a proxi- '
met, elllU' of the claimant's dtJmag,s that would
not bave been incurred if the prior action bad
been properly pursued. By contrast, in many
instances of estate planning malpractice, causa- .
tion and damages are readily provable. Take,
for example, the analogous situation in estate ,
planning to the m~sed statute of limitations,
where the will that bas been prepared is not
properly attested.- Here, a· disappointed bene-
ficiary, who loses a legacy because of a mistake in
attestation, can easily demonstrate that if the
will bad been witnessed in the required manner,
he or she would have received tbe anticipated
bequest or devise. Proximate cause is obvious,
and damages are established by the value of the
legacy that would have been received.' Similarly, if
IOmething goes afoul in drafting provisions to
secure the marital deduction, and that significant
tax benefit is lost, proof of causation and damages
presents little problem.- Thus, in estate planning
a number of the t)'pical mistakes and errors that
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have occurred are relatively easy to prove, and the
filing of malpractice claims is thereby encClur:lged.
in estate planning a number of the
typical mistakes and errors that
have occurred are relatively easy to
prove, and the filing of malpractice
claims is thereby encouraged
In most areas of legal malpractice, the prh"
ity doctrine applies with considerable force, so
that only the original client who was in "privity"
with the lawyer in question is entitled to bring
suit for malpractice.' In contrast, in the area
of estate planning the courts have rather consis-
tently held that a disappointed beneficiary can
bring suit after the testator's death, even though
such person or entity had no prior relationship
with the defendant attomey. The consequences
of removal of the privity barrier are discussed in
more detail below,lO and the ohly point to be
noted here is the fact thnt the risk or malpractice
is enhanced· by expnnding the class or potential
plaintiffs beyond the party who received the
purportedly faulty legal services.
One final factor which increases the estate
planning malpractice· risk should be noted. Due
to the fact that wills generally lie dormant until
aSee CO~lin, "Attorney Ne~ligence .... A Suit
Within a Suit," 60 Wrsl Virginia Law R.-vic-.., 225 (1958);
Waite, "The Attorney's Liability for Ne~li~ence," 12
Varzdl."1'bi/1 Law HC':.irJl 755 (1959); "The Standnrd of
Proof of Cansation in Le~1 Malpractice Cases," 63
Co",~ll l.4TIJ Rn;c-oL' 666 (1978): L~'sick v. Wn[c(lfll. 65
Cal. Rptr. 406 (l96S); Cotm II. Girzsb,.ro. 509 P. 2d 1293
(Colo. 1973); Pipl."1' II. Grcrn, 216 III. App. 590 (1920):
Utterback-GI'tlson Co. t'. Sttmtlard AuidCflI /"s. Co. 184
N. Y. Supp. 862 (1920); JIKUOIJ II. Urban, 516 S. W. 2d
94S (Tex. 1974).
aSee, e. g., Binlta"ja II. Irvin!1, 320 P. 2d 16 «('al.
1958); Mickel t'. Mllrphy, 305 P. 2d 993 «('al. 19~7);
BlIcki,y fl. Gra)', 42 P. 900 (('.al. 1895); Licata t·. S/wtor.
225 A. 2d 28 (Conn. 1966); Woodfor/: tI. Salld.:r.f. 2~S So.
2d 419 (La. 1971); Go/diurg f'. Bor.mrtll. 215 N. Y. S.
2d 849 (961); Glly II. Litdcrbndl, 459 A. 2d 744 (Pa.
1983); Schi,.".,r II. N,tl,trndt. 288 P:lc. 205 (\\":lsh. 1930);
and AII"c II. COfJtUtmttll Cas. Cu., 331 N. W. 211 325 (Wis.
1983).
tId.
aBMCqwt II. Litoift(1slon. 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976):
LnliIJ II. Bt!f'lry. 728 F. 2d 551 (CA-l 19R.1). See also
Ho"" II. P"klaMfJ, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979) (nlalprac-
tice in establishinst Clifford tnlst).
a NGlioul Stwiltgs BIIM fl. Wcard, 100 U. S. 195 (1879) ;
JlKobstm II. O'::l."1's,as TtId,lai/, Cor!'., 11 F. R. D. 97
(E. D. N. Y. 1950); Mic.tl fl.; Jlurpl'J" 30S P. 2d 993
(Cal. 1957); Bllcki~ fl. Grtty. 42 Pac. 900 <Cal. 189:);
. Rost! II. DtIfIis, lSi'S. W. 2d 284 (Ky. 19·41); Kaml v.
Morr,II, 183 N. Y. S. 2d 928 (1959); Hakeria t'. Vall
S~Iuric., 12 N. Y. S. 2d 928 (1939). See lenerally 11:lJlcn
&: Levit, ugal M'JIlrtlCtie, II i'1-82 (West, 2d ed. 1981).
• See Na 783-85, wn. .
a testator's death, any mistake or error committed
by the draftsman may not be uncovered until
years later. Again, this is somewhat unique to
estate planning.ll Thus, an estate planner may
be responsible for his or her work product for a
much longer period of time than what is gen-
erally the case in other fields of law. This
unusual aspect of estate planning malpractice
will also be developed more fully below in con-
nection with a discussion of the tolling of the
statute of limitations until the mistake or error
has come to light.11 Because the risk factor is
thus extended in time, it becomes essential for
the prudent estate planner to maintain accurate
files and records for years longer than might
otherwise be necessary.
II. Demise of the Privity Barrier
Under a long-standing, well-established doc-
trine, the only person who had standing to bring
a legal malpractice suit was the cliept who had
initia~ly contracted for the legal services.1I This
rule was applied by the U. S. Supreme Court
in an analogous malpractice action in 1879,u and
it was thereafter adopted in the estate planning
setting to preclude disappointed beneficiaries from
bringing suit against the draftsman of a will
after the testator's death.u For over half a
century thisriJ1e remained well entrenched, and
as a consequence many lawyers benefitted from
strict &pp'lication of this privity barrier.
Some 25 years ago, the California Supreme
Court put the .first small chink in the lawyer's
protective armor. In 1958, the California court
held in Bi4kanja v. Irving 1. that a would-be bene-
ficiary under an invalid will could state a cause
of action against the notary public who prepared
the will. Any doubt about application of this
new rule to attorney-drawn documents, where
unauthorized practice would not be a factor, was
put to rest three years later when the California
Supreme Court rendered its now famous decision
in Lucas v. Hmnm." In Lucas, the drafting attor-
ney prepared a testamentary trust which violated
the rule against perpetuities. The cOurt reaffirmed
its holding in Bi4kan;a rejecting the privity doc-
trine, and substituted a balancing-of-factors test
to determine who, other than the original client,
had standing to bring a legal malpractice suit
against the attorney whose mistake had caused
the problem. In determining whether a third
party was entitled to initiate suit, a court under
this test would look to such factors as the extent
to which the attorney's services were intended to
benefit the third party in question; the foresee-
~bi1ity of harm to the plaintiff; the proximity of
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the attorney's error and the resulting injury; the
policy of preventing similar detrimental conduct
in the future; and the extent to which the allow-
ance of such causes of action would be an undue
burden on the legal profession.lI
The Biakan;a and Lucas decisions have been
widely followed in other jurisdictions.1t \Vhen
the balancing-of-factors test is applied in the
estate planning setting, disappointed beneficiaries
are uniformly allowed to bring suit against the
draftsman in spite of a lack of privity between
the parties.1o Some courts have shown a concern
that the balancing-of-factors test may open the
ftoodgates to too many nonclient malpractice liti-
gants, and have adopted a narrower, third-party
beneficiary exception to the privity requirement.21
While this more conservative approach may have
the effect of precluding malpractice claims in
other circumstances, beneficiaries, or at least
would-be beneficiaries, have consistently been
held to meet the more restrictive requirements,
and their claims against attorneys who have pre-
.pared defective wills have withstood attack.II
uSee, e. g., G"y ". Lwdn-boch, 459 A. 2d 744 (Pa.
1983) (will drafted in 1957; testator died in 1972; mal-
practice suit filed in 1976); BMcqllet ". Livingston, 129
Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976) (trusts for husband and wife pre-
pared in 1961; husband died in 1964 and wife died in
1969; malpractice suit filed in 1970). One area that is
analogous involves the search and certification of title
to real estate. There, a substantial'amount of time may
pass between the date the error was committed (e. g.,
failure to detect a lien during title search) and when
that error was discovered (e. g., years later when the
lien holder forecloses on the property). See Mllmford
t'. StGtcm, Whaley b Price, 255 A. 2d 359 (Md. 1969),
where the plaintiff had been required to surrender realty
she had purchased 12 years earlier in reliance on a
defective title search. See Ilenerally Mallen & Levit,
ugal Malp,-actice §§ 600-610 (West, 2d ed. 1981).
.. See pages 785-86, infra.
.. See cases and authorities cited in note 9. supra.
II NatitmGl SaJJings Bank t'. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 (18i9)
(suit brought against attorney for negligent certification of
title to realty by third party who relied on certificate
but who had not employed the attorney).
,. BMcklty ". GrGY, 42 Pac. 900 (Cal. 1895); Mickel
v. M"rphy, 305 P. 2d 993 (Cal. 1957); Mtmn"i ". Amodeo,
238 N. Y. S. 2d 302 (1963).
II 320 P. 2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
If 364 P. 2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
II Id. at 687-88.
.. See, e. g., Fickdt v. S,."mor COllrt, 558 P. 2d 988
(Ariz. 1976); Heyer ". Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1961);
LicatG ". Spector, 225 A. 2d 28 (Conn. 1966); Nud/uJln
'L'. Ha,niltcm, 459 A. 2d 1060 (Disl. of Col. 1983); McAbee
". Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1976); Ogle 't'. Ftliten,
<J66 N. E. 2d 224 (Ill. 198-J); Stntlart ". Sbn,.,.o, 362 A.
2d 581 (N. J. 1976); and Allrie ". ContilU!fltal CtIS. Co.,
331 N. W. 2d 325 (Wis. 1983).
.. See cases cited in note 19, supra.
II G"y t'. Liederbacl., 459 A. 2d 744 (Pa. 1983); Sttr.ue
t'. SII/ith, 441 A. 2d 81 (Conn. 1981).
II Sec cases cited in note 21, supra. But see Lor-
raine v. Gro"cr, Cill/Cllt, lI'einstein, 467 So. 2d 315 (Fla.
(Continued on following page.)
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A number of years ago New York made it
clear that the privity barrier would not be lowered
to permit suit against a will's draftsman by per-
IOns other than the testator." But several recent
decisions in New York have provided a strong
indication that that jurisdiction, too, may soon ,
be joining, the states that allow disappointed
beneficiaries to maintain suit in spite of a lack
of privity with the attomey-draftsman.
'
• Nebraska,
on the other hand, appears to be solidly in the
"privity" camp, and may be the only jurisdiction
that will continue to preclude suit in the will
drafting-disappointed legatee setting. In two re-
cent decisions involving malpractice claims filed
by such would-be beneficiaries, the Nebraska
Supreme Court unequivocally barred suit for lack
of privity without a moment's hesitation." It is
significant to note that there was no mention in
either case of the fact that the identical issue
had been resolved in favor of permitting suit in
numerous other jurisdictions, and it may be that
the Nebraska Court did not pay adequate atten-
tion to the strong movement away from privity
in virtually every other state that has considered
this precise will drafting issue in the last 2S years.
with the exception of Nebraska,
and possibly New York, disappointed
beneAciaries are now able to bring
malpractice claims against draftsmen of
defective wills or trusts
Thus, with the exception of Nebraska, and
possibly, New York, disappointed beneficiaries
are now able to bring malpractice claims against
draftsmen of defective wills or trusts. This precise
issue has been decided in many jurisdictions, and
there is little reason to believe that any different
result will be reached in the other states when
the question is presented."
Resolution of this issue seemingly has had
much less to do with a particular court's reaction
to the privity requirement as such than it has had
with the practical consequences of the application
of this barrier in these particular circumstances.
As several courts have indicated," since a mis-
take or error in a testamentary document generally
will not, because of its nature, be discovered
until after the testator's death, unless an erstwhile
beneficiary who has heen injured as a result of
the draftsman's mistake or error is allowed to
bring suit, no one will be entitled to relief.
In theory, at least, an executor or administrator
of the decedent's estate might be able to file a
malpractice claim against the erring attomey,"
aince the fiduciary is considered as sta~ding in
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the shoes of the decedent. The problem, how-
ever, is that any damages that might be recover-
able would be so modest that they would not,
in most cases, be worth pursuing. A personal
representative might be entitled to recover the
cost of will preparation if, as a result of faulty
drafting or supervision of. execution and attesta-
tion, the will was determined to he invalid." But
such measure of damages hardly provides suffi-
cient incentive to pursue a malpractice claim, no
matter how legitimate.
On the other hand, it seems clear that the
personal representative would not be entitled to
damages based on the value of a lost legacy. Sup-
pose, for example, that a testator executed a will
under which a nephew was to be left an entire
estate worth $100,000, to the exclusion of grand-
children who were issue of the testator's pre-
deceased children. If the will was not properly
witnessed, then at the client's death the estate
would pass by intestacy to the grandchildren.
Even if the nephew were precluded from bring-
ing suit because of a lack of privity, the ad-
(Foot'Mt~ 22 corUiftwd.)
App. 1985), where a Florida court refused to e'l:tend the
rule previously adopted in that juristfiction that excepted
a disappointed will beneficiary from the privity re-
quirement to a highly analoll'ous estllte planning situation
involvin~ an inter vivos transfer.
- In Marlni~. Amodto, 238 N. Y. S.2d 302 (1963), the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. specifi.
cally rejected the Binian;o and Lrual decisions. The
court in Victor ~. Goldmtm, 344 N. Y. S. 2d 672 (11)73),
reco\tT1ized the new trend in \\·hich attorne}'S could be
held liable to third parties in certain ciTcumstance~. and
referred to the "well-considered" rlecisions of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Bialtarlio lind Lrteal. but felt com-
pelled te follow the decision in VieJor ~. Goldman in the
draftsman-will beneficiary setting.
II See E.stat~ of Dm",lns, 42R N. Y. S. 2d 558 (1980);
and Bner ~, B"nder, 447 N. Y. S. 2d S3R (19~2).
- St, Ma",·', nll"rh af Sd/lryltr~, TOffU'lt, 325 N. W.
2d 1M (Neb: 1982); Lil)'horn ~. Dier, 335 N. W. 2d S54
(Neb. 1983).
- It should he noted, however, that a Mar)'lnnd
cOllrt reeentl~ side~tepped the privity iutle ill a case
involving a will that was attelledly drafterl in a nC'l;lil:'ent
manner. Ki"gtm ~. Pnrkl, 478 A. 2d 113 (Md. App.
1984). After reviewing the law in other jurisdictions in
considerahle depth. the Maryland COllrt decided the case
on anothu iSlue, and left for another day the decision
""'hether, in an appropriate case, the beneficiary of a
will can' maintain a lellal malpractice action in this
state aRainst the testator's attorney for nel:'lic:rence in
preparintr the will or in supervising its execution..• ,"
.,8 A. 2d at 718.
If~ If.• Gay If, Lin/triatla. 459 A. 2d 144 (Pa. 1983);
H~" ~. Flaig, 449 P. 2d 161 (Cal. 19(9).
• In H,," ~. F14ig, supra note 21, the court indio
cated that a testator is not injured as a consequence
of the neglip;ent preparation of a will "except to the
utent of fees paid" for "Ich work, and that "only the
beneficiaries lufTer the real loss." 449 P. 2d at 165.
-Gu, v. LUd,rbocla, supra note 27; H~,c" ~. Flaig,
lupra note 'Z1.
ministrator would not be entitled to recover
the $100,000 legacy as the measure of the damages
suffered by the decedent. Any other result would
be nonsensical, as such a $100,000 recovery would,
in the hands of the personal respresentative, have
to be distributed as an asset of the intestate estate
to the heirs-at-Iaw. Any suit by the administra-
tor would rebound only for the benefit of the
heirs, and not for the real party who was injured
by the attorney's negligence. Thus the heirs
would receive yet a second windfall-<me as a
consequence of the will's invalidity; the other
due to the administrator's recovery of the lost
legacy.
III. Tolling the Statute of
Limitations
Once courts began to hold that disappointed
beneficiaries could bring malpractice claims against
a will or trust draftsman without regard to a
lack 'of privity between the parties, a second sub-
stantial barrier faced such claimants. Just as in
the case with "privity," malpractice plaintiffs had
to overcome a well-entrenched statute of limita-
tions rule that had also served for years to pro-
tect attorneys from the consequences of their own
negligence. It had long been held that the statute
began to run in an action for professional mal-
practic,e at the time that the mistake.or error was
committed.'o In the case of estate planning, this
often meant that the applicable statute would
have run well before the testator's death, and
hence prior to the time that such a mistake or
error would come to light.11 Again, courts were
faced with a dilemma of providing a cause of
action based on malpractice, yet effectively negat-
ing such a right by imposition of a statute of
limitations which began to run at the time the
will or trust was defectively drafted.
By 1969, courts began to toll the statute of
limitations until, at least, the time of the testator's
death." Thus, a disappointed beneficiary would
• be given an opportunity to learn of the loss of
a legacy, and, presumably, the reason or reasons
for such loss. The principal theory adopted to
achieve this result was patterned on the "dis-
covery" rule utilized in medical malpractice, and
tolled the limitations period until the claimant
discovered or should have discovered the at-
torney's error." Numerous other jurisdictions
have followed this lead and applied the qiscovery
rule to the statute of limitations in cases arising out
of the drafting of wills or trusts.'· Other courts
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have arrived at a similar result by a slightly
different route, whereby the statute is tolled dur-
ing the period that the dient was continuing to
utilize the attorney's services."
In the last few years, some courts have
shown a relqctance to apply the discovery rule
in a broad manner which would entitle a third-
party claimant to recover a legacy many years
after the attorney-draftsman's negligence had
caused a defective instrument to be executed."
In one extreme example of judicial hesitancy to
permit the discovery rule to run its full course,
the Iowa Supreme Court in Millwright tI. Romer 17
determined that laymen are held to know the
law, even the rule against perpetuities, and as a
consequence a disappointed beneficiary was not
entitled to wait until conclusion of appellate re-
view of the validity of the bequest in question
before bringing suit against the draftsman of the
• See. eo g., Wilcor tI. Ph,"""tr, 29 U. S. (4 Pet.)
172 (1830): Alttr tI. Michael, 413 P. 2d 153 (Cal. 1966);
Bustonumte If. Hott, 35 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1963): Master
Mortgogt Cor,. tI. Bytrs, 202 S. E. 2d 566 (Ga. 1973):
MolfJNty tI. Grolumt, 171 Ill. App. 409 (1912); Sullivcm
tI. Stout, 199 A. 1 (N. J. 1938): Goldbtrg If. Bosworth,
215 N. Y. S. Zd 849 (1961).
• See discussion of this point in H~tr tI. Flaig, 449
P. 2d 161, 166 (Cal. 1969): see generally "The Com-
mencement of the Statute of Limitations in Lejtal Mal-
practice Actions-The Need for Re-Evaillation," 15
U. C. L. A. Law RtTMu,.23O (1967). .
• H~tr If. Floig, Dote 31, supra: d. Mumford tI.
StoiDfl, Wholty l!r Pritt, 255 A. 2d 359 (Md. 1969) (stat-
ute of limitations tolled in malpractice case involving
negligent certification of title until error discovered).
• See, e. g., M"mford v. SttltO'l, Whol"y l!r Price, note
32, supra; Wood"'ff If. Tomli'l. 511 F. 2d 1019 (CA·6
1915): Ntal If. MoglJM, Oillty, Levy, Cot/actlri l!r Gelfand,
491 P. 2d 421 (Cal. 1971); Dtntmi"g 71. Vniru, 228 So.
2d 622 (Fl App. 1969): Kohltr tI. Woollm, Braum l!r
HlJUIlew, 304 N. E. 2d 677 (III. ,App. 1973): Hendrickso'l
v. Stars, 310 N. E. 2d 131 (Mass. 1974); McKu tI.
RiordQfl, 366 A. 2d 472 (N. H. 1976): Family SaTJ. & Loan,
IftC. II. Ciccortllo, 207 S. E. 2d 157 (W. Va. 1974); d.
Morgcm If. GrGCt HOI~tol, I"c., 144 S. E. 2d 156 (W. Va.
1965) for an example of the classic application of the
discovery rule in a medical malpractice case.
• E. g., LevirI tI. Btrlty, 728 F. 2d 5S1 (CA-] 1984):
MillUTrigAt 11. RDfflW, 322 N. W. 2d 30 (Iowa 1982):
SUCCtSsiOfi of Killift!1SU1orth, 270 So. 2d 196 (La. App.
1972): JanIffIillo 11. Hood, 601 P. 2d 66 (N. M. 1979); and
Auric tI. CDflMnttol Cu. CD., 331 N. W. 2d 325 (Wis.
1983).
• This is known as the "continuous treatment" rule,
and it also has its genesis in medical malpractice deci-
SiODS. Under this approach, the statute does not begin to
run until the attomey-client relationship has terminated,
regardless of when the negligent act occurred. Kramtr
II. Belli, 482 N. Y. S. 2d 898 (1984): Grtent tI. Greme,
436 N. E. 2d 496 (N. Y. 1982): Siegtl fl. Krani.s, 288
N. Y. S.2d 831 (1968): KtlJltffl CD. If. Kollry, 271 N. E.2d
172 (Ohio 1971).
• See. e. g., Lt!fIi,. tI. Btrl~, 728 F. 2d 551 (CA-l
1984): Millwright fl. Romtr, 322 N. W. 2d 30 (Iowa
1982): and Jaromillo If. Hood, 601 P. 2d 66 (N. M. 1979).
II 322 N. W. 2d 30 (Iowa 1982).
J
I
1
I\~'.' .
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
:,'ia
r
r
r
r,
r
r
r
r
r
r
.. i
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
• t
instrument which violated the rule.1I In spite of
such indications that the discovery rule may be
applied more strictly by courts in the future, any
such tr~nd in the estate planning setting will
simply 'affect the amount of additional time ofter
the testator's death that the limitations period
would continue· to be tolled and will have no
impact on the tolling of the statute prior to the
date of the testator's death.
Other courts have begun to show some hesitancy
in allowing disgruntled beneficiaries to bring mal-
practice actions against attorney-draftsmen when
the wills in question do not indicate that a mis-
take or error has been committed. The Connecti-
cut Supreme Court's decision in Stowe v. Smith"
highlights this concern. There, the beneficiary
claimed that the terms of a testamentary trust
were < not accurately reflected in his deceased
mother's wilt: According to the son, the trust
remainder was to be distributed to him on his
fiftieth birthday, but a review of the will after
his mother's death indicated that the corpus
would be distributed directly to the son's u.rut
when. he reached SO. While upholding a cause of
action against the attorney-draftsman, the court
was careful to point out that "because no invalid-
ity appears on the face of the will, the present
case may very well present greater obstacles to
recovery than cases in which intended beneficiar- . .
ies brought actions against attorneys who pre-
pare~ ,ineffective wills.""
Courts, in at least two other jurisdictions
have been more emphatic in limiting legal mal-
practice actions in these circumstances. Inter-
mediate appellate courts in both Florida and
Maryland have recently held that disappointed
beneficiaries have no cause of action against the
attorney-draftsmen when the alleged mistakes
were not apparent on the face of the wills.n The
rationale of these courts is based on the pur-
ported need to preserve the sanctity of the statute
of wills and the long-standing doctrine that ex-
trinsic evidence should not be admitted where
the terms of a will are clear and unambiguous.
On the other hand, in upholding the right of a
disappointed beneficiary to bring suit against the
draftsman of a will, the Illinois Supreme Court
expressly rejected this same contention and held
that a legal malpractice action was not a collateral
attack on the underlying will u such. The Illinois
court thus allowed the admission of extrinsic
evidence to show that the attorney had negli-
pntly drafted the testamentary document, whether
or Dot the error was obvious 011 the face of the will."
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While some jurisdictions may still recognize
a few procedural barriers to estate planning mal-
practice claims, as the recent decisions in Florida
and Maryland illustrate, technical defenses based
on lack of privity and statutes of limitation have
been largely removed. Clearly, prudent estate
planning practitioners should not rely on technical
rules to shield them, but should adopt good office
practices and procedures, as well as maintain
substantive competence in the field, in order to
minimize the number and seriousness of potential
malpractice claims.
IV. Practicing Defensive Law-
Guidelines 10 Reduce Ihe Risk of
Islale Planning Malpractice
As outlined above, malpractice presents a
serious threat to the estate planner. But much
as the physician has resorted to the practice of
defensive medicine, so, too, should legal practi-
tioners take steps to protect their practices and
reputations. While the phrase "defensive medicine"
conjures up the spectre of unnecessary tests and
procedures that are in no way beneficial to good
medical treatment, this is not the case with
"defensive law." Many of the steps which are
recommended below are things that competent
estate planners should be doing anyway as a
matter of good practice for the benefit of their
clients. The fact that such procedures are also
effective to minimize the risk of future malprac-
ticeclaims is simply icing on the cake.
A. The Importance of Written Communi-
~tion..-At times, there may be some confusion
as to whether an attorney has entered into an
attorney-client relationship with a person who
may have casually mentioned an interest in hav-
ing a will or trust prepared." To clarify the
- It is, of course, difficult to reconcile the holding
in MiI/u";gJat ~. Rom",. 322 N. W. 2d at 33. that "every
citizen i. usumed to know the law" and, therefore.
"should have known that the will \iolatell the rule :llr.'inst
perpetuities," with the conclusion in Luca" v. Hall/IJJ,
364 P. 2d 685, 690 (Cal. 1961), that the rule ar:ainst
perpetuities is a technicality-ridlten Icgal nh:htmare.
fraught with confusion, and a trap for tlJe unwary drafts-
lnan, 10 that the violation thereof did not indicate negIi-
cence on the part of an attorney who drafted a will
which ran afoul of the mle.
-441 A. 2d 81 (Conn. 1981).
-Id. at 84.
e See D,MariI tI. "flli, 426 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. ,App.
1983); l.DrnJiM tI. G,t1IJ"., CiMnct, ~W,;JUt,in, 467 So. Zd
315 (FIa. App. 1985): and KirI- tI. Parkl, 478 A. Zd
713 (Md. App. 1984).
• 0011 tI. FrUtn, 466 N. Eo 2d 224 (III. 1984).
- See aenerally J(eGlofII tI. 1.«", 288 F. Supp. 662
(D• .s. D. 1968): H"..rtoa tI. WItit'I,ll, 348 So. 2d 10S4
matter, the attorney should write to the person
in question and either confirm that the assign-
ment will be undertaken, or indicate that no
such services are to be performed unless the
prospective client makes a more specific request.
Such an "engagement" (or "nonengagement")
letter is, of course, recommended procedure in all
areas of practice.··
Assuming that estate planning services are to
be rendered, the letter should outline the scope
of the employment, give an estimate of the amount
of time required for each task, and provide some
indication of the fee that the attorney will charge
for the work. The latter point is particularly
important because much client dissatisfaction can
be traced to unhappiness with the fee ultimately
charged, and that is often the result of poor
communication about fees at the outset of the
relationship.•,
At the conclusion of the estate planning
assignment, the attorney should also write to the
client, advise him or her that the work has been
completed, and indicate whether or not the at-
torney anticipates having a continuing relation-
ship with the client. In the absence of any
indication to the contrary, there is a good chance
that an attorney will be held to have an ongOing
. obligation after will or ·trust execution to advise
the client of any changes, such as modifications
of the,tax laws, that might affect the previous
estate plan.·' Even without a c9mmitment to
provide such'information, a court could well hold
that an attorney was liable for any loss attribut-
able to the failure to advise a present or former
client of a change in the law, on the grol1nd that
the attorney owed such a duty to the testator.·'
If the drafting attorney does not plan to contact
the testator about any such changes in the law,
the attorney could obtain valuable protection
against the possibility of a malpractice claim in
the future by writing a letter to the client at the
conclusion of the assignment indicating that the
attorney does flot plan to bring subsequent changes
in the law to the testator's attention, unless the
client specifically requests such additional, con-
tinuing services.
In fact, any time an estate planner gives
specific advice to a client that is not apparent
from the terms of a will or trust that has been
prepared, that advice should be confirmed in
writing. The facts inWard 'V. Arnold" serve to
illustrate the value of a written record whenever
advice is given. There, the plaintiff-spouse re-
tained the services of a lawyer to prepare a will
for her husband, who was hospitalized. Under
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the will, all of the testator's property was to be
left to the surviving spouse. However, the hus-
band's will, executed in the hospital, was not
witnessed. According to the surviving spouse's
allegations, when the attorney was subsequently
asked about the need for another wiU because the
first was not witnessed, the attorney advised that
a new will was unnecessary since all of the hus-
band's property would pass to the wife anyway
under the local intestacy laws. The husband sub-
sequently died without a will, and a portion of his
estate passed by intestacy to his brother, to the
surviving spouse's dismay. The court held that
such allegations stated a cause of action for legal
malpractice.
It seems unlikely, of course, that a lawyer
who had just prepared a will for a client would
tum around and give advice that no such will
was really necessary since the intestacy laws
would achieve the same result. Nevertheless, if
the attorney had documented the actual advice
that was given in a letter, such correspondence
might have served as a rather effective rebutt."l
of the surviving spouse's allegations. Without
such a letter, it would be simply the attorney's
word against the client's (or a benefici."r)' under
the client's will), and lawyers may not fare very
well in the eyes of a jury asked to resolve such
a factual dispute."
McAbee 'V. Edwards 10 simil:lrly illustrates
the value of a written record of advice given to
(Ala. 1971); Q,fDglin(l II. Qrcaglifto, ISZ Cal. Rptr. 47
(1979); BrlJlltllin t/. B~lcMr. 134 Cal Rptr. 1 (1977); Al~.t"­
artder II. Russo, 571 P. 2d 350 (Kan. 1977); and ROllnigl'tl
v. H"tog" 199 N. W. 2d 420 (Minn. 1972).
to Smith, Prr,mcting ugal Malpractice 2-5 (West
1981); Stem & Felbt-Retzke. A Practical Guide to Pr~­
ventirtg ugal Malpractice §§ 5.08-5.09 (McGraw-Hill
1983).
.. Smith, supra note 44. at 5-10; Stem & Felix-Ret-
zke, supra note 4~, at § 5.06.
.. ABA Formal Opinion 210 (1941) addresses the is-
sue of unethical solicitation when an attorney contacts
an estate planning client or fonner client ahout the
need for review and revision of ,,-ills that. were pre-
viollsly drafted because of changes in the law, economic
changes, or changes within the testator's family. The
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances
not only approved the propriety of such conduct, but
indicated that an attorney might have a "duty" to con-
tact testators in such circumstances.
.. See Johnston, "Legal Malpractice in Estate Plan-
ning," 67 1t1WfJ Ltr..u RC'IIit'W 629, 655-57 (1982).
• 328 P. 2d 164 (Wash. 1958).
• See, e. g., Bridgman, "Legal Malpractice-A Con-
sideration of the Elements of a Stron~ Plaintiff's Case:'
30 South Carolirta 1.afII RC'IIir..u 213, 216 (1979); Goulden,
The MilliD8 Dollar ~·n's 270 (1978); McCabe, "The
Lawyer as Target: Today's Client Is Tomorrow's
Plaintiff," 48 PnmsylwniIJ Bar Associatioft Quart,rly 525,
531 (1977).
• 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. App. 1976).
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a client. There, a cause of action was stated on
the basis of allegations that the attorney-drafts-
man advised his client that it was not necessary
to redraw a will after the client's marriage to
insure that the testatrix's daughter would remain
as the sole beneficiary. The testatrix got married,
did not revise her will, "and died shortly there-
after. Under Florida law the new spouse, having
not been specifically excluded under the prior
will, was held to be entitled to a portion of his
spouse's estate. Assuming that the attorney in
question was familiar with the applicable law,
then he should have put his advice in writing
when he was asked whether a revision of the will
was necessary or desirable.
Thus, it is highly advisable to maintain a
record, via written communications with the testa--
tor, of important events in the relationship, such
as the commencement and scope of the services;
~e completion of the assignment; and any legal
advice given to the client which is not obvious
from the face of the will Or trust. Such a record
could refresh a client's recollection (or indicate
to a disappointed beneficiary what actually tran-
spired), and could therefore serve as an effective
means of persuading a client or interested third
party of the futility of a malpractice claim. But
even· if suit were filed, the written record would.
serve as invaluable evidence to rebut any con!"
tention of erroneous advice aUegedly given to
the testator. ";
'h B.,The Need for Complete Information.-
It is axiomatic that a competent estate planner
should obtain and review complete information
with regard to .a client's family history, the nature
and extent of property interests, and other per-
tinent data such as pre- or post-nuptial agree-
ments, divorce decrees, trusts in which the client
has an interest, etc. Yet all too often an attorney
will prepare a will or trust for a client without
taking the time to collect and review this es-
sential information: "A recent case, Lily1stm& v.
[)iff',II serves to 'highlight the sort of problems
that may result when an attorney proceeds with-
out complete and accurate data from the client.
In Lil,1stm&, the plaintiff, a would-be bene-
ficiary, filed suit against the attorney who drafted
a will for his deceased mother under which the
testatrix purported to leave 240 acres to the plain-ti" when, in fact, Ibe owned only a life estate
in the property. ~ a consequence, the plaintiff-
IOn was effectively left out of the will, whereas
he contended that he would have shared equally
with his two sisters in the property interests that
the mother could transmit at death if the attorney
B-9
had properly advised the testatrix that her interest
in the 240 acres terminated at her death.
The need for the acquisition of complete
information from a testator is also illustrated in
Lorrtzin~ 'U. Grw,r, Cimmt, Weinstein.II In that
case, the drafting attorney failed to detect that
"the testator's residence was subject to Florida's
homestead law, under the terms of which the
property would pass at death to the testator's
minor child. Consequently, the will was totally
ineffective to devise a life estate in the residence
to the testator's spouse. If the attorney had
recognized that his client's estate contained prop-
erty that was subject to the homestead statute,
then it apparently would have been possible to
achieve the testator's objective of giving his
spouse a surviving life interest in the house by
an inter vivos tra~sfer.1I
If an estate planner does not take the time
necessary to collect, evaluate and verify data
relating to his client's property holdings, it is
entirely possible that the client will misdescribe
his or her assets, or the extent of the interest
therein, and the attorney drafting a testamentary
document under such circumstances may well
rely on inaccurate information. An unsophisti-
.cated client might well mistake a life estate for
ownership in fee, think that he or she owns cer-
tain property outright when in fact it is owned
as a joint tenant with right of survivorship, or
fail to describe real property as a residence which
would be subject to homestead Jaws. In any of
these cases, the attorney might draw a will that
specifically devised or bequeathed such property,
when in fact the interest terminated at death,
passed by survivorship, or was otherwise not
subject to the terms of the testator's will. An
instrument containing such an ineffective trans-
fer is certain to upset an intended legatee or
devisee, as it did in Lil,1&orn" and Lorrainl," and
disappointments caused by poor planning or drafts-
manship can easily result in a malpractice claim.
• 335 N. W. 2d 554 (Neb. 1983).
-467 So. 2d 315 (Pia. App. 1985). "
• Note, however. that the Florida appellate court
in lAmJiw upheld summary judcment apinlt the plain-
tiff-beneficiary Oft the lJ'Oundl that the alleptions of
nelli,ence reJatinl to the failure of the teltator's attor-
ney to IUlrgut an inter viVOI transfer to avoid Fiorida'i
homeltead law did not come within the limited exception
to the privity requirement. and that the aileled error
failed to appear on the face of the will.
• 335 N. W. ZdS54 (Neb. 1983). It should be noted
that the Nebraska Supreme CoUrt in LU,htlf"fS upheld
application of the privity doctrine in the draftsman-dis-
appointed beneficiary context, and thus affirmed the
crant of lummary judlftlent in the attorney's favor.
·467 So. 2d 315 (FIa. App. 1985).
If the drafting attorney obtains and reviews the
applicable title or certificate of ownership, the life
estate, joint ownership, or homestead interest
is likely to be uncovered, and a potentially costly
error will be avoided.
. . Other illustrations could readily be given of
slmt\ar attorney errors that can be directly traced
to the failure to obtain and review information
about the client, his or her assets, etc." Thus,
not only does good, competent estate planning
suggest the need for collection and review of such
information, but the practice of defensive law
further confirms the desirability of following
s~ch procedures. Furthermore, it is highly ad-
Visable for estate planners to retain such back-up
documentation in their files until well after a
dient dies. This can, admittedly, mean that such
data will have to be retained by the attorney for,
~any, many years if there is a long period of
time from will or trust execution until death, but
because courts will toll the statute of limitations
under such circumstances," often for a substan-
tial period of time," such documentation could
~erve to exculpate the attorney from charges of
malpractice brought after the testator's death.
Even though it may be annoying and costly to
retain files containing such data for long periods
of time, it takes ~nly one instance of safekeeping
that serves to quell a malpractice daim to more
than justify the expense of keeping hundreds of
such client files.
c. Adequate Time to Plan an Estate.-It
is quite common for a dient to appear on an at-
torney's doorstep and anno~nce that he or she is
going on an extended trip in a week or two and
wants to execute a new will before departing.
Or perhaps the client wants to execute a will
before having to enter a hospital for an operation.
It is obvious under such circumstances that a
~orough job of estate planning will not be pos-
Sible. Yet lawyers rarely refuse a client's request
for assistance, at least if the testator has a fairly
substantial estate or is otherwise a valued client.
Most estate planners will go ahead and do the
best that is possible under the circumstances, and
will rely on an admonition to the client that
the document which has been drafted is to be
considered "temporary" and that, as soon as the
client returns or is released, he or she should
make an appointment for full-blown estate plan-
nin.g services. But an interim will is hardly a
satisfactory document, and preparation of such
an instrument may leave an attorney open to a
later daim of malpractice.
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Because there is not adequate time to do a
thorough job of estate planning, there is a sig-
nificantly greater likelihood that the document
that will be produced before the trip or operation
will contain a mistake or error. In spite of an
admonition, the client may return from the trip
or be released from the hospital with the belief,
if the client thinks about it at all, that the
"temporary" document can continue to serve as
his or her will, at least for the time being. If
the testator were to die in the interim, a would-be
beneficiary whose legacy is lost or diminished by
some drafting error is not likely to be sympathetic
to the draftsman because of the exigencies of the
situation.
Moreover, an attorney may not be able to
protect himself or herself fully by a letter to the
client, explaining why the will that has been
prepared is only a "temporary" measure, and
suggesting that the client call for an appointment
as soon as he or she returns from the trip or
hospital stay. While such a letter is highly ad-
visable, and may be of assistance in defending
against a malpractice daim, a court could deter-
mine that a lawyer in such circumstances has a
duty to take the initiative and follow up to make
certain that the- interim document is replaced by
a more permanent one. Thus, in addition to .
preparing such a letter, it would be a good idea
to pursue the matter with the client when he or
she returns from the trip or is released from the
hospital At a minimum, the attorney should estab-
lish a written record to evidence efforts to get the
testator back to the office to replace the interim will.
There are, of course, exceptions to the above
warnings. If a client is elderly or in poor health,
time may not permit the preparation of a thorough
and deliberate testamentary document.II Ob-
• For instance, an inartfully drawn will could in-
clude a specific bequest of closely held stock when the
stock in question was subject to the terms of a buv.sell
agreement at the testator's death; or a will could at-
tempt to distribute property interests whose disposition
was governed by the terms of a legally binding will
.contract.
• See the discussion of the tolling of the statute
of limitations at pages 785-86, sppra.
• • See Gtty tI. Litderbach, 459 A. 2d 744 (Pa. 1983)
(w~1I d~!~ed in .1957; testator died in 1972; malpractice
action Initiated In 1976); Br~ fl. Lit.illgslon, 129 Cal.
~ptr. 514 (1976) (husband and wife trusts prepared
1ft 1961; husband died in 1964 and \Vife in 1969' suit
for malpractice brought in 1970). Cf. Mltmford fl. Stnlon_
!V~'Y b Priu, 255 A. 2d 359 (Md. 1969) (malpractice
1ft title search of real estate).
-In Li,.ck tI. Baroku b Martin, 667 P. 2d 171
(Alaska 1983), for example, an attorney and an ac-
countant were in the process of developing an estate
plan for their client when be died. And in Lorrnint fl.
Growr, Cimt1lt, Wtimttin, 467 So. 2d 315 (Fla. App.
(CoMMltd 0fJ following pagt.)
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viously, in such a situation the attorney should
do his or her best under the circumstances. Even
so, the estate planner would be well advised to
make a written, contemporaneous record of the
reasons why it was not possible to render the
usual, complete estate planning services. 1£ a
letter setting forth such facts appears unseemly,
then the law)·er should document the pertinent
facts in a memorandum to the files.
D. The Danger of Out-of-State Assets or
Clientl.-The prudent estate planner should be
alert to another red flag-the client who wants a
will but lives out of state, or is about to move
out of state. In such a situation, the practitioner
might well be advised to refer the matter to a
lawyer who practices in the other jurisdiction.
It is, of course, important to exercise considerable
care in recommending a particular lawyer to the
client. as a malpractice claim jcould be posited
on the negligent selection of an out-of-state
attorney."
An example will serve to highlight the po-
tential dangers. Assume you are practicing in a
Midwestern city and one of your longtime clients
is being transferred to a city in the Southwest.
Because of. the travel involved, your client wants
a new will prepared before departure. Federal tax
law will obviously be the same in either jurisdic-
tion, but that is not true of state law regarding
wills, probate and inheritance taxes. An out-of-state
., lawyer may not know about the peculiarities of
local law such as; for instance, expedited probate
administration where a testator's will specifically
brings that administrative procedure into play.·l
If a will is prepared before the move which £on-
tains no such provision, and the client dies while ..
domiciled in the new state and the .same will
remains operative, then a malpractice claim for
the additional expenses of full-scale probate could
be filed against the attorney for preparing a will
under these circumstances.
The difficulty is that it is virtually impossible
for a lawyer in one jurisdiction to be knowledge-
"-! able of important local laws and procedures in a
far-distant state. ~Moreover, the problem is not
wholly resolved by an admonition to the client
to have a Ilew will prepared once he or she
settles into the new home, as a reasonably pru-
dent lawyer might be held to foresee the possibility
that the client would not appreciate the need for
hiring another attorney, and would thus continue
with the original will. On the other hand, a letter
spelling out the desirability of having a new will
prepared would certainly help protect the attor-
B-11
ney from a later malpractice claim, but it would
be even better to make arrangements for a referral
to a lawyer in the new jurisdiction.1Z
Basically, the same issues are raised when
a client domiciled in one state goes to a practi-
tioner in ·that state to have a will drawn, and the
client's assets inc:1ude real property interests in
another jurisdiction, like a condominium in Florida
or oil and gas rights in Oklahoma. Under the
generally applicable conflicts rule, the 1:I.w of the
situs applies to immovables," and the lawyer in
the state of domicile will probably not be knowl-
edgeable about the local laws and procedures in
the situs jurisdiction. Again, the prudent prac-
titioner should seek the assistance oi an attor-
ney practicing in the situs state, at least where
the out-of-state assets are sufficiently valuable
that retention of a second attorney's services is
warranted. If, however, the real estate interests
located in another jurisdiction are not p:lrticulnrly
valuable, or the client is not agree:lble to em-
ploying another laW)-er, the attorney in the domi-
ciliary state should be sure to document these
facts in a letter to the client, so that there will
be a written record for future reference.
E. Avoiding Delays.-Qnce a practioner un-
dertakes an estate planning assignment, it is im-
portant that he or she proceed with reasonable
dispatch. Often lawyers who prepare wills or
trusts for clients do not specialize in estate
planning, and the temptation may be great to
put aside an assignment because of the press of
(Foohto/~ 59 COff/i'lII~d.)
1985), the testator was in a hospital when he eontaetcd
a lawyer to have a will prepared. and the lawyer's sec-
retary took notes of the client's testamentary desires.
The testator died of cancer two weeks after wilt
exeC\ltion.
• Trmrro v. YormlJ,.k. 398 F. Snpp. USC) (D. N. J.
1975) (nell:li"ent referral to a ollt·of-state lawyer who
subsequently embezzle" the client's funds); Wild(rmnJfn
V. WGclIt~l1. 267 N. Y. S. 840 (1933) (attorney helli to
standard of reasonable care in the selection of associate
coun!lel from another state).
.. See, e. g., Tex. Probate Code § 145.
• The same problem can, of course, arise if an
attorney admitted to ttl'lletiee in State A ttrep:'Ires a
will for a client domiciled in State A and, well after ex-
ecution of the will, the client moves permanently to
State B and dies. In the!le circumstances, there is no
opportunity for referral to an out-of-state lawyer. A
prudent estate planner shonld, however, do more thnn
make certain that a will that is prepared, execnted and
attested meets the formalities of the .tatnte of wills
in the testator's domicile. The draftsman .hol1ld follow
broad procednre. to increase the chances of vnlidity of
the will in various other state,. See diseullion in 1 Cas-
ner, E$IGI~ PltmJling131-40 (4th ell., Little, Brown 1980).
• See Scoles at RheinsteiD, "Conflict A"oi,lanee in
Succession Planning," 21 lAw 6- COJltnnto,.ary P,.obl,,,as
499, SOZ-04 (1956).
other business. Every effort should be made to
avoid this temptation. At the outset, the attorney
should write the client and establish a schedule
for work on the matter, including a time for final
preparation and execution. If the client fails to
meet a deadline, such as the completion of a
questionnaire on family history and property
ownership, the attorney should send a reminder,
which not only will serve as a courtesy but will
document the fact that the attorney was not
responsible for the delay. However, malpractice
exposure could arise if, during a period of un-
reasonable delay due to attorney procrastination,
the client were to die une.'Cpectedly, and the un-
consummated estate plan included beneficiaries
who are not mentioned in an earlier will or are
not heirs-at-law.I.
The danger here is greater in situations where
the client is not elderly or in obvious ill health.
In these latter circumstances, the drafting attor-
ney would be likely to realize the need to act
expeditiously. Where the client appears to be in
good health, the risk of procrastination is the
greatest-and a disappointed beneficiary may not
understand or appreciate unreasonable delays on
the attorney's part.
F. Effective Use of Forma.-A competent
estate planner should be proficient in the utiliza-
tion qf forms to meet the needs of his or her
client., The use of forms has, of course, been
made easier and more efficient with the advent
of automated office equipment.II All of these
technical advances benefit both the estate planner
and the client if the draftsman does not fall into
the trap of making his or her client's needs fit
the existing forms, rather than tailoring the
standardized clauses to meet the individualized
needs of the client. Moreover, an attorney should
never insert a clause in a will unless the draftsman
fully understands each and every provision, as
such a lack of comprehension increases the possi-
bility of a mistake being inadvertently committed."
Because of the need to use provisions that
are fully understood, there are advantages to an
attorney preparing his or her own set of forms.
Here, however, the draftsman should be particu-
larly on guard against the belief that such clauses,
which are individually developed by the attorney,
will meet the needs of individual clients. Forms,
no matter how well drafted, should serve only
as guides for the requirements of a particular
testator. Of course, certain standardized clauses
can and should be inserted in all or virtually all
wills and trusts that are prepared. These include
a common disaster or survivorship clause, a tax
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clause, a rule-against-perpetuities savings clause,
and a broad set of executor and trustee powers.
Although survivorship provisions may seem
to be rather straightforward and routine, that is
not necessarily the case. For example, in Ogle
'lI. Fuilen," reciprocal wills were drafted that in-
advertently failed to cover the contingency of
both spouses dying within a 30-day period, but
not as a result of a common disaster. The attor-
ney in that case had prepared wills for a husband
and wife which stated that the entire estate
should pass to the other spouse if that spouse
survived by 30 days. In the very next article,
the wills provided that in the event of a common
disaster in which both spouses were killed, the
estate should' be divided equally between two
named nephews. After the wills were executed,
the husband died of a stroke and his wife died 15
days later from cancer. Since nnther will pro-
vision was applicable, the estate passed intestate
to persons other than the two nephews. The
nephews filed suit against the drafting attorney
for the negligent failure to cover the possible
contingency that did in fact occur, when it was
obvious that each testator wanted his or her
estate to pass to the nephews, and not intestate,
if the other spouse did not survive. Accordingly,
drafters should be careful not to include conflict-
ing survivorship and common disaster clauses in
the same will or, as occurred in Ogle, not to leave
a gap between two otherwise e'ffective survivor-
ship. provisions.
Marital deduction provisions are also exceed-
ingly important, and every attorney who drafts
wills or trusts should be thoroughly familiar with
the underlying law and terminology to assure
that their utilization wilt result in the maximum
• Vielor v. Goldman, 344 N. Y. S. 2d 672 (1973) (mal-
practice suit based on attorney's negligent failure to
prepare will prior to testator's death). See generally
Johnston, "LeR&1 Malpractice in Estate Plannina." 67
10U1tJ LatlI RnMuI 629. 658·59 (1982); and Miller, "Func-
tions and Ethical Problems of the Lawyer in Draftinlt
a Will," 1950 U"rv"nly of IUiftou Law Fon,m 415. 43&.
See also Li"d v. BaroktU Cr Martin, 667 P. 2d 171
(Alaska 1983), where an attorney and an accountant were
working on an estate plan when their client died leav-
ing an earlier will as his last will and testament. How-
ever, the details of the death were not disclosed in the
opinion, and the malpractice action was not posited on
any delay in completing the estate plan.
• E. g., Wilkens, DroflinO Will.r arid Tn,.rl Ag"mlf~/.r:
A Sy.r/nn.r Anroach (Warren. Gorham & Lamont 1980).
• See, e. g., DeBruyn, "Will DraftinlZ," in FilMa-
ffWfltal Co"upt.r of E.rIGtt PI~g 1979, at 71, 73-74 (PLI
1979); Leach, "Planning and Draftinl': a Will," 27 Bo.r/on
U"it1tr.ri/y L:rw Rt'lIiettJ 151 (1947); Miller, '''Functions and
Ethical Problems of the Lawyer in Drafting a Will,"
1950 Uni'U".ri/y of ll1i"oi.r LatlI Fonlm 415, 438.
.. 466 N. Eo 2d 224 (111. 1984).
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tax benefits. In fact, the marital deduction may
present the single greatest risk in terms of estate
planning malpractice.II The purpose of utilizing
such provisions is obvious-to obtain federal estate
tax benefits, usually in the amount of the maxi-
mum deduction provided by law. If a marital
deduction clause is inserted which, for some rea-
son, does not achieve its objective, then the
presence of the mistake or error will be clear
for all to see." Furthermore, the marital deduc-
tion can be so beneficial from a tax standpoint
that virtually all practitioners, and not just those
who specialize in estate planning, utilize will pro-
visions to take advantage of this liberal deduction.
Thus, it is not surprising that inanfully drawn
marital deduction clauses have been the source
of a number of legal malpractice claims.70 And
because of the tax savings that can be achieved
through proper utilization of the marital deduc-
tion, any mistakes or errors that are committed
can result in rather substantial liability.
G. Verification of Beneficiariea' Names.-An
estate planner should make every effort to verify
the precise names of all beneficiaries prior to
execution of a will or trust. Of course, in the
case of individual legatees, the draftsman may
have no alternative but to rely on the testator or
settlor for verification. Even in this case, how-
ever, care should be taken to review the names
prior to execution. This would serve to minimize 0'
the chances of an ambiguous bequest in the gov- '
eming instrument, and the cost, after the testator's
death, of exPensive court proceedings to resolve
any vagueness or uncertainty.
Verification is also important with regard to
charitable organizations. The problems that can
arise from an attorney's failure to check the exact
name of a charity are illustrated in the legal mal-
practice claim brought in J"mtwtJ C01Inty H"fr&tJM
Sociny fl. HoUO'III4Y,n where one-quarter of a $40
million estate WIJ left to the "SOCIETY FOR
THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO AN-
IMALS (Local or National)." After the testa-
, tor's death, over 100 charitable organizations filed
a claim to the legacy, and it took thirteen days
of trial in order to determine a division amongst
the various claimants." It leems inexcusable
that the draftsman planning this large of an
estate would utilize such 1ft accurate and patently
ambiguous name, since a well-known U. S. Gov-
ernment publication, the IRS- CtImfIlatifI, Lin of
Org_i6tmcnu, contains an exhaustive list of all
charitable organizations that have received favor-
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,able rulings for income tax purposes under Section
170(c).fI
Thus, to avoid expensive will or trust con-
struction proceedings and' the malpractice ex-
posure that could result if such proceedings are
required, a draftsman should make, every reason-
able effort to verify the names of all beneficiaries.
As indicated above, in the case of charitable
bequests, this process is straightforward and
should require little time or effon.
H. The Draftsman Should Not Be a Bene-
ficiary.-An attorney cannot adequately represent
a client's interests when that attorney also has
a personal interest in the subject matter of the
representation which may be adverse to the client's.'·
Thus, both the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the newly adopted Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct include restrictions against the
practice of drafting an instrument such as a will
or trust in which the draftsman is named as a
• Bucqt"t v. Liviftf1stoN. 129 Cat. Rptr. 514 (1976);
Lm" v. B"lry. 728 F. 211 S51 (CA.l 1984); see also
Mallen &: Levit. L,gol Mal!'"JCticr, Pkt. Supp. 126
(West 2d ed. 1981 &. Supp. 1985).
• For example. in BNU{",t v. Livingston. supra note
68, the inter vivos trust that the attorney prepared for
the settlor-husband reserved the power to mortify, al.
ter, revoke or tenninate the trust. The .trust instrument
further provided that after the settlor's death. his wife'
had the right to exercise these powers for her life. Upon
the husband's death, the right given to the wife became
tantamount to a general power of appointment which
would inadvertently cause the corpus of the nonmarital
share to be taxable to the wife's estate.
• See cases cited in note 68, supra.
II 115 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974).
• After the wiJ1 construction proceedings, a malprac·
tice suii was brought against the attorney who had
drafted the ambi~ously worded charitable bequest. The
court found in favor of the draftsman, on the jtround
that there was no damage flowing from the attorney's
use of the ambiguous tenninolotrY, because the testa-
mentary intent was carried out u a result of the will
construction litintion. J/mturtJ County HIIWIDM Sod,t, 'V.
HoIIOfllG'. 115 Cal. Rptr. 464 (974).
• Because bequests to the charitable organizations
listed in this IOvernment publication would also entitle
an estatf' to a charitable deduction under Section 2055
of the Code, the book is used extensively by estate
planners to verify charitable names and to make certain
that the bequest to a specific charity will qualify for the
deduction. See Frimmer, "Charitable Dispositions at
neath," in Ad1lOJK" Will DrGft;"g 1978, at ISS, 160-61
(PLI 1978).
• DR 5-101 (A) of the Code of Profellional Re-
aponsibility provides:
Except with the consent of his client after full dis-
closure, a lawyer ahall not accept employment if
exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of
his elieDt witJ be or reasonably may be affected by
his own financial, busineu, ,property, or personal
interests. .
Comparable provisions are contained in Rule 1.7 of the
newly adopted Model Rules of Profeuional Conduct.
"
beneficiary." Yet, somewhat surprisingly, there
are numerous court decisions involving precisely
this conduct." Some of the cases are will contests
that challenge such attomey action as constituting
undue influence; fT other reported decisions in-
volve disciplinary proceedings against attomeys
who have drawn wills in which they are named
as beneficiaries." Needless to say, a number of
courts have been critical of such conduct." In
the future, we may well see legal malpractice
actions based on similar attomey conduct, brought
by a beneficiary whose share would have been
larger if the will had not included a devise or
bequest for the draftsman.
Estate planners who would not think of
drawing a will or trust in which they were to
receive a substantial gift or share might include
a token bequest at the insistence of a grateful
client." Although it may be a little awkward
to refuse to prepare an instrument containing
such a gift, it is important to rememb~rthat what
mig~t seem to be a token or modest bequest to
both the testator and the draftsman may not be
. looked upon in the same light by another bene-
ficiary whose portion is reduced by reason of
such gift. Accordingly, a draftsman would be
well advised not to prepare an instrument for a
client that includes such a gift, no matter how
small or insignificant it may appear at the time.
I •. Failure to Achieve the Lowest PosSlDle
Tax Consequences.-It is perfectly proper to pre-
pare an estate plaJ;l that provides for the distribu-
tion of property in a manner that does not result
in the lowest possible state and federal transf-er
taxes. A client is entitled to make an informed
decision about the person or entity that he or she
wants to receive the estate, and that choice may
well be based on factors other than maximum tax
reduction. As long as the client has been fully
advised of the various alternatives, the attorney
should draft the necessary documents to carry
out the testator's desires. Thus, for example, a
wealthy client may decide to leave all of his or
her estate to the surviving spouse to the exclu-
sion of children, rather than combine the marital
deduction ,with the unified credit, with a gift
calculated on the amount of the maximum credit
passing to the children. Such a disposition would,
however, result in a higher tax upon the surviv-
ing spouse's death, and would thus reduce the
amount which will ultimately pass to the chil-
dren's generation after the death of both parents.
Any time an estate plan is established, such
as the one above, that is not geared to achieving
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the lowest possible transfer taxes, there is a risk
that a malpractice claim will be filed down the
road by a beneficiary whose share would have
been larger had taxes been minimized.1t This
is not to say that an attomey should not follow
the client's directions, which are, of course, para-
"Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-5:
. . . If a client voluntarily offers to make a gift to
his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the gift, but
before doing so, he should urge that his client secure
disinterested advice from an independent competent
person who is cognizant of all the circumstances.
Other than in exceptional circumstances. a lawyer
should insist that an instrument in which his client
desires to name him beneficially be prepared by
another lawyer selected by the client.
Rule 1.8(c) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
contains more specific restrictions:
A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the
lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent,
child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift, from
a client, including a testamentary gift, except where
the client is related to the donee.
.. See extensive discussion of and citation to cases
in which the draftinR' attorney is named as a beneficiary
in JO,hnston, ",An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate
Planning Practices," 4S Ohio Sial' 1.auJ 10fIf'JIG1 57, 60-86
(1984): see also Thomason, "How Estate Planners Can
Cope with the IncreasinR' Risk of Malpractice Claims,"
12 Estal, Plaftniftgl30. 135-36 (May 1985).
"See, e. g., In ,., Thom"on', Estal" 398 P. 2d 926
(Ariz. 1965): Allm v. Estal, of DulIOfI, 394 So. 2d 132
(FIa. App. 1980); In ,., E,lal, of 1Aw.r0fl, 423 N. Y. S. 2d
106 (1980); 1ft ,., Estat, of N,uOft, 274 N. W. 2d 584
(S. D. 1978): 1,. ,., EslaU of Komarr. 175 N. W. 2d
• 473 (Wis. 1970). See also 1ft ,., Eslal, of P,dridt, 482
A. 2d 215 (Pa. 1984), where the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld the Register of Wills' action in denyin'g
admission of a will to probate because 0.£ the attorney'.
unethical behavior in preparing a will for an elderly, ill
client in which all of the testator's modest estate was
left to the attorney and the attorney's brother.
• E. g., In ,., K,.otmb,rg, 527 P. 2d 510 (Ariz. 1974):
In ,., Saladino, 375 N. E. 2d 102 (III. 1978): Commitl" Oft
Prof"siOfltJ1 Ethic.r ~. Sylv,st"., 318 N. W. 2d 212 (Iowa
1982): Committu Oft P"oft.rsional Elhics v. B,hnk" 276
N. W. 2d 838 (Iowa 1979): 1ft ,., Dilci,lmary ActiOft
AgaM Pru""" 359 N. W. 2d 613 (Minn. 1984); Dis-
ci,linary Boa,.d 11. A",ufldsoft. 297 N. W. 2d 433 (N. D.
1980): Columbus Bar ASl'n v. R(IffI", 290 N. E. 2d 831
(Ohio 1972); 1.. ,., COfIduct of TOftkon, 642 P. 2d 660
(Ore. 1982) (overrulin,; earlier decision in 1,. ,., 10ft'"
462 P. 2d 680 (Ore. 1969»; I.. ,., Kftultmd, 377 P. 2d
861 (Ore. 1963); Offiu of Disei,liff4f7 CouII"I~. Walker,
366 A. 2d S63 (Pa. 1976): In ,., GOfIYO. 245 N. W. 2d 893
(Wis. 1976): Slat, v. GHlbaditm, 196 N. W. 2d 730 (Wis.
1972): Stat, v. Coli",,",,, 159 N. W. 2d SO (Wi.. 1968).
• See, e. g., Committe, Oft Proftlsional Elhic.r v. Syl-
wst"., 318 N. W. 2d 212 (Iowa 1982): E,lat, of KtJf'tJbahtJft
v. HMI, 170 N. W. 2d 166 (Mich. 1969); Offiu of Disci-
f'liNJry COUfII,1 v. Walk"., 366 A. 2d 563 (Pa. 1976); 1,. ..,
Estal' of Pcdric1t. 482 A. 2d 215 (Pa. 1984); and In ,.,
GOftYo, 245 N. W. 2d 893 (Wis. 1976).
• See Johnston, "An Ethical Analysis of Common
Estate Planning Practices," 4S Ohio Sial' 1.auJ 10tIf'fIGl
57, 73-75 (1984).
• Bucqwt ~. LiviftgltOfl, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976)
(loss of marital deduction): Lmft~. B".l", 728 F. 2d 551
(CA-l 1984) (marital deduction): HDrfI, v. Pultham, 158
Cal, Rtpr. 714 (1979) (Clifford trust).
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mount. At the same time, having in rrllnd the
fact that a malpractice action can be maintained
bya disappointed beneficiary after the client's
death, an attorney who drafts and implements
such a plan should be very careful to develop a
written record establishing the fact that the client
had been fuUy advised that the plan adopted
"would not achieve tax 'minimization and that the
client stiJJ decided on an alternative course of
action.II The logical time to create such a record
is by letter to the client prior to wiJJ or trust
execution, detailing the various choices and in-
dicating the adverse tax consequences that wiJJ
result if the client continues to pursue some other
distributive plan.
J. De Novo Internal Review.-It is good
office procedure to have a. lawyer other than
the draftsman provide a second review of the will
or trust prior to execution. Of course, this in-
volves an additional expense in terms of attorney
time, but it should be worth the effort in the long
run. It takes only one or two instances where
such a second review uncovers a potential prob-
lem prior to execution, thus preventing the pos-
sibility of a later malpractice claim, to justify
the additional cost. Byway of iJJustration, suppose
that in the process of going from a draft to the
final copy, an important wiU clause was inad-
vertently omitted from the will.II \Vhile the
drafting attorney should always read over the .
wiJJ or trust prior to execution, use of another
lawyer experienced in estate planning to review
the document serves as a valuable double check.
. .;
This is a good example of the practice of de-
fensive law.
If anything, the risks of accidental omission
of a provision appear to be even greater in these
days of word processors than before the advent
of such automation. Careful proofreading is fast
becoming a lost art, and yet it is possible for a
mistake to occur while using such equipment.
No matter how advanced office machines become,
information has to be fed into the processor, and
thus the' chance for human error stiU exists.
Accordingly, while automated equipment may
reduce the time required for thorough sentence-
by-sentence proofing, it clearly does not remove
the need for careful examination prior to execu-
tion. If time does not permit such additional at-
torney review prior to execution, or if no one is
available at that moment, then it is advisable to
have the internal review performed as soon after
execution as possible. Any mistake or error caught
by that procedure can generally be corrected by
the execution of another instrument. White the
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client may not welcome the inconvenience of
another e."Cecution ceremony, he or she is certain to
appreciate the draftsman's precautionary measures."
K. Carrying Out the Testator's Testamen-
tary Intentions.-It goes without saying that an
estate planner should carry out a client's testa-
mentary intentions. Yet the fact remains that an
ever increasing number of malpractice suits are
based on the alleged failure of an attorney to
achieve this overridin~ objecth·e." Even though
such claims may be difficult to prove when the'
matter proceeds to trial," if a beneficiary strongly
believes that the testator intended to· include a
bequest to him or her, and would have but for
the attorney's error, that frustrated, would-be
beneficiary may be able to state a cause of action
which will withstand pre-trial attack.IT Thus, at
• Two recent cases ilhl5trate the fact that failure to
achieve tax minimization can also be a suhstantial moti-
vatintr factor in the initiation of a Ic~al malpractice c1:tim,
even in a post-mortem estate fllanllin~ settinl:l'. See
Li"dr tI. Ba~nknl & Mnrti", 667 P. 2d 171 (Alaska 1983)
(attorney and accountant failed to advise widow to dis-
claim her interest under the will and thus avoid gift
taxes attributahle to the transfer ('If the inherited prop-
erty to her chiMren); Km"'l'r tl. Bl'lfi. 482 N. Y. S. 2d
898 (App. Div. 1984) faction for malpractice against
attorney for failure to renounce tnlllt created in deceased
wife's will in order to help alle\;ate adverse tax conse-
quences in husband's estate).
.. • See, e. If., CMUI,ctimt J'lfIi~~ Rrllllblic t'. S"Q~OIl Hos-
_ ,stol, 448 A. 2d 190 (Conn. 19B2) (inadvertent suhstitu-
tion of wrong charities w.hile draftinll' will); Nudh/l'" tI.
HOffliltoJl, 459 A. 2d 1060 (Di~t. of Col. 1983) (failure of
final version of will to include resilluary clause): In ,.,
CoIoln~1 Estate, 196 N. Y. S. 2d 443 (1959); and I" ,.,
DO~IOfI'1 Eltat" 196 N. Y. S. 2d 344 (1959).
.. In A"ric tI. COJltiJl""tal Cnll/alty Coml'nfIY, 331 N. W.
2d 325 (Wis. 1983), an attorney prepared a will and a
revocable tnlst for his client. The c:Iient came to the
attorney's office to execute the documents and, while
the attorney and hill secretary hoth siJrned the tnlst as
,,'itnesses, due to either "confusion" or a "mistake of the
moment," only the attorney shomed as a witness to
the ,,·ill. '331 N. W. 2d at 327. This mist:tke, which the
attorney conceded was the result of nelfligence. was not
discovered until after the testator's death. anll the will
"'as denied admission to probate. A post-execution in-
ternal review, at least for purposes of verifring due
execution and attestation, would have detectett the error
at a time when it could have been easily remedied.
• E. g., Hirmstra t'. H,uton, 91 Cal. Rptr. 269 (l9iO);
SttlU¥ tI. Smith, 441 A. 2d 81 (Conn. 1981); Onle 1'. Fuifrn,
466 N. E. 2d 224 (til. I~); LiI~'/lo", lI. Dicr,335 N. W.
2d 554 (Neb. 1983); St. J,fnr.\·'1 Chu~c11 ~f SC/IIf~'lcr lI.
Tom,lr, 325 N. W. 2d 164 (Neh. 1982).
• SttJttIt tI. Smitll, supra note 85, at 84 ("Because no
invalidity appears on the face of the "'ilI, the present
case may very well present Rl'Gter obstacles to reCO\'ery
than cases in which intended beneficiaries broulrht lICtions
against attorneys who prtp:\red ineffective wills") ; HiCTnlt~a
co. HrutOfl, supra note 85. at %12.
• Himtstra tI. H,utOfl, 91 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1970): Stt1U',
tI. Smith, 441 A. 2d 81 (Conn. 1981): Onl, t'. F",ittfl,4M
N. E. 2d 224 (III. 1984). But ~e DeMaril tI. Asfi. 426
So. 2d 1153 (Fta. App. 1983): z.o,.,.,,;,., tI. CrO't'rr, Ci"'tfIt,
Wrirvtrill, 467 So. 2d 315 (Fla. App. 1985), and Ki,.gan
a minimum, an attorney will have to go to the
time, expense and embarrassment of defending
against a malpractice claim. The cautious alter-
native is to take a few extra steps to provide
additional certainty that the final draft of the
will or trust reflects the client's intent, and then
document that fact in a letter.
In addition to an internal review by a second
lawyer described above, the draftsman should be
certain that the testator carefully reads over the
entire will immediately before execution." If a
proyision has been inadvertently left out, or if a
devise or bequest is not in the right amount, the
testator, hopefully, will spot the omission. It is
important to resist the temptation of foregoing
a final review immediately before execution on
the ground that photocopying and word process-
ing make such an action unnecessary. Mistakes
in transposition can and do occur.
Any time that a testator wishes to dispose of
his or her estate in a manner that is substantially
different than intestate distribution, that should
serve as a red flag to the estate planner. Imple-
mentation of the testator's plan may result in a
disappointed legatee who is a natural object of
the testator's. bounty. And, as has been noted,
the existence of such a would-be beneficiary is
often the cornerstone upon which a malpractice
. claim is mounted. The attorney should, of course,
develop and implement a plan that will carry out
the testator's wishes, but under such circumstances
the attorney should be sure to document the
fact that the plan, as evidenced in the will or
trust. is an accurate reflection of the' testator's
desires. Such a written record could prove in-
valuable if questions are raised after the testa-
tor's death about his or her true intentions.
L. Formal Proc.edures for Execution and
Attestation.-l\tany of the estate planning mal-
practice cases that have been reported to date
involve the failure to have a will witnessed," or
the utilization of a beneficiary as one of the
witnesses, causing that person to forfeit the legacy."
In either instance, negligence is rather obvious,
and that fact is undoubtedly the main reason
why so many suits are brought in these circum-
stances. Furthermore, a number of these cases
involve laymen, rather than lawyers, who have
drafted the wills and attempted to supervise their
execution.'t Yet this does not explain all of the
decisions, as some of the cases involve lawyers
who failed to see that the instruments they
drafted were properly attested.t2
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There are several lessons inherent in these
cases. First, a lawyer who is experienced in the
field should handle the planning, draft the imple-
menting documents, and personally supervise their
execution. If this is not possible, then another
attorney in the office should preside over execu-
tion and attestation. Although an attorney ex-
perienced in estate planning would be thoroughly
familiar with the procedures for signing and wit-
nessing of wills, others in the office may not have
this degree of familiarity. Thus, it is suggested
that a written set of procedures for the execu-
tion of wills and trusts be adopted for required
use throughout an office, so that even the least
'Z'. PtJI'ks, 478 A. 2d 713 (Md. App. 1984), all of which
held that there is no cause of action for malpractice
unless there is an indication on the face of the will
that the testator's intent has been frustrated.
• A number of reported cases indicate the types of
omissions or errors that might have been caught if a
second lawyer had reviewed the documents prior to exe-
cution. Lrolin v. B~rl~\', 728 F. 2d 551 (CA-l 1984) (prob-
lem with marital deduction): Homc v. Pukllanr, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 714 (979) (defective establishment of Clifford
trust); Bucqlltt 'V. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976)
(poor draftsmanship causinll loss of marital deduction):
Lucas v. Han,,,,, 364 P. 2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (terms of
·testamentary trust violated rule against perpetuities);
COfIn~cticllt jll"ior R~~ublic 'V. Sharon Hospital. 448 A. 2d
190 (Conn. 1982) (inadvertent insertion of wrong chari-
table beneficiaries); Stowc v. S",itl,. 441 A. 2d 81 (Conn.
1981) (allelled error in m3nner of distribution when in-
come beneficiary reaches 50 years of alte); N ttdha", v.
Hamilton. 459 A. 2d 1060 (Dist. of Col. 1983) (omission
of residuary clause in final draft of will); O.fJlc 'Z'. FI/itm,
466 N. Eo ·2d 224 (III. 19~) (failure of wills to cover
continjtency which occurred); JlilltiJright v. Ram", 322
N. W. 2d 30 (Iowa 1982) (provisions of will violated
rule aninst perpetuities).
• See Bialtania v. [M.inn, 320 P. 2d 16 (Cal. 1958);
Mickcl 11. Mllr,hy, 305 P. 2d 993 (Cal. 1957); Licata 'Z".
SI'~ctM', 225 A. 2d 28 (Conn. 1966);' Auric 'Z'. Continmtal
Cas. Co.• 331 N. W. 2d 325 (Wis. 1983). Cf. Pric~ v.
Holmu, 422 P. 2d 976 (Kan. 1967): S"ucsswn of Killings-
'a.'orlll, 2iO So. 2d 196 (La. App. 1972); and WeillI: t'.
Krc",", 10 So. 416 (La. 1892).
• B"ck/~~' v. Gray. 42 Pac. 900 (Cal. 1~5); Woodfork
fl. Sand"s. 248 So. 2d 419 (u. 1971); GoMbcrg t'. Bos-
worth, 215 N. Y. S. 2d 849 (1961); Gil)' 'V. Licdtrbach, 459
A. 2d 744 (Pa. 1983); Sc/,i",,~r v. Nctll«cllit. 288 P. 265
(Wuh. 1930).
.. E. g., BiankOflia 11. l"ti"(1. 320 P. 2d 16 (Cal. 1958)
(notary public); and Price v. Holfll~s, 422 P. 2d 976 (Kan.
1967) (will prepared by bank not attested by witness
in testator's presence).
• The recent case of AI/ric 11. Continental Cas Co., 331
N. W. 2d 325 (Wis. 1983) provides an eltctlJent example
of the types of problems that still arise. There, the
attorney had the testator come to his office to execute
a revocable iiving tntst and a will. The attorney explained
the provisions of the trust to the testator, who sil:ned it,
and then both the attorney and his secretary ~igned as
witnesses. The attorney then went over the will and h3d
the testator sign it, too. The attorney then si~ned as a
witness. but because of "confusion" or a "mist3ke of
the moment," the secretary failed to sign as a witness
to the will, which was found to be invalid upon the
testator's death a few years later. 331 N. W. Zd at 327.
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experienced associate will be able to perform the
ceremonies effectively and efficiently.
Also with regard to the execution and at-
testation of wills, it is strongly recommended
that the testator come to the draftsman's office,
or, if that is not possible, then the lawyer should
be sure'to supervise the execution ceremonies in
the testator's home, in his or her hospital room,
or wherever else the will may be signed. Con-
versely, a will should nron- be sent to a client for
execution without professional supervision, no
matter how detailed and explicit the instructions
may be which accompany the unexecuted docu-
ment. The fact is that clients, no matter how
well versed in other matters, are simply not going
to appreciate the importance of the formalities
that are required, and may, therefore, intentionally
or inadvertently, fail to follow all the steps. It
is entirely possible that a would-be beneficiary
who has lost a legacy because of faulty execution
or attestation under such circumstances, where
the drafting attorney failed to supervise the cere-
monies, could state a cause of action in malpractice
on the ground that the attorney in question
breached a duty to supervise personally the sign-
ing and witnesS'ing of the will in order to avoid
any mistakes or errors.II
Thus, it is highly advisable to prepare a man-
datory set of execution procedu~ for use through-
out an office, and to be certain that the draftsman
or some other attorney in the office supervises the
ceremonies, rather than leave it to the testator
to follow the required formalities.
M. Maintenance of Complete Office Files.-
As indicated earlier, because of the tolling of the
statute of limitations, an action for legal mal-
practice can be successfully maintained "a"" aftn-
the will or trust was executed and the mistake
or error occurred." For this reason, it is im-
perative that an attorney maintain complete and
accurate files of estate planning matters over an
extended period of time. If a malpractice claim
later arises, one key document could be worth its
weight in gold in terms of exculpating the draft-
ing attorney.
It is suggested that the following files, at a
minimum, be maintained:
(1) A client file which would include the
completed asset and family history questionnaire;
aU correspondence to and from the client: any
memoranda a'bout the estate plan: all drafts of
wills or trusts: and a conformed copy of any
documents that were executed.
,.,0
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(2) A separate master wills and trusts file,
containing in one single location conformed copies
of all such documents executed by firm clients.
One set should be maintained alphabetically by
clients' last names, another set kept in chrono-
logical order by date of execution. This will
serve as a valuable backup to the complete files
for each client.
(3) A file containing abbreviated descrip-
tions of each client's will or trust that provides
pertinent data on such things as whether the
document contained a QTIP trust, a charitable
. unitrust, etc. Such data would be available (on
index cards, stored in a computer, etc.) for the
attorney to review as necessary, when, for in-
stance, there has been a change in the tax laws.
N. Good Client ReI.tiont.-Articles dealing
with the prevention of legal malpractice in general
properly emphasize the importance of maintain-
ing good client relations." Many malpractice
claims can be traced, at least in part, to the fact
that the attorney did not communicate effectively
with the client. While good client relations are
also important in estate planning, they may not
be as effective in avoiding malpractice claims.
As has been noted, estate planning malpractice is
somewhat unique, in that it is usually a wo~ld-be
beneficiary, rather than the original client, who
brings the claim." Thus. in addition to develop-
ing a good rapport with the immediate client, an
estate planner should, whenever possible, cul~i­
vate and maintain similar good relations with the
client's family.
'One way of maintaining a good relationship
with the client and his family is to undertake a
periodic review of the estate plan, say every three
years, to see whether it needs updating. It is also
appropriate to notify the client that a certain
period of time bas passed since will or trust exe-
cution, and suggest that the client may want to
review the plan to see whether it still meets his
or her needs." In the event of any changes in the
• See Johnston, "I.e,.l Mal1>ractice in Estate Plan-
.,," 67 r",. l.atI1 Rruiftt1629, 651-52 (1982).
• See pa.e. 785-86, SU1>ra.
• Stern It Felix-Retzke, A p,.octicol G,M' to P"rune..t-
itg lAgol Mol~tic, 112.07, 5.01-5.15 (McGraw-HIli
1983); Smith, p,.ftm&tv.g lAgol Mol""octie, 18-21 (West
1931). • Pri •
• See the discussion of the -DemISe of the 'flty
Barrier" at paps 783-85, supra. • .
• See, "I., Iafonnal Opiaioa 159, 57 Mac/&tgGft SUI!'
BOP' /0WffIIl 316 (Special Issue. Feb. 1978), re1)Ort!d .In
MtII"K. 1980 S.."kMnat to 1M Dig,,, of Btl,.. AuotlO!iOfl
E.tlaiel OIi"iOfU No. 11572 (ABF 19R2) (hereinafter Cited
U M.... 1980 Supp.); Opiaioa ill 188,44 N,. Ytwi Slot,
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law that might affect a previously drawn will or
trust; a client will appreciate receiving notice of
that possibility from the drafting attorney. In
fact, an attorney may even have a duty to contact
the client or former client in such circumstances."
The draftsman could be found liable if he or she
fails to so notify the client and it is later shown
that the failure to modify the will or trust to
accommodate the new law resulted in a loss to
the estate (or to a beneficiary of the estate)."
O. The Elderly or Disabled Client.-The
practice of defensive law can be put to very
effective use when an attorney performs estate
planning services for an elderly or disabled client.
The mere presence of such a client, particularly if
he or she has a substantial estate, should serve
as a red flag, because of the increased possibility
that a will or trust will be subject to attack after
the client's death, on the grounds of lack of
capacity, undue influence, etc. A prudent lawyer
in such circumstances should anticipate such a
challenge and begin to build an evidentiary record
for later use. It goes without saying, of course,
that the attorney should first be satisfied that the
client has the necessary testamentary capacity
and is not operating under any undue influence
before proceeding with the drafting and execution
of a will or trust.l • In the event that there are
any substantial questions in'the planner's mind,
he or she should not continue with the assignment.
The .problems presented when representing
an aged or disabled client are exacerbated if
that client wants to leave his or her estate in
a manner significantly different than that pro-
vided by intestate distribution. This could oc-
cur if, for instance, the testator wanted to
exclude a child from the estate or was planning
to include all of the children but did not want
to treat them equally. Here, again, a red flag
has been waved, and the attorney should take
appropriate extra measures to guard against an
attack on the instrument after the client's death.
Once the attorney anticipates the possibility
of a will contest, and is satisfied that there is
no valid basis for sucp a challenge, then there
are certain steps that the planner may want to
take. For example, it might be a good idea
to make a videotape of the execution ceremonies,
assuming, of course, that the testator is agree-
able, as such visual evidence could provide valu-
able proof of the testator's condition at the
time of will or trust execution. Or, with per-
mission, the lawyer might want to talk to the
client's physician, and, where appropriate, have
the doctor serve as one of the witnesses, or
provide a statement about the testator's con-
dition as close as possible to the date that the
document was executed.
Inclusion of an attestation clause, while not
required in any state, is always a good practice.
In this connection, it might be a good idea to
include a phrase as part of the attestation clause
to the effect that the testator was, at the time
of execution, of "sound mind and memory and
not operating under any undue influence." Such
a provision can provide valuable rebuttal evi-
dence if a witness, after the testator's death,
begins to have reservations about the testator's
competency at the time the will was executed.lOl
P. Avoidance of Intra-family Conflicts of
Interest.-Estate planning for more than one
member of a. family is fraught with potential
and actual conflicts of interests, and it behooves
the attorney in these circumstances to be sensi-
tive to this problem and avoid dual representa-
tion when there is any indication of a lack of
a meeting of the minds among the various indi-
.viduals.lot .In situations where an attorney is
Bor JourJUJl 56 (1972), reported in MGf'W, 1915 Su", No.
8948; Opinion CPR-52, 22 North CGt'oliM Bar No. 35
at 24 (1975), reported in Moru, 1980 S""., No. 12303;
10 Tulso ~w 6 (Sept. 1970), reported in Moiu, 1915
Supp. No. 9753.
• See .ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances, Formal Op. 210 (1941): N. Y. St. B. A. Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics, Op. 189 (1971),44 NIVI York
Stott Bar JOlcmtJl 56 (1972): N. C. St. B. Ethics Comm.,
Op. 813 (1972), 19 Nortll CaroliftG Bar No.4, at 9 (1972);
Okla. St. B. Executive Council, Op. 209 (1961), 32 Oklo-
IIoma Bar JofU'ntll1570 (1961).
• See Johnston, "Legal Malpractice in Estate Plan-
ning," 67 /0flJG 1.auJ RmlVl 629. 654-58 (1982).
- See, e. g., Opinion 354, N. Y. Co. 1.. A. 747 (1940),
reported in Mon', Tilt Digtlt of Bar Association EIMcs
Opiflioru No. 1971 (ABF 1970) (hereinafter cited as
Moru); Opinion 517, N. Y. City 28S (Dec. 6, 1939),
reported in Maru, No. 2673.
III See, e. g., I,. ,., V,'ii's Enot" 183 N. E. 2d 515
(111. 1962); Murut". II. MGt''"''"' 393 N. Eo 2d 256 Unci.
App. 1979).
- See Ho}""s II. Firsl Nol'l Sial' Bk. of N. I., 432
A. 2d 890 (N. 1. 1981); Committ" "n ProfmioMl Ethics
II. ChrisMn, 191 F. Supp. 87 (D. C. V. I. 1961). See also
Wolfman &: Holden, Ethicol Problmu in F"j,ral Tu
Proc,ic,98-99 (1931); Thomason, "How Estate Planners
Can Cope with the Increasing Risle. of Malpractice
Claims," 12 Eztot, P14nrsing 130, 133-35 (May 1985);
Brosterhous, "Conflicts of Interest in Estate Planning
and Administration," 123 Trwts 6- Estatts 18 (June
1984); Moore, "Conflicting Interest in Estate Planning
and Administration after ERT.A: Recognition and Reso-
lution," 17 Mitmli [rutitut, Oft Es'at, P1Gflning f 6.1-.34
(1983); Flaherty, "Conflicts of Interest Arising in the
Two-Spouse Estate Planning Context," Estat" Gift Cr
Trwl JotmIIIl, Ma.Y-June 1982, at 17; and Midoniclc, "At-
torney-Client Conflicts and Confidences in Trusts and
Estates," 35 R,c. A. B. Cit, N. Y. 215 (1980).
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- See' renerally ''Disqualifie:ttion of Coun~f'I-ConRict
of Interest Issues," 30 D,fnu, Lmu JD"",nl 149 (1981);
"Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the
Legal Professional," 94 H4,..",ard 1.tnsJ RftlirJJ 1244 (1981).
- See dilcussion under "ConRict of Interest" in Thoma-
son, "How Estate Planners Can Cope with the Increasing
Rilk of Malpractice Claims," 12 E.rlat, Pla,mi"{1 130,
133-35 (May 1985).
- Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-10H A)
8£ DR 5-107(A) 8£ (B): Model Code of Profe~sional
Conduct, Rules 1.78£ 5.4(c).
- See ethical provisions cited in note lOS. sll{'r.; see
~!ne~lI~ Zissman, "Potential Liability of Corporate
FlduClanes for Estate Planning Errors," 124 TrlUts Cr
E.rt4U.r 28 (June 1985).
... See discuslion in Johnston, "An Ethical AnalYl'is
of Common Estate Planning Practices," 45 Ohio Slate
Law ItnlmtJl 57, 115-24 (1984).
. - ·rhe danlters inherent in the la\VYer'l acceptance
of such a Umited role are illustrated in CONflutictlt ;'",ior
R,tttblic fl. SAarOfa Hos~ttJl, 448 A. 2d 190 (Conn. 1982).
Tbere, a tru.t officer took instructions for a codicil from
the testator, and, in tum, the bank official passed those
instructions on to the attomey-drafuman. The attorney
prepared the codicil, but mistakenly reinstated seven
charities as beneficiaries that bad previously heen deleted
from the testameutary plan. The attorney turned the
draft will over to the trust officer, who took it, alone, to
the tcstator for execution. The testator executed the will
without any detection of the mistake, which \vas uncov-
ered for the first time wbeD the talator died several
,.ears later.
planning the estates of more than one family purchase of additional life insurance is part of
member, such as husband and wife or parent an estate plan, there should be a clear, com-
and child, and potential conflicts of interest pelling need for such insurance. Its purchase
cannot be resolved, one of the familv members should not in any respect serve as "compensa-
should retain the services of anothe; lawyer to tion" to the agent for bringing new business to
provide independent counsel. the attorney. Similarly, a lawyer should not
If the initial attorney decides to represent urge a testator to utilize the fiduCiary services
both members of a family, as will often be the of a bank merely because a particular financial
case, then it is important that each person be institution has sent some of its customers to the
counseled individually. For instance. a lawyer lawyer in the past.l" Moreover, a draftsman
should not prepare a will for a client's wife should not suggest inclusion of a bank, r:lther
when all information regarding her desires is than an individual, as executor as a way of
obtained from her husband. Care should be securing future business, clue to the b:mk'c; long-
taken to meet with each person sepnrately to standinl{ practice of employinl;' the drafting attorr.ey
insure that the testamentary intentions to be to assist in probate.IOT Such "quid pro quo"
memorialized in a will are in fact those of the dealings may have a place in the business world,
particular individual. but an attorney owes all of his or her allegiance
Areas of conflict o.f interest are numerous. to the client and should not be fe:lthering his
For example, a husband may want to leave his or her own nest at the client's expense.
estate in the form of a QTIP trust, but his wife A lawyer should always deal directly with
cannot reconcile herself to such a disposition. the client, and not through an accountant, bank
In such circumstances the attorney would be or life insurance agent. If an attorney takes
well advised to represent only one of the parties. directions from one of the other estate planning
Furthermore, the forum for claims of conflicts 'professionals as to what the testator needs or
of interest has largely shifted from disciplinary desires, then the attorney may find himself or
proceedings to litigation between private parti.es,loa herself serving principally as a scribe with little
and it is entirely possible that a family member~· /,' active involvement other than the drafting of
who had been a client could claim that the ~documents.l" An attorney owes it to the client
attorney had committed' malpractice by attempt- to carry out the client's testamentary intentions,
ing to' represent diverse interests within the and this can best be accomplished by maintain-
family, one of whom is now dead and has dis-
posed of his or her estate in a manner which
the surviving'member does not find acceptable.1M
The transmission of a letter from the attorney
to the appropriate family members explaining
the potential problem areas and the attorney's
understanding that the clients consent to joint
representation could go a long way toward
precluding a subsequent malpractice claim based
on an alleged conflict of interest.
,i. Q. Confticta Among Members of the "Es-
tate Planning Team."-While an attorney can and
often does cooperate effectively with a testator's
accoqntant, life insurance agent, or banker to
develop an estate plan, the attorney should
always be alert to the possibility of a conflict
of interest in working with these other profes-
.ionals. It is essential to remember that the
testator is entitled to the independent advice
and loya1t)- of his or· her lawyer.1DI Thus, a
practitioner should be careful that a continuing
relationship with a bank or life insurance agent
does not affect the attorney's judgment to the
detriment of the client. For iDstance, if the
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ing direct and separate contact with the client.loe
The more distance that there is between the
attorney and the client, and the more informa-
tion from the client that is passed through one
of the other planners, the greater the chance
that the documents that are drafted will not
reflect the testator's true intentions or serve to
meet his or her needs.
R. Proper Use of Paralegals.-Legal assist-
ants have long been used effectively in estate
planning, and this practice is likely to continue.
Much of the work-such as collecting and evalu-
ating data regarding family history and property
ownership, and assisting in the preparation of
drafts of documents-can and should be per-
formed by paralegals, provided that their work
is directly and continuously supervised by the
attorney responsible for the assignment.
In part because of the low fees generated
by estate planning business,no there is.a greater
and greater tendency to overuse paralegals, and
permit them, without adequate supervision, to
do virtually all the work from initial client inter-
view, through preparation of documents into
final form, to supervision of the. execution cere-
monies. While an attorney may want to have
a legal assistant present at the first meeting, and
at execution and attestation, the attorney should
be in charge of and responsible for these occasions.
No matter how intelligent or experienced,
a paralegal does not have a law degree, and
should not be permitted to function as a lawyer
or to perform the more substantive tasks that
lawyers typically undertake. Not only will such
use of a legal assistant raise questions of un-
authorized practice of law, but the lack of legal
training may also result in the commission of
errors that would have been avoided if a lawyer
had performed the work or had provided the
needed supervision. Moreover, overutilization
of paralegals can leave a bad impression on
clients, who like to think that their business is
important enough to warrant a lawyer's time
and attention.
Thus, legal assistants, if properly utilized and
supervised, can perform invaluable services at
the lowest possible cost. But cost consciousness
can be a little dangerous. The desire to keep
the time allocated to a matter in line with the
amount that the client is going to be charged
can put an undue premium on the use of a legal
assistant in lieu of an attorney. This practice
may result in bad client relations, and increase
an estate planner's malpractice exposure.
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S. Higher Fees for Estate Planning Work.-
Many of the corners that attorneys cut in the
provision of estate planning services are attributable,
directly or indirectly, to the low fees that are
charged for such work.111 Conversely, if charges
were based on hourly rates, much as .other legal
work is billed, then the higher fees would not
only increase profitability, but would, in the long
run, justify the expenditure of greater time and
effort in performing the legal services. This,
in turn, would serve to reduce the number of
mistakes and errors, and thus lower the overall
malpractice risk.
Perhaps a testator should have the alter-
native of paying for a low-priced will and run-
ning a greater risk of attorney error, just as a
consumer can choose between a Chevette and
a Cadillac. But there is no indication that this
theory has even been recognized by the courts.
Although there are now enumerable estate plan-
ning malpractice cases on the books, not one
discusses the attorney's fee as a factor in deter-
mining the extent of the draftsman's liability,
or even hints that such a consideration has any
bearing on the malpractice issue. Thus, the
lawyer who charges $50 for preparing a will
has exactly the same malpractice exposure as a
practitioner who would bill $1,000 for planning
the same client's estate.
Moreover, if fees are discussed at the outset,
and the lawyer carefully explains what is in':
volved in providing estate planning services and
why the work is not done on a cut-rate basis,
there is no reason to believe that the client will
balk at this approach. The preparation of a will
or similar document is very important from a
client's viewpoint, and that person is not likely
to make cost comparisons if lower charges are
seen as reflecting a reduction in the quality of
services. Thus, with a little salesmanship, at-
torneys should be able to charge more for estate
planning, and the increased profitability of such
work should provide incentive for the expendi-
ture of greater time and effort during the assignment.
- IE an attorney receives instructions about will
preparation from someone other than the testator. he or
she may be an unwitting participant in conduct constitut-
inR' undue influence. See. e. g.• 1ft re Estate (If Carl't'1Ittr,
253 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1971); Bowe Be Parker, pag, on Wills
1129.84. 29.95 (1961).
•• See the discussion uncler "5. Higher Fees for
Estate Planning Work:' infra.
.,. See Kram. "Estate Planning: The Public's Per-
cet'tions and Attitudes" 8 R,nI Pr(ll't:rly Probate 6- Tnlst
JOllrnal 4R9, 493 (1973); Miller. "Functions and Ethical
Problems of the Lawyer in Drafting a Will," 1950 Uni-
v,rsity ollUinois Law F01"IIIft 415. 441.
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T. Competency in Estate Planning.-A law-
yer should become competent as an estate plan-
ner if he or she plans to work in the area. In
addition to the acquisition of such competence,
an attorney should strive to maintain a high
level of expertise in what has now become a
rather fast-changing field, what with all the
revisions in the federal gift and estate tax law
in the last eight or nine years. To keep abreast
of such changes, an estate planning attorney
should subscribe to leading periodicals in the
field, regularly attend CLE seminars, and be-
come active in local estate planning councils.
Ignorance of changes in the law and the failure
"to utilize new planning techniques implementing
such changes may well result in malpractice
liability.UI
An attorney should not undertake an estate
f)lanning project unless that attorney, or some
other lawyer in the firm, is competent to handle
all aspects of the assignment, including the tax
considerations.11I If no one in the office has the
necessary ex.pertise, the matter should be re-
ferred to an outside attorney who is competent
in the field.nt In certain instances, it may be
appropriate to associate a lawyer with the nec-
essary expertise, rather than refer the entire
matter.uI
The case of Hom, v. P,dh4m 1St serves to
illustrate the dangers in accepting an assign-
ment that, may take 'an attorney into areas of
the law in which"· he or she has little com-
petency. In Homl the clients, a husband and
wife, approached a lawyer in general practice
who had been representing them in other legal
matters, and asked him to set up a Clifford trust
for the benefit of their son. While professing
his ignorance of tax law, the general practitioner
agreed to take on the assignment and prepared
a trust, which his clients executed. Several
years later, the IRS challenged the effectiveness
of the" trust to shift taxable income from the
grantors to the beneficiary-son, and a large
deficiency was assessed against the parents.m
They paid the deficiency and then bought a
malpractice suit against the lawyer who had
let up the trust. The court upheld the plaintiffs'
malpractice claim, and in the process approved
a jury instruction that had been borrowed from
medical malpractice, which provided that a gen-
eral practitioner owes a duty to refer a matter
to a lawyer who specializes in the area if a
reasonable practitioner similarly situated would
have referred the matter.UI On this basis, the
B-21
court ruled that a lawyer who is not competent
in an area can be liable for malpractice for fail-
ing to refer a matter to another attorney with
the necessary expertise.
Moreover, an attorney who is not a specialist
in estate planning should avoid holding himself
or herself out as being an expert· in this field.
Only a handful of states recognize certification
or designation of specialties, so an explicit
holding out of expertise is not likely in the great
majority at jurisdictions. However, an attorney
can make such an implicit representation by
advertising that his or her law practice includes
estate planning or the preparation of wills or
trusts, or that the attorney limits his or her
practice to certain specified areas, including
estate planning.11I While this may technically
not be a statement of "specialization" in these
areas, from a layman's point of view an adver-
tisement that an attorney offers these services
may implicitly involve some holding out of ex-
pertise, or at least experience in the fields
indicated. There is a danger here, because a
lawyer who holds himself or herself out as
being experienced in estate planning is likely
to be held to a higher standa:rd of care in con-
nection with the performance of such services.
Thus, a gen~ral practitioner who indicates' an
ability to perform work in this field may be held
for malpractice purposes to the standard of those
who specialize in estate planning, rather than
to the level of a generalist who from time to
time undertakes estate planning assignments.uo
- See Johnston, "Legal Malpractice in Estate Plan-
ning," 67 101lltl 1.DuI Rft'iftu 629, 6SS-S3 (1982).
"DR 6-IOl(A)(I) of the Code of Professional Re-
.ponsibility provides that a lawyer shall not handle a
legal matter that he is not competent to handle unless
he usociates another lawyer who is comJjetent in the
particular field. See also Rule 1.1, Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.
1M See Hrmw 1'. PICI."., 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (979).
- See DR 6-I01(A)(I), discussed in note 113, supra;
see also EC 6-3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
-158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979).
.. The settlors owned a valuable patent and originally
planned to transfer it to the Oifford trust. At the last
minute they ehanged their minds and, instead, assigned
a Donexelusive patent lieense to the trult. The IRS
usessed a deficiency on the srounds that a nonexclusive
)ieense was ineffeetive to transfer the income tax liability
from the settlors to the trust beDefidaries.
-158 Cal. Rtpr. at 720.
- DR 2-101 (B) (2) of the Code of Professional Re-
.ponsibility permits attomey. to advertise "[o]ne or
more fields of law in whieh the lawyer or law firm prac-
tiees. a statement that practlee it Umited to one or more
field. of law. • • ... See also the U. S. Supreme Court's
decision inJ.. til, MGtt" of R. M. J.• 455 U. S. 191 (1982).
• See 2 R,stGtftMltt (Zrtd) of TtWII I299A comment
d (1965). The Supreme Court of Atkan... hu noted
v. Conduslon
Most of the suggestions that are made in
this article about reducing the risk of malprac-
tice claims in an estate planning practice are
both time consuming and expensive. Many of
the suggested practices involve additional time
in gathering infomiation and in the careful
preparation of documents. All of this is time
which, presumably, could be spent in a more
~onetarily .productive way by working on other,
higher paytng client matters. There are at least
two good answers to these admittedly legitimate
concerns. First, and perhaps foremost, an attorney
who practices in the wills and trusts area should
strive to become competent in this field. Com-
petency is its own reward, but it takes time and
B-22
effort. Second, if the adoption of the sort of
practices and procedures recommended in this
article saves a practitioner just one single mal-
practice claim over the next 10 or 15 years of
practice, then the effort will have been worth-
while. In this area, at least, an oun:ce of pre-
vention is clearly worth a pound of cure. •
that the right of attorneys to publish infonnation about
areas of practice involves a corresponding implication of
expertise in those fields. /,.,., Ammdmmts to tl., Cod,
of P"of,ssilmal R,sporuibiJity DfIll CGftOflS of Judicial Ethics,
S90 S. W. 2d 2, 3 (1979). See also Rubinelli, "Risk of
Liability for Malpractice Increased as Beneficiaries Bring
Suit Against Plannen," EstGt, P/ofI,.iJl{1, March 1981 at
66, 69-70; "Specialization: The Resulting Standard' of
Care and Duty to Consult," 30 Boylor 1.DVI RnMw 729
734-35 (1978). '
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ADDENDUM -- RECENT CASES
'. (1) Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 503 A.2Q 386(1986). This case highlights the serious malpractice implica-
tions that can arise out of an attorney's conflict of interest in
attempting to represent clients with differing interests. Also,
the New Jersey intermediate appellate court in this case
reaffirmed the rule in that state that an attorney under certain
circumstances may owe a duty to persons who are not his clients,
under the balance-of-factors test adopted in Lucas v. Hamm, 364
P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
In Albright, the attorney-defendant was in the middle of a
transaction between an elderly man that executed a power of
attorney in favor of his nephew, who was also a defendant in the
case. The court found that the attorney was providing services
to both the principal and the attorney-in-fact, and thus did not
adequately protect the elderly uncle's interests in connection
with the nephew's sale of a substantial portion of the prin-
cipal's estate in order-to fund the nephew's own business
ventures.
(2) Berry v. Dodson. Nunley & Taylor. P.C., 717 S.W.2d 716(Tex. App. 1986). This decision is significant because, in a
case of first impression in Texas, the intermediate appellate
court upheld the privity barrier and precluded a malpractice suit
brought by disappointed beneficiaries against an attorney
employed to write a new will for a man terminally ill with
cancer. The decision thus rejects the trend reflected by cases
such as Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), to lower the
privity barrier in order to permit intended beneficiaries of a
negligently drafted will to bring suit against the attorney who
drafted the defective document.
The decision also highlights an area of considerable
malpractice risk for estate planners. Here the allegations of
malpractice were posited on the attorney's failure to prepare a
will and have it executed prior to his client's death, where the
attorney was retained while the client was hospitalized with
terminal cancer. The client died some 60 days later, and while
the attorney had prepared a draft of the new will, it was not
executed prior to death. Suit was brought by the decedent's
stepchildren, who would have been beneficiaries under the new
will, but who had not been included in an earlier will.
When engaged to draft a will or trust for an elderly person,
or one who is seriously ill, an attorney would be well advised to
prepare the necessary documents and have them executed promptly
in order to avoid a claim that he or she was negligent in not
seeing such a matter through to conclusion more expeditiously.
801-a
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(3) Brammer v. Taylor, 338 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1985).
Brammer demonstrates that the malpractice dangers of estate
planners are by no means limited to attorneys. In this case, a
bank and its president were successfully charged with malpractice
for their involvement in the preparation, execution, and
attestation of an invalid codicil. As a consequence of what was
deemed the unauthorized practice of law, the bank and its
president were held to the same standard of care of practicing
attorneys for failing to have a codicil properly witnessed.
(4) Connecticut Jr. Republic v. Doherty, 20 Mass. App. 107,
478 N.E.2d 735 (1985). Eight charities brought a malpractice
claim against the attorney who drafted a codicil which inad-
vertently reinstated different charities that had been benefici-
aries under an earlier, superceded testamentary instrument. As a
result of this mistake, the eight charities lost $1.3 million in
bequests, and after an unsuccessful attempt to have the will
reformed [see 448 A.2d 190 (Conn. 1982)], the charities brought
suit against the drafting attorney.
. This case illustrates that there are dangers lurking even in
the most ministerial functions, such as the transposition of the
names of beneficiaries from one document to another. Yet,· this
sort of blatant mistake will often go unnoticed unless the
drafting attorney's office has a routine proofreading procedure
in the case of all wills, trusts and similar instruments prior to
execution.
Here, the Massachusetts intermediate appellate court seemed
to search for some theory that would allow the attorney in
question to escape liability for his obviously negligent conduct,
and found the necessary escape hatch in the issue of proximate
cause. since the codicil which incorporated the erroneous
charities had been read word-for-word to the testator prior to
execution, and the testator had subsequently indicated that his
latest codicil had reverted back to charities previously
included, the court concluded that the testator had ratified the
inadvertent Substitution of the earlier charities for the eight
charities that were supposed to be included in the codicil in
question.
(5) Dickey v. Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App. 1987). In
this intermediate appellate decision, the court affirms its 1986
ruling [in Berry v. Dodson, et al., supra] that beneficiaries
under a will are not in privity of contract with the drafting
attorney, and thus have no cause of action for mistakes made in
the preparation and execution of such documents. This is yet
another recent decision which has declined to follow the Lucas v.
Hamm trend that provides an exception to the privity barrier in
the disappointed will beneficiary setting.
801-b
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Of equal significance, however, is the attorney error which
provoked the malpractice suit. Here, a well-known Houston firm
prepared a will for one of .its clients whose assets included
'~-mineral"interests in Louisiana. The firm apparently was not
knowledgeable regarding Louisiana law and did not seek outside
assistance from a Louisiana firm, as it was discovered upon the
testator's death that the testamentary trust was invalid as to
the Louisiana mineral interests. Where a client has substantial
assets located in another state that might be governed by thatjurisdiction's law, a prudent estate planner should minimize the
inherent malpractice risk by recommending that an attorney in the
second jurisdiction be retained to review the estate plan to
assure its effectiveness under the other state's law.
(6) Hale v. Groce, 304 Or. 281, 744 P.2d 1289 (1987). In
this case, the Oregon Supreme Court adds that state to the
growing list of jurisdictions that have overcome the privity
barrier in order to all~w a disappointed beneficiary to maintain
a malpractice cause of action against an attorney whose
negligence caused the loss of the legacy in question. The Oregon
court arrived at its conclusion on the basis of a third party
beneficiary contract theory followed by several states, rather
than the balance-of-factors negligence theory popularized by the
California Supreme Court in Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (1961).
(7) Hamilton y. Needham, 519 ·A.2d 172 '(D.C. 1986). In a
_prio~ appeal in this same case, Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d
. 1060 '(D.C. 1983), the District of Columbia court had added its
~ jurisdiction to the growing number of states that permit a
nonclient-beneficiary to.bring suit against an attorney whose
negligence resulted in the lost of a bequest or devise under a
will. The partiCUlar error in this case was the inadvertent
omission of a residuary clause, with the result that the rest and
residue passed to an unintended intestate heir.
In the current appeal, two issues of interest are involved.
First, the appellants challenged the plaintiff's failure to
present expert testimony that the attorney's conduct fell below
the required standard of care. The court overrode this conten-
tion by finding that the case came within the "common knowledge"
exception to expert testimony, where the jury is capable of
assessing the attorney's conduct without expert assistance. The
second issue concerned the contention that the trial court erred
in receiving evidence outside the will to establish the tes-
tator's true intent. The District of Columbia court rejected the
holdings in DeMaris v. Asti, 426 SO.2d 1153 (Fla. App. 1983) and
Kirgan v. Parks, 484 A.2d 274 (Md. App. 1984), to the effect
that an attorney is only liable to intended will or trust
beneficiaries in instances where the testator's intent is
reflected in the will itself. ThUS, the plaintiff was entitled
801-c
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to introduce earlier drafts of the testator's last will and
testament which clearly demonstrated the testator's intention to
include the plaintiff as the sole residuary beneficiary.
(8) Jenkins v. Wheeler, 69 N.C. App. 140, 316 S.E.2d 354
(1984). This case involves estate administration rather than
estate planning as such, but the decision has considerable
relevance in the latter context. In upholding a sole
beneficiary's malpractice claim against the estate's lawyer for
failing to include a wrongful death claim as an asset of the
estate, the intermediate appellate court reaffirmed the
balancing-of-factors test to allow a non-client third party to
bring suit against an attorney whose negligent conduct injured
the third party. The decision is also of interest for its
further holding that an attorney's representation of conflicting
interests can form an independent basis fo~ an action in
malpractice.
. (9) Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1981). Marker
is'significant because of the refusal of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota to extend the balance-of-factors privity exception
from the disappointed will beneficiary setting to a closely
analogous situation. In Marker, a surviving joint tenant sought
to bring suit against the attorney who had performed estate
planning services for plaintiff's father, inclUding preparation
of a deed which succeeded in transferring certain real estate,
owned by the father, to a joint tenancy between father and son,
with right of survivorship. According to the son's allegations,
$20,858.18 in federal and state death taxes would have been saved
if the attorney had transferred the property to father and son as
tenants in common, rather than joint tenants.
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied the general rule against
attorney liability to third parties, holding that the case at
hand did not fall within the exception to the privity barrier
often found in will drafting cases. Since the two estate
planning situations appear to be quite analogous, it would
appear that the court wanted to impose some rather substantial
limitations on the balancing-of-factors test of Lucas v. Hamm in
an attempt to keep a lid on the explosion of legal malpractice
claims.
(10) Matter of McCoy, 419 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 1987). This is
an interesting case involving the duties and obligations of a
co~orate trustee of a revocable inter vivos trust to prevent
ambiguities from arising regarding the settlor's testamentary
intent. According to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, a dis-
appointed trust beneficiary has a cause of action against the
80l-d
B-26
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corporate trustee for its negligence in failing to advise the
settlor of the steps she needed to take to amend her trust and
make the plaintiff the recipient of the corpus upon the settlor's
death. This appears to be a logical extension of the Lucas v.
Hamm exception to the privity barrier, but in comparable
situations other jurisdictions have limited, rather than
extended, the Lucas v. Hamm rationale. See Marker v. Greenberg,
supra.
(11) Matter of Strobel, 149 Ariz. 213, 717 P.2d 892 (1986).
The Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Strobel illustrates that
courts may be willing, under some circumstances, to look for ways
in which an attorney's drafting error will not result in a loss
to an intended beneficiary, thereby avoiding potential mal-
practice liability. Procedurally, the case involved a petition
for construction of a will that purported to exercise a general
power of appointment over an inter vivos trust created for
marital deduction purposes by the testatrix's husband. The
intended beneficiary asked the court to find that the power of
appointment had been exercised by language in the will that did
not comply exactly with the trust's requirements, so that the
remainder of the trust would pass to the beneficiary, rather than
to a taker in default. Alternatively, the beneficiary alleged
that the attorney who drafted the will should be liable for
negligence for failing to include the proper language that would
~xe~cise the power of appointment.
, " The" probate court found that the will did not effectively
exercise the power of appointment. The attorney was allowed to
~appeal this decision because the ruling on construction of the
will was central to the beneficiary's alternative malpractice
claim. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that it was clearly the
testatrix's intent to exercise the general power of appointment
over the marital deduction trust, and therefore it would give
effect to the attempt to invoke that power even though the
attempt was technically defective. Thus, the court chose to
rectify a blatant drafting error by the attorney by construing
,the will in accordance with the testatrix's intent, rather than
insisting on a strict construction that would have opened the
door to a malpractice suit.
(12) McLane v. Russell, 159 Ill. App.3d 429, 111 Ill. Dec.
250, 512 N.E.2d 366 (1987). This case illustrates that mal-
practice exposure can exist after execution of a will. Here the
drafting attorney failed to place title to the testatrix's
property in an appropriate form so that it would be governed by
the terms of the testator's newly executed will. The attorney
had prepared a will under which the testatrix devised her
interest in a 240 acre farm, worth $325,000, to a father and son
801-e
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who were tenant farmers of the property. However, the land was
held jointly by the testatrix and her incompetent sister, with
right of survivorship. At no time after execution of the will
did the attorney take any action to sever the joint tenancy to
covert it into a tenancy in common, which could then be devised
under testatrix's will. The testatrix subsequently died and the
farm passed by survivorship to the incompetent sister. Upon the
latter death, the property, in its entirety, passed to the
incompetent sister's cousins. The Illinois Appellate Court
upheld the suit brought by the intended beneficiaries under
testatrix's will, because the attorney's failure to sever the
. joint tenancy was a proximate cause of the beneficiaries' injury.
McLane serves to demonstrate the dangers lurking in the
failure of an attorney to acquire full and complete information
regarding all of a client's property and the exact manner in
which it is held, and then to take such farther action as may be
necessary so that the will will operate effectively to transfer
the testator's property as intended.
The decision in this case is also of interest because of the
.court's application of the discovery rule, so that the five-year
statute of limitations on the beneficiaries' malpractice claim
did not begin to run until the testatrix's death, when they had
their first opportunity to discover the facts underlying their
claim.
· (13) Persche v. Jones, 387 N.W.2d 32 (S.D. 1986). This is
one of two recent cases (the other is Brammer v. Taylor, supra)
which have held bankers liable for errors committed while
assisting testators to draft and execute testamentary documents.
In Persche, the testator requested that his bank draft a series
of wills, the last of which was improperly executed. The court
rejected the privity defense and found that the bank owed a duty
to the disappointed beneficiaries of the defective will. The
fact that the testator may have been contributorily negligent in
rejecting advice that his will should be drawn up by a lawyer
rather than a banker was irrelevant in the court's view to the
question of the bank's breach of duty to the beneficiaries.
Unauthorized practice considerations aside, these decisions
indicate (1) that banks (and other estate planning professionals)
have no greater recourse to the privity defense than do attor-
neys, and (2) that the possible contributory negligence of the
testator who ignores advice or fails to review the instrument
will not abrogate liability of the estate planner to the
beneficiaries.
(14) Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1987).
The Iowa Supreme Court's decision in this case contains several
significant points of law. First, Iowa joins the long list of
801-f
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states which have permitted non-clients to bring a legal
malpractice cause of action in situations involving disappointed
beneficiaries whose interest under a will or trust has been lost
or diminished by reason of the negligent conduct of the drafting
attorney. While joining the trend begun in 1961 by the
California Supreme Court in Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, the
Iowa court went to extreme lengths in an attempt to limit its
holding to the narrow set of circumstances presented in dis-
appointed will beneficiary cases. Moreover, the court gratui-
tously added further limitations, even though its discussion had
little to do with the facts in the case before it. The court in
Schreiner expressly stated that such a cause of action could only
arise where a testator's intent as expressed in a testamentary
instrument has been frustrated by reason of a lawyer's negligent
conduct to the detriment of an intended beneficiary. ThUS, by
imposing this further limitation on non-client legal malpractice
claims, the Iowa supreme Court has added its considerable weight
to the earlier intermediate appellate decisions on this point in
Florida and Maryland. ~ DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So.2d 1153 (Fla.
App. 1983) and Kirgan v. Parks, 478 A.2d 713 (Md. App. 1984).
In addition to its holding, the facts in Schreiner
illustrate yet another area of malpractice exposure for the
estate planner. Here, an attorney prepared a will and then a
cOdicil under which the testatrix devised her interest in certain
real estate to a friend. Within a month after the codicil was
executed, the same attorney brought an action for partition by
sale of the identical real property interest, and the property
was ·sold. ·A year and one-half later, the testatrix died without
changing. her will or codicil. As a consequence, the devise in
question'was adeemed, and the disappointed beneficiary filed
suit against the attorney, based principally on the ground that
the lawyer was negligent in failing to advise the testatrix of
the consequence of the partition sale on the terms of her pre-
existing will and codicil.
In reversing the lower court's decision, the Iowa court held
that such allegations set forth a valid cause of action for
malpractice. However, the court attempted to limit the impact of
its decision by stating: , "In most cases separate transactions
between lawyer and client will not be linked, nor should they
be. No'lawyer reasonably can be eXpected to keep track of the
provisions in the wills of his or her clients, nor the effect on
those instruments caused by changes in the clients' affairs."(at p. 683.) Despite such disclaimer, the fact remains that the
attorney in Schreiner, who apparently did not keep track of the
provisions in a previously drawn will and codicil, was held to be
responsible for the adverse consequences caused by his inadver-
tent conduct.
Thus, in order to minimize one's potential malpractice
liability, a prudent estate planning should review other work
tha~ he or she has performed for a client, including previously
801-g
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drafted testamentary instruments, and advise the client of any
possible adverse impact of the current undertaking on work
previously performed.
(15) Spivey v. Pulley, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145 (App. Div. 1988).
In spite of particularly appealing facts, the intermediate
appellate court in New York has once again held that a dis-
appointed will beneficiary has no cause of action against the
attorney who drafted a defective instrument, since the bene-
ficiary is not the client and therefore is not in privity of
contract with the attorney. In this case, .the attorney used the
sole residuary beneficiary named in the will he had just drafted
as one of the essential attesting witnesses, thus voiding her
bequest under New York law. Spivey thus reaffirms the New York
intermediate appellate court's 1986 holding on this very point --
see Viscardi v. Lerner, infra.
In view of the rec~nt decisions in Spivey and Viscardi, the
statement with regard to the law in New York concerning the
privity barrier that appears at the top of page 784 of my TAXES
article needs to be modified. The law in New York is now clear
that disappointed beneficiaries are barred by a lack of privity
from bringing suit against an attorney who has prepared an
ineffective will or trust. Thus, at the present time, New York,
Nebraska [see Lilyhorn v. pier, 335 N.W.2d 554 (Neb. 1983)] and
Texas [~ Berry v. Dodson et ale (1986) & Dickey v. Jansen
(1987), supra] still subscribe to the privity barrier and
ther~fore bar such causes of action. It should also be noted,
however, that the New York and Texas decisions on this point have
been rendered by intermediate appellate courts, not the highest
court in the respective jurisdictions, although Lilyhorn was
decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
(16) Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash.2d 675, 747 P.2d 464
(1987). This is yet another significant case decided in the area
of estate planning malpractice in the 2-1/2 years since
publication of the TAXES article. On its facts, stangland is
very similar to Schreiner v. Scoville, supra, with regard to the
duty of an attorney to consider the possible effect of present
services for a client on the terms of testamentary instruments
previously drawn for the same client.
In the case at hand, one of the defendant attorneys prepared
a will for a long-term client which left all of testator's "real
property" to two designated individuals. At the time of will
execution, the only real property of any significance was
testator's farm. About three years later, the same client
utilized the services of another attorney in the same firm to
prepare a real estate contract for the sale of the testator's
farm. The second lawyer did not bring the subject matter of the
sale to the attention of the lawyer in the firm that had prepared
801-h
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the will, nor did anyone advise the testator of the impact that
the sale of the farm would have on the devise of real property
under the prior will. A year later the testator died, and by
reason of the sale of the farm, the devisees were effectively
deprived of their anticipated inheritance.
The disappointed beneficiaries brought suit against the two
attorneys and their firm, alleging that the first attorney was
negligent in not originally draftinq the will in broader terms to
protect the devisees' interest and in not advising the testator
of the consequences of the subsequent sale of the farm, inasmuch
as an internal firm memo should have brought the later represent-
ation of the.testator in connection with the farm sale to the
first attorney's attention. The second attorney was alleged to
have acted negligently for not having reviewed the testator's
will prior to working on the sale of the farm. If the attorney
had done so, he would have been in a position to bring to the
testator's attention the impact on the earlier will of the sale
of the farm. The trial cour~.qranted the defendants' motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and the Supreme Court of
Washington affirmed.
At the outset of its decision, the court upheld the
disappointed beneficiaries' standinq to bring suit against the
attorneys, in spite of a lack.of privity, on both the Lucas v.
HAmm'balance-of-factors theory and the third party beneficiary
conbract theory. However, the court then proceeded to find that
the allegations, even if true, did not show a failure on the
attorneys' part to conform to the applicable standard of care.
According to the court, an attorney "has no continuing obligation
to monitor the testator's management of his property to ensure
that the scheme originally established in the will is maintained.
The time and expense that would be required for the attorney to
follow all of the testator's activities with respect to his
property would prevent the attorney from being able to provide
reliable and economical services to the client, and would
constitute an overwhelming burden on the attorney's practice as a
whole." (at 469.) Horeover, to impute to another attorney, even
one in the same firm, knOWledge of the contents of wills
executed at an earlier time "would impose potentially staggering
responsibilities on attorneys. An attorney would have to
research every matter that attorney's firm had previously handled
for the client, no matter how large the firm or how extensive the
firm's prior work for the client. This would place an unreason-
able burden on the attorney and would markedly increase the cost
of providing legal services." (at 469-70.)
(17) Teasdale v. Allen, 520 A.2d 295 (D.C. App. 1987).
This is an abbreviated decision by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals that disappointed beneficiaries can bring a mal-
practice action against the attorney who drafted a will, even
801-i
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though their precise status as beneficiaries cannot be discerned
from the four corners of the will itself. Thus, the court
decided against the broad sweep of a per se rule that appears in
cases like Kirgan v. Parks, 60 Md. App. 1, 478 A.2d 713 (1984),
that in order to be entitled to bring a legal malpractice suit it
must be apparent from the face of the will that the testator's
intent had been frustrated.
The facts in Teasdale serve to illustrate the need for an
estate planner to anticipate possible contingencies in preparing
testamentary documents. The testator's will left all of his
residuary estate to his fourth wife, if she survived him. If she
predeceased or they died in a common disaster, the residue was to
pass to the testator's grandchildren (who were the plaintiffs in
the subsequent malpractice action). Testator died, followed by
his wife's death 62 day~ later. As a consequence, testator's
residuary estate passed via his widow to her children from a
previous marriage. The grandchildren-plaintiffs contended that
the attorney who drafted the will should have provided for the
'possibility of the death of the fourth wife shortly after the
testator, as well as providing for the disposition of his
property if she predeceased him or they died in a common
disaster.
In circumstances involving subsequent marriages, particular-
ly where one or both spouses have children from an earlier
mar~~age, additional planning is needed to avoid the sort of
unfortunate and presumably unintended result that occurred in
Teasdale v. Allen.
(18) Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662, 510 N.Y.S.2d 183
(1986). As previously noted in spivey v. Pulley, supra, this is
a decision of the intermediate appellate court in New York which
specifically applies the general rule barring suits by non-
clients against attorneys to the disappointed beneficiary who
suffers a financial loss by reason of an attorney error in the
preparation or execution of a will. First, the New York Court
reviews authority to the contrary in numerous jurisdictions
following the balance-of-factors theory of Lucas v. Hamm, and
then rejects those holdings in favor of the firmly established
privity requirement.
See further discussion of the New York rule in Spivey v.
Pulley, supra.
(19) Walker v. Lawson, 514 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. App. 1987). In
a case of first impression in Indiana, the intermediate appellate
court in Walker holds that a disappointed beneficiary can
maintain a malpractice action against an attorney who may have
acted negligently in the drafting of a will. The court discusses
both the balance-of-factors theory and the third party bene-
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ficiary contract theory as limited exceptions to the privity
barrier, and appears to approve of both approaches without
specifically indicating a preference for one over the other.
The facts in this case serve to highlight an area of
potential malpractice liability. Here, the attorney prepared a
will for a testatrix who had cancer and wanted to leave all of
her estate to two sons of a prior marriage. Such a will was
prepared and executed, but when the testatrix died shortly
thereafter, her spouse elected to take against the will, thereby
substantially depleting the testatrix's estate. Testatrix's two
sons brought suit against the attorney, alleging that he had
negligently failed to advise the testatrix about her husband's
statutory rights, and that if the attorney had forewarned his
client, the testatrix would have chosen other means of
disposition which would have effectively transferred all her
property to her children. Although expressing no opinion on the
difficult proximate cause issue, the Indiana court did hold that
the complaint stated a cause of action.
If an attorney prepares a will at his or her client's
request which leaves all or SUbstantially all of the estate to
persons other than the client's spouse, the attorney should, of
course, advise the client of the elective share laws protecting
spouses from such disinheritance. But the attorney should go a
step further to help preclude a claim such as the one made in
Walker v. Lawson. The attorney should leave a written record of
the fact that the testator was so advised and still wanted to
leave the spouse out of the will (or include the spouse, but for
an amount less than the statutory share). One logical way to
leave such a record would be to include a statement on the face
of the will to the effect that the testator intended such
omission and the reasons therefore.
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Congress through the combination of elimination of lower
capital gain rates, repeal of the General Utilities (nctrine and
adoption of 2036(c) has made the family ~business and family farm
very difficult to preserve for future generations:
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I. The Revenue Act of 1987 inserted a new section 2036(c),
"inclusion related to valuation freezes", into the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 in an effort to stop so-called
"estate freezes".
A. For section 2036(c) to apply, each of the following
four tests must be met:
Test #1. The person (the decedent to be, whom we think of
as the parent in the typical situation, hereinafter
referred to as "person") holds a substantial interest
in an enterprise.
(a) The use of the word "holds" in the first test
[sect. 2036(c) (1) (A)] suggests that the requisite
holding must exist before the transfer and re-
tention [sect. 2036(c) (1) (B)] described below
occur;
(b) "Substantial interest" means 10% or more of the
voting power and/or income stream in such enter-
prise owned directly or indirectly by the Person.
A new constructive ownership rule has been enacted.
(c) The term "enterprise" is not defined in section 2036(c
However, the conference report says an enterprise
includes a business or other property which may
produce income or gain.
C-l
Test #2. After December 17, 1987, the person must" in
effect" transfer property to a family member having a
disproportionately large share of potential ap-
preciation in such person's interest in the enter-
prise.
(a) The conference report states that a "transfer"
encompasses, but is not limited to, all trans-
actions whereby property is passed to or
conferred upon another, regardless of means or
device employed in its accomplishment (includes
gifts or sales).
(b) A "disproportionately large share "of potential
appreciation is any share of appreciation in
the enterprise greater than the share of
appreciation borne by the ?r~rty retained by
the person.
Test #3. The person at the same time must retain a dis-
proportionately large share in the income of and/or
rights in the enterprise.
(a) The Conference Committee report says "rights"
in the enterprise includes voting rights,
conversion rights, liquidation rights, warrants,
options and other rights of value.
(b) Questions:
(i) Can a person's compensation for services
to the enterprise in the future be counted
as a share in the income of the enter-
prise for this purpose?
(ii) Is rent on a building the person has
leased to the enterprise or interest on
debt owed to person by the enterprise be
considered income of the enterprise?
Test #4. At the time of the person's death he must still
own a disproportionately large share of the income of or
rights in the enterprise.
(i) The three year rule of IRC g2035 - will
apply
B. The result of meeting the four tests is that the
transferred property will be included in the person's
gross estate.
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(1) The transferred property is considered to be a
retention of the enjoyment of the transferred
property [sect. 2036(a)].
(2) Inclusion in the gross estate means valuing the
property at the date of death of the person (or
the alternate valuation date) whether higher or
lower than the value at the time of.the section
2036(c) transfer.
(3) Because the property included in the gross estate
under section 2036(c) belongs to someone other
than the decedent, it cannot be left to the
decedent's spouse to qualify for the marital
deduction.
Adjustments to be made in what is included in the
persons' gross estate.
(1) The conference committee report indicates that a
proportionate adjustment will reduce what's
includable in the person's gross estate to just
that part of the transferred property that is
disproportionately large in relation to the
preferred income or other rights or interest still
retained at death.
(2) The amount included in the estate of the person
will be reduced by the value of the consideration
received by the decedent.
Questions have been raised as to the effect of 2036(c) on
many common situations.
(1) How close together in time must successive transfers
be in order to be treated as one transfer for
purposes of applying 2036(c)?
(2) What will be includable if all the stock of an
enterprise is owned by the child and the parent
then buys preferred stock from the enterprise
(or from the child)?
(3) What is includable if loans are made by the
parent to an enterprise when all equity in the
enterprise is owned by the child?
(4) What if the loan is instead made to the child who
in turn loans the funds to the enterprise.
(5) What if after the loan to the child individually
the child pledges his common stock as security?
C-3
Pre-1989 liquidations of qualfied corporations in
accordance with the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Transitional Rule qualification [sect. 633(d}]
If the person sells all his stock but obtains
a salary continuation agreement?
What is the effect of Section 2036(c), if any,
on the following?
I
the estate, trust or decedent.
Qualified person - individual estate
trust described in l36l(c} (2) (ii) or
(iii). However, Technical Correction
Bill of 1988, 106(g} (B), would
eliminate attribution from such trusts
to their beneficiaries and would treat
any such estate or trust as one person
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Constitutional challenges?
How would tax be paid? Collected?
What if the residuary estate is
insufficient to pay tax?
(i)
On 8/1/86 and at all times thereafter
through liquidation over 50% of stock value
held by 10 or fewer "qualified persons"
determined after attribution.
Fair market value of corporation on date of
Plan of liquidation adopted (or if greater
on 8/1/86 (the applicable value) is no more
than $10,000. However, if applicable value
exceeds $5,000,000 the transitional relief
if phased out. (Blue Book 353) staff of I'
Joint Committee on Taxation general explanat
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (l-iay 8/87)
C-4
Private annuity?
Inter-vivos charitable lead trust?
Buy Sell agreement?
Sales of remainder interest or joint purchase?
Intra-family installments sale?
(i)
Grantor Retained Income Trusts?
(b)
(ii)
Complete liquidation prior to 1/1/1989 by
a qualified corporation.
(a)
Other Areas:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(I)
(7 )
(6)
A.
II.
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B. Non-recognition items
(1) Long term capital gain
C. Major Exceptions to non-recognition at corporate level.
(1) Tax benefit rule.
(a) Previously expensed items. US v. Bliss Dairy
Inc. 460 US 370 1983)
(b) Bad debt reserve - sale not greater than net
value
(2) Assignment of income.
(a) Cash basis accounts receivable. Williamson v.
US 929 F2 524 CT CL ~96l)
(b) Condemnation award. Wood Harmon Corp. v.
US 311 F2 918 (2nd cir. 1963)
(3) Corporate debt to shareholder
(a) Transfer of appreciated property in satis-
faction of debt constitutes sale at a gain
increasing earnings and profits.
(4) Depreciation recapture on personal property and
commercial real estate, section 1245
(5) Excess of accelerated over straightline on
residential real property, section 1250
(6) Investment credit recapture, Section 47
(7) Disposition of installment obligations.
Section 453 B
(8) Farm recapture property. Section 1261
(9) Corporate tax preference. Section 291
(10) In general check prior years tax returns for any
special deduction, credit, exclusion or exemption
the benefit of which might be recaptured.
D. Major Types of Liquidation:
1. Section 333
C-5
(a) 80% of corporate shareholders made election
(b) Distribution within one calendar month
(i) Retain only cash to meet unascertained
or contingent liabilities.
(ii) Non-assignable property, such as tax
refund claims
(iii) shareholder cannot be located
(c) Form 964 filed within 30 days after plan of
liquidation adopted.
(d) Recognition of gain
(i) earnings and profits
(ii) Money and securities
(iii) Pre-share basis
E. Basis of shareholder stock (increased by gain recognized
and decreased by money received) determines basis in
assets received, which is further increased by liabilities
on the assets (liabilities encumbering specific property
increase its basis; other liabilities allocated among all
properties by FMV)
F. Accounts Receivable - may result in ordinary income to
shareholder even though already taxed to the corporation.
G. File forms 1096 and 1099 DIV
H. Must file certain information with tax return and
maintain permanent records. Reg. 1.333-6(a)
I. Collapsibility precludes use of §333
2. Old Section 337 Liquidation
(a) Time of sale or exchange (within 12 month period)
(b) Inventory must be disposed in bulk sale for share-
holders to take advantage of installments sale rule.
337 (b) (1) (z) 453 (b) (1)
(c) Limitations apply to sales to related persons
453 (G) (h)
(d) File form 966 - 1096 and 1099 DIV
C-6
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(e) Use of limited partnership or
liquidating trust. Rev. Proc.
82058 1782 2CB 847.
III. CONCLUSION
Hopefully when the pending amendments to 2036(c) in the
"Technical Correction Bill" is passed, which should be in 1988, it
will be less difficult for taxpayers to identify which past
12/17/87 transfer to family members will cause inclusion and which
will not. However, unfortunately, to date this bill does not
answer 90% of the numerous questions raised under Sect. 3026(c).
Whether Sect. 2036(c) needed to be enacted in the first
place is questionable. Clearly Sect. 2036 (c) makes the continuation
of the family business and farm beyond the present owners'
lifetime even more difficult and unlikely than in the past.
Closely held corporations are hurt by the removal of the
lower long term capital gain rates on corporations, as well as
higher maximum income tax rates on corporations than on in-
dividuals for the first time since 1913. In addition the
resulting double income tax on sale or distributions of capital
gain assets by domestic (Chapter C) corporations upon the
corporation's sale or liquidation makes this form of corporation
an unpopular and potentially costly form of doing and/or continuing
to do business.
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TAX PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR
POTENTIAL AUDITS AND LITIGATION
Overview of the Examination and Judicial Review Process
1. Classification of the Return.
Most Returns are merely checked for mathematical
accuracy. Generally, for a Return to be selected
for examination, there must be not only issues to
be resolved but also a significant sum of money
involved (to recoup the Services' time expenditure).
2. The Examination (Audit).
Note that a contact for information may not be
audit, if the information is required to "perfect
the return." For instance, to supply a missing
Form 712 or other document which should have been
filed with the Return, or to correct mathematical
errors or discrepancies.
a. Types.
(1) Correspondence audit: exchange of informa-
tion through the mail or by telephone.
(2) Office audit: in person meeting between
Examiner and Taxpayer (or representative),
in Service office.
(3) Field audit: an office audit conducted
at the Taxpayer's or representative's
office.
b. Proposed Changes to the Return.
The Examiner will present proposed changes.
In formulating changes, the Examiner cannot
consider the "hazards of litigation" and should
not bargain on valuation issues. Nor can an
Examiner "horse-trade" issues: accepting the
estate's position on one issue in exchange
for the estate's accepting an adjustment in
another area.
c. Estate Agreement with Proposed Changes.
If the Estate agrees with the proposed changes,
the Examiner will ask that the Estate sign a
Form 890 waiving the requirement of a ninety-
day letter (statutory notice of deficiency).
D-l
d.
Signing a Form 890 bars subsequent access to
the Tax Court unless there is a later statutory
notice of deficiency. There may be a partial
waiver: the Form 890 will enumerate those
issues on which the Estate and the Examiner
agree. If no form 890 is signed, assessment
of the deficiency will be deferred for at
least 120 days (30 days to file a protest
after the preliminary notice of deficiency
(30 day letter) plus 90 days to file a Tax
Court petition after the statutory notice of
deficiency (90 day letter» during which time
interest on the unpaid deficiency continues
to accrue.
Estate Disagreement with Proposed Changes.
(1) Preliminary Notice of Deficiency (Thirty
Day Letter).
A preliminary notice of a proposed defi-
ciency will be issued if the Examiner
determines a deficiency. Accompanying
the 30 day letter will be a waiver, in
case the Estate decides to accept the
Examiner's findings. The Estate has 30
days to respond, by filing a written
protest. Without a Protest timely filed,
the Service will issue the statutory
notice of deficiency. In certain instances,
extensions of the 30 day period may be
available.
(2) Protest.
The Protest is filed, in duplicate, with
the District Director responsible for
the audit, who in turn will forward the
Protest to the Appeals Office. Incomplete
Protests will be returned for additional
information. The Protest should contain
the following:
(a) A statement that the taxpayer wants
to appeal the findings of the examiner
to the Appeals Office;
(b) The taxpayer's name and address;
(c) The date and symbols appearing on
the thirty-day letter;
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(d) The tax periods or years involved,
and in the case of the estate tax,
the date of death;
(e) An itemized schedule of the adjust-
ments with which the taxpayer disa-
grees;
(f) A statement of facts supporting the
taxpayer's position in any contested
factual issue;
(g) A statement outlining the law or
other authority on which the taxpayer
relies; and
(h) A declaration under penalty of perjury
that the statement of facts is true
to the best knowledge of the taxpayer.
The following language is acceptable
for this purpose: "Under penalties
of perjury, I declare that I have
examined the statement of the facts
presented in this written protest
and in any accompanying schedules
and statements and to the best of
my knowledge and belief they are
true, correct and complete."
The Estate may request that the Appeals
Office request Technical Advice from the
National Office, which bind the Service,
but not the Estate. Generally, the Appeals
Office is more taxpayer oriented than
the National Office; thus, the best strategy
often is to avoid Technical Office.
(3) Appeals Office.
The conferences are informal and all
evidence may be presented and considered.
The Appeals Officer may consider the
cost and risk of litigation, and may
compromise issues, and may raise new
issues. The Estate may also raise new
issues. If agreement is reached between
the Appeal Office and the Estate, the
parties may sign the Form 890, or a Form
890-AD. Unlike the Form 890, the 890-AD
requires both the Service and the Estate
to agree not to reopen the case. Form
890-AD may be limited just to those issues
agreed on. The legal effect of the Form
D-3
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a90-AD is not as clear as that of a closing
agreement. A closing agreement binds
the Estate and Service, absent a change
in the law (and then only in certain
instances), however the a90-AD may not.
(4) Statutory Notice of Deficiency (Ninety-
Day Letter).
May be issued either because no Protest
was filed within 90 days, or because the
Appeals Office upheld the Examiner's
proposed deficiency. The Estate has 90
calendar days in which to petition the
Tax Court for review of the Appeal's
Office determination. After the 90 day
letter is issued, the Estate may pay the
proposed deficiency without losing the
right to Tax Court review (payment earlier
will deprive the Estate of the right to
go to Tax Court).
(5) Tax Court Petition.
(a) File in Washington, D.C. with the
Tax Court. Timely mailing is timely
filing; however, because the Tax
Court has no jurisdiction absent a
timely filed petition, filing early
and/or in person is generally most
desirable. Note: transport by
private delivery service, rather
than U.S. Mail, will not constitute
timely filing unless the Petition
is actually received by the Tax
Court within the 90 day period.
(b) The Estate may request an appropriate
hearing location (e.g., Louisville,
Cincinnati).
(c) For four months after the petition
is filed and the case is trans-
ferred to the Appeals Office in the
jurisdiction where the Tax Court is
to hear the case, the Appeals Office
may settle the case, and either the
Service or the Estate may open nego-
tiations. Subsequently, District
Counsel will have jurisdiction to
settle the case.
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(6) Tax Court Decision.
The Tax Court may dismiss the petition
(which has the effect of affirming the
Service's deficiency determination) or
grant a default judgment for the Service
or for the Estate--subject to the general
rules and standards of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure ("genuine issue of
material fact," Rule 56). The Tax Court
may increase the Estate's deficiency
above that proposed by the Service. In
certain circumstances the Tax Court may
award litigation costs aginst either the
Service or the Estate.
(7) Appeal from Tax Court Decision.
Appeal may be taken by the Service and/or
the Estate, and must be filed within 90
days after the Tax Court's decision is
entered. The 90 day time limit probably
must be met in order for the Court of
Appeals to have jurisidiction. The other
party has 120 days after the first party
appeals to offer its own appeal. The
proper Court of Appeals is the one in
which the petitioner, if a person, has
legal residence, or, if a corporation,
has its principal place of business or
principal office. Generally, the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure must be
followed. Appeal from the Court of Appeals
is by writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court.
Estate Pays the Tax, Wants a Refund
a. Administrative Procedure.
(1) Before litigation can be brought for a
refund, a claim for refund must be filed
with the Service. The claim must be
filed within three years after the return
was filed or two years from the time the
tax was paid, whichever is later.
(2) Form 843 is used to file estate and gift
tax refund claims, and must be filed
with the service center where the tax
was paid.
D-S
b.
(3) The claim must provide specific grounds
for the refund and sufficient facts must
be stated as well. All grounds should
be pressed and any interest due should
be demanded.
(4) Where filing the claim increases the
administrative expenses allowable as a
deduction on the estate tax return, the
claim should include a refund of the
estate taxes no longer due.
(5) A protective claim or a claim for an
amount which is as yet uncertain may be
filed.
Internal Revenue Review.
Estate and gift tax refund claims are reviewed
by the pertinent district office. The claim
for refund will not be considered (and a "no
consideration" letter issued) if the claim:
(1) was not filed timely;
(2) contests the constitutionality of the
statute as its sole claim;
(3) is for a refund which was waived in an
offer and compromise acceptance, or in a
settlement;
(4) is for either issues, or a tax period,
subject to a closing agreement (absent
an exception);
(5) is for a refund on a return closed due
to a final order of a Court (absent an
exception) .
Generally, the review of the claim for refund
is similar to the audit process discussed
earlier. If the claim is not allowed for ,the
full amount, the Service wil request that the
Estate sign a waiver of the statutory notice
of disallowance. The waiver does not waive
the 6 month waiting period before the taxpayer
Estate can file suit, but does begin the statute
of limitations running.
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Using the Internal Revenue Service Examination Technigue
Handbook for Estate Tax Examiners
1. General Emphasis.
a. Handbook urges agents to be businesslike, but
aggressive in the pursuit of additional tax
revenue.
b. Agents are not to be concerned with the relation-
ship among the executor (donor) and his or
her attorney, accountant, or appraiser. The
agent is urged to contact the "taxpayer" directly
in many instances--a prospect to which the
executor should be alerted.
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d.
Litigation.
Suit for refund may be filed either in Federal
District Court or the u.s. Claims Court. Choice
of precedent may be important in deciding
which forum to use. The Claims Court is bound
by the decisions of the United States Court
of Claims (its predecessor court), the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the u.s. Supreme
Court. A Federal District Court is bound by
the decisions of the Court of Appeals for its
circuit, and the u.S. Supreme Court. No jury
trial is available in the Claims Court and it
does not follow the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (although its rules are similar).
The District Court does follow the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and a jury trial is
available upon request of either party. Both
courts follow the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Appeals.
Appeal from the District Court or the Claims
Court is to the appropriate Circuit Court of
Appeals, and from there, by writ of certiorari,
to the u.S. Supreme Court.
Agents are reminded of the limit on their
authority to compromise valuation issues, or
"horse-trade" issues. Also, agents are instructed
not to consider potential litigation hazards
or the risk of reversal by the Appeals Office.
In short, confidence and aggressiveness are
the agent's "marching" orders.
Agents are not supposed to settle every case,
and their work may be scrutinized if they
D-7
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resolve an excessive number of cases on an
agreed basis. Generally, agents who settle
too many cases are adopting values too low,
or are accepting other positions overly favor-
able to the Estate. These sorts of institu-
tional pressures must be considered when develop-
ing a proper audit strategy.
Concern About Statutes of Limitations.
The Service is very concerned that the applicable
statutes of limitation are met. The Handbook notes
that the statute of limitations may be extended in
gift tax cases (or income tax cases) but not for
estate tax.
a. Usual Time Period.
The deficiency must be assessed, or a statutory
notice of deficiency mailed, within three
years from the time the estate tax return was
filed or was due, whichever is later. There
are three exceptions to this rule:
(1) When a "false or fraudulent return" has
been filed with intent to evade the tax,
the tax may be assessed at any time [IRC
6501(c)]
(2) If the taxpayer has omitted from the
gross estate items includible in the
gross estate which exceed in value 25
percent of the gross estate stated in
the return, the period is 6 years. In
making this computation, any item omitted
from the gross estate shall not be taken
into account, if such item is disclosed
in the return, or in a statement attached
to the return, in a manner adequate to
apprise the Secretary of his delegate of
the nature and amount of such item [IRC
6501(e)(2)]. Court decisions concerning
application of a similar income tax provi-
sion indicate that this provision will
have only a very limited effect in extend-
ing the statute of limitations.
(3) An extra one-year period is allowed for
assessment against a transferee [IRC
6901] .
b. Service's goal is to process returns on an 18
month cycle (2 years for "exceptional cases").
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c. Release of Executor from Personal Liability.
Under §2204, an executor may ask to be relieved
of personal liability, and is entitled to be
so relieved within 9 months after making written
application for discharge, if the amount of
tax the Service notifies is owing is paid
during that period. Agents are instructed to
consider priority handling for returns accompanied
by such request, unless there is sufficient
real property to secure payment of any potential
deficiency. Corporate executors are not given
priority due to the routine nature of their
S2204 requests.
Selection of Returns for Audit.
D-9
"Ordinarily it is the practice of the Service
to examine returns in the order in which they
are filed, and this practice should not be
deviated from except for compelling reasons."
However, the Service recognizes a number of
categories of so-called "priority returns"
which are to be examined regardless of the
first-in, first-out rule.
Priority Returns.
(1) Cases in which the Government's or tax-
payer's interest is in jeopardy due to
the imminent expiration of the statute
of limitation. Such cases require immed-
iate attention.
a. Which Returns Are Likely To Be Audited.
Returns should be retained for audit only if
it has "at least one issue identified likely
to result in a material change in tax liability."
An agent is not to examine a return merely
hoping to find a change in tax liability, or
to verify that all items are correctly reported.
Such audits are "unnecessary and unproductive."
Of course, if a return is selected for audit,
closer scrutiny may be given to items too
minor to generate an audit standing alone;
however, at all times an examination is to
focus on the essential areas which need investi-
gation.
Order in Which Returns Are Audited.b.
c.
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(2) Cases returned by Review for reconsidera-
tion. These cases should also be given
immediate attention and be returned to
Review within 30 days of receipt.
(3) Cases on which the 18-month cycle is
about to run, and cases not completed
within the l8-month cycle. Since the
announced pOlicy of the Service is to
complete all estate tax examinations
within 18 months after the returns were
filed, unless circumstances beyond the
control of the Service prevent such comple-
tions, "overage" cases must be periodically
checked to ensure that the Service does
not become a party to continuing the
delay in effecting their disposition.
(4) Collateral examination requested by another
district. These requests call for prompt
completion of the requested investigation:
complete such collateral examinations as
early as possible in order not to delay
the primary examinations.
(5) Claims for refund. These should be
associated with the related returns and
receive a preliminary examination to
ascertain whether they are entitled to
further consideration, as provided in
IRM 4512. If entitled to further consider-
ation, claims will be assigned and the
examination usually initiated within 30
workdays after receipt in the Examination
Divison.
(6) Elections to pay estate tax in installments
under IRC 6166. The Examination Division
is responsible for determining whether
an election made by an estate qualifies
under IRC 6166 and for advising the install-
ment billing function as to whether or
not the election qualifies. See IRM
4398. Accordingly, determinations regard-
ing acceptability of such elections should
be made as soon as practicable after
their receipt in the Examination function
and the installment billing function
notified prior to the first anniversary
billing date.
(7) Requests for discharge of lien. Good
administration and sound pUblic relations
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require that requests for the discharge
of a lien be processed promptly. IRM
4394 contains instructions for processing
requests for discharge of property subject
to the estate tax lien.
(8) Informant's letters and claims for reward.
It is the practice of the Service to
consider informant's claims for reward
at the earliest possible date.
(9) Cases where adverse publicity might result
or public relations might be impaired
unless an early examination is made.
A number of priority items have been eliminated
from the 1980 Handbook:
(1) Requests for prompt determination of tax
and discharge of executor from personal
liability under Section 2204.
(2) Referrals by Collection involving refusal
to sign a delinquent return.
(3) Cases involving property having a situs
in a death duty or gift tax treaty country,
or involving a beneficiary or donee residing
in Japan.
(4) Requests to postpone payment of tax under
Section 6l6l(a)(2) because of reasonable
cause.
(5) Offers in compromise.
(6) Returns including special-use valuation
elections under Section 2032A.
Form 5225, Estate Tax Preplanning and Examination
Workpaper Coversheet.
The examining agent is required to use Form 5225
to plan and record the audit. The agent is to
list the items to be investigated, the depth of
the examination, the records to be inspected, ques-
tions to be answered and audit techniques to be
employed. The progress of the audit and the agent's
findings at each stage are to be noted. References
to worksheets developed during the audit are also
called for. Managers and reviewers evaluate the
quality of the examination by reference to the
Form 5225 and the Handbook reminds the agent that
D-ll
5.
the activity on a case (as noted on the 5225)
should correspond to the agents time entries,
travel vouchers and sign-out sheet. Practioners
who find themselves in litigation over an estate
tax return may want to pursue a copy of the Form
5225 through a Freedom of Information Act request.
Use of Background Information - the Estate Tax
Return as a Whole.
a. Generally.
The agent is instructed to develop an integrated
"picture" of the decedent, both before and at
the time of death. This explains why details
are often requested that do not appear to
bear directly on the return's central purpose
of reporting assets and liabilities. The
decedent's age, cause of death, occupation,
financial interest, assets and the deductions
claimed on the return are all important.
b. To Locate Unreported Assets.
(1) The Handbook notes that clues to assets
may be found in the decedent's will and/or
trusts. Specific items to examine are
specific bequests of property, and powers
of appointment. The Estate should be
prepared to explain why such property
should not be included in the gross estate,
if it has not been listed on the return.
(2) Schedule K deductions generally relate
to specific assets: thus the Service
will look for that correspondence. This
is especially the case for mortgages,
promissory notes or liens.
(3) Special emphasis is placed on comparing
insurance premium deductions for personal
property with the value of the property
set forth on the return.
(4) The decedent's business or profession
will dictate certain kinds of assets the
Service expects to see on the return.
(a) The Handbook says anyone engaged in
a profession should have accounts
receivable and office equipment.
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(b) Sales persons may have extra commis-
sions due, and life insurance agents
generally have renewal commissions.
(c) Farmers should have certain types
of equipment, and may have unsold
crops depending on the time of year
of death. Farmers may also own
stock in cooperatives, interests in
pooled crops, or revolving fund
certificates. Other occupations
may have retirement pensions or
other benefits includable in the
gross estate.
(d) The absence of any of these items
where the decedent's occupation
suggests their presence, may invite
inquiry from the Serivce, inquiry
which may broaden to include other
issues.
Information Required By the Return.
The Handbook also takes the view that all informa-
tion required by the return and by the instructions
must be submitted by the taxpayer in order to comply
with Sections 6011 and 6018. Reg. 20.60ll-l(a)
provides that the return must include the informa-
tion required by the applicable Regulations or
forms. When this Regulation was issued, the instruc-
tions for Form 706 were printed on the reverse
side of the schedules of the return. While the
instructions were removed from the form in a number
of updates of Form 706, the latest version again
includes the instructions on the back of each schedule.
The Handbook concludes that the Regulation would
be interpreted to require that all information
requested in the instructions be filed with the
return in order for the return to be complete.
Given that the instructions are now on the form
itself, this may well be the proper view.
High Profile Issues.
The Handbook enumerates a number of items which
"are more likely to be incorrect and bear a closer
scrutiny than the average item."
a. Claims against the estate by heirs are to be
reviewed as to their bona fides.
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Promissory notes issued to spouses or children
are to be checked to see if any consideration
was given for the issuance of the notes.
If large claims are paid to the decedent's
heirs, the examiner is to prepare an Informa-
tion Report to ensure that the payment is
included in the claimant's income for tax
purposes.
Marital and charitable deductions are to be
checked to determine whether the beneficiary
qualified and whether any contingency prevents
the spouse or charity from receiving the amount
claimed.
Items listed on the inventory of the decedent's
safe-deposit box and not included in the gross
estate are to be given special investigation,
with the presumption that the possession of
property indicates ownership.
Agents are to check whether the decedent retained
the income, possession or enjoyment of property
transferred without adequate consideration,
regardless of whether there is a provision in
the relevant instrument indicating that all
of the rights were transferred by the decedent.
Any mention of the word "discount" to explain
the valuation of an asset is a signal for
scrutiny of the value reported. Returns with
discounted values are to be given special
attention as to all other matters as well,
since the use of discounted values demonstrates
"an intent to reduce the value of the gross
estate."
If a fractional interest in an asset is reported,
the other owners are to be identified, and
the manner in which the fractional interest
was acquired is to be determined. The purpose
of this inquiry is to see if there are any
unreported gifts involved in the creation of
the fractional interest.
If there is any indication that the decedent
inherited property, special consideraion should
be given to tracing the assets received.
In community property states, the agent is to
determine whether the surviving spouse claims
any separate property, and then determine if
D-14
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this claim is valid. Similarly, the character
of property included in returns as community
property is to be verified.
k. If supplemental documents are missing, this
may indicate that the taxpayer did not obtain
supporting data for valuations, or did not
give proper consideration to preparation of
an accurate return.
1. The Handbook indicates that some taxpayers
may obtain more than one appraisal of an asset,
and only use the one reflecting the lowest
value. Agents are therefore to request all
appraisals of property made shortly before
death or during the period of administration.
The agent is to make sure that there is an
appraisal from each firm for which an appraisal
fee is deducted.
Valuation of Real Property.
a. Generally.
The Handbook contains extensive guidance for
the agent with respect to real property valua-
tion. Unless special-use valuation has been
elected, the agent is instructed to obtain
the "highest and best use" value which is
defined as that reasonable and probable use
that will support the highest present worth
of the (improved) property based on the highest
net return that it can produce over a reasonably
foreseeable period of time. The Service recog-
nizes that a bona fide, arms-length sale within
a reasonable period of time after the valuation
date probably represents the fair market value
of the real estate.
b. Information to Obtain.
The Handbook instructs the exam~n~ng agent to
obtain 12 items of information for all types
of real estate:
( I) The taxpayer's basis for valuation, includ-
ing comparable sales relied upon.
( 2) The tax assessor's parcel number.
( 3) The property's address or a map showing
its exact location absent a street address.
D-15
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(4) A copy of the most recent county tax
bill.
(5) The dimensions or area of the land.
(6) The size, age, condition and type of
construction of all improvements.
(7) Written permission from the estate to
examine the tax assessor's files.
(8) Copies of all appraisals made within
five years of the valuation date.
(9) Copies of all listings o~ the property,
and names of realtors handling the realty,
within the past three years.
(10) Details of all offers made.
(11) Copy of the closing statement if the
property was purchased within five years
of the valuation date.
(12) Any special conditions, restrictions, or
circumstances that would relate to valua-
tion.
The following information about certain types
of property should also be considered. For a
single-family residence, the number and types
of rooms, and special amenities such as pools
and guest homes. For residential income property,
the size and type of units, the actual economic
rent for each unit, and the actual expenses.
For commercial and industrial property, copies
of leases, the names of tena.lts and terms of
occupancy and expenses. On improved land,
copies of any leases or options, the actual
use of the property, and the description of
any growing crops.
Valuation Technigues.
The focus of the section on Valuation of Realty
has moved away from a general theoretical
discussion of possible approaches, in favor
of a discussion of techniques that are used
improperly by taxpayers. The admonitions in
the new Handbook include the following:
(1) Do not use gross rental multipliers in
determining the value of rental real
D-16
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estate: net income multipliers are more
exact and are actually used more frequently
by investors.
(2) In using the income capitalizaiton approach,
taxpayers cannot build capitalization
rates based upon the yield on Treasury
bonds at the time plus an additional
yield for the risk factor, where the
resulting rate is higher than the typical
market rate. Potential appreciation and
tax shelter aspects of real estate are
said to add value to the investment over
and above the net income generated. (Given
the new limitations on passive losses
adopted by TRA '86, the tax shelter benefit
is questionable).
(3) The comparable sales approach creates
great difficulties because the comparables
are rarely, if ever, sufficiently similar
to the subject property to indicate fair
market value without adjustments for
significant differences. If comparables
are used, all comparables must be viewed
by the person making the adjustments and
the valuation.
(4) The residual method of valuation is to
be rarely used, and is most appropriate
when the value of the land and improve-
ments is readily ascertainable and the
net income is determinable. The approach
is not of great value for ascertaining
the total value includable in the gross
estate, but is good for allocating value
between land and improvements.
(5) The replacement cost method is viable
only when the improvements are fairly
new and the fair market value of the
land is independently ascertainable.
(6) If the property is subject to a long-
term lease, the value is largely deter-
mined by the present value of the lease
payments, with residual value of the
property itself being of little signi-
ficance. However, if there are short
or medium-term leases, the property is
to be valued without the leases and
adjusted for the positive or negative
effects of the lease. This adjustment
D-17
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is made by determining the difference
between the present value of the lease
payments and the present value of what
the economic rent would have been absent
the lease. If the lease is to a related
person and the terms are not market rental,
the value of the real estate subject to
the lease should be "adjusted accordingly."
(7) Leasehold interests held by the decedent
as a tenant may be includable as an asset.
The value is the difference between the
present value of the payments according
to the lease and the present value of
the economic rent for that period of
time. The Handbook does not indicate
whether leases may constitute liabilities
under the same rationale, if the actual
rent exceeds economic rent on a present
value comparison.
Special-Use Valuation.
a. Generally.
The special-use valuation election under Section
2032A is one area where the 1987 version of
the Handbook gives substantial additional
guidance to the examiner. It acknowledges
that real estate other than farmland may be
the subject of a special-use value election.
b. Reguirements.
(1) In order for property to meet the pre-
death qualified use requirement, the
decedent or a member of his family must
have been receiving farm income, as opposed
to passive rental income. According to
the Handbook, this means that the decedent
or a family member could not have cash
rented to a nonfamily member and still
qualify.
(2) In applying the pre-death requirement
that the realty must have been owned by
decedent or a member of his family for
at least five of the last eight years,
the Handbook acknowledges that the dece-
dent can acquire the property in a like-
kind exchange or as a result of the rein-
vestment of involuntary conversion proceeds,
with tacking of ownership allowed for
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the swap or reinvestment amount. Any
investment in excess of the swap or rein-
vestment portion must be held for a least
five years.
(3) Property held in a corporation or a partner-
ship can qualify, if the corporation or
partnership has fewer than 15 shareholders
or partners and the decedent's ownership
interest is at least 20% of the value of
the voting stock or 20% of the capital
interest of the partnership. This dual
requirement varies from Section 6166(b),
which requires that only one of the tests
be met. Since Section 2032A(g) indicates
that the 6166(b) approach is to be used,
the Handbook appears unduly harsh. The
transfer of land into a corporation or
partnership will not require any five-
year period if the transfer was nontaxable
under Sections 351 or 721.
(4) In determining whether the 25% and 50%
tests for qualification are met, the
agent is to take into account the rule
of Section 2035(e)(3) and construct a
hypothetical adjusted estate. Under
that rule, transfers made within three
years prior to death are generally added
back to the estate for purposes of deter-
mining qualification under Section 2032A.
The Handbook does not elaborate on how
this hypothetical adjusted estate is to
be constructed. Rev. Rul. 87-122~ IRB
1987-46, 14, indicates that farmland
given away within three years prior to
death is added back to the estate for
the purpose of meeting the 50% test, but
not the 25% test.
(5) While an undivided portion of an entire
interest in realty can pass to a nonfamily
member, any other interest passing to a
nonfamily member generally will disqualify
the property for special-use valuation.
If property passes to a daughter and a
stranger as tenants in common, the Handbook
indicates that the daughter's portion
can be specially valued. If the property
passes to the daughter for life with
remainder to the stranger, then no portion
of that interest can be valued under
Section 2032A.
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c. Material Participation.
(1) Generally.
Detailed audit guidelines are also issued
on material participation.
(a) The first point of reference is
whether self-employment taxes were
paid on the alleged material parti-
cipant's income tax returns. Even
if self-employment tax is paid, the
agent is instructed to scrutinize
returns further.
(b) If the return reflects cash rentals
rather than crop sales, or if it
does not show any sharing of expenses,
the landlord's economic interest in
the property may not be sufficient.
(c) Further, if there is not depreciation
or investment credit taken for farm
equipment and machinery, this may
indicate a lack of material partici-
pation. (Given the repeal of the
investment credit, the latter should
no longer be a criterion.)
(d) If farm management fees are deducted
on the return, the farm manager
should be interviewed to explain
the circumstances and to verify
whether the decedent remained involved.
(e) The Handbook does not direct the
agent to check whether farm losses
appeared as active or passive losses
under TRA '86, but this may still
be a factor.
(2) Other Information.
The agent is instructed to consider other
schedules of the estate tax return itself
regarding the material participation
issue.
(a) Inquiry is to be made for assets
and debts usually involved in a
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farming operation, such as growing
crops, farm animals and production
loans.
(b) The death certificate is to be scruti-
nized to indicate whether the decedent's
health was sufficient to permit the
decedent to participate, and whether
the decedent had the mental faculties
to understand and decide farm manage-
ment issues.
(c) If the decedent died in a nursing
home or in another area of the country
during the growing season, this may
indicate a lack of material partici-
pation by the decedent.
(d) If the decedent owned a car, the
agent is to consider the mileage
accumulated, to see if it is suffi-
cient to indicate regular trips to
the farm for inspection and discus-
sion.
(e) Canceled checks are to be analyzed
to determine if they indicate that
the decedent might have had a summer
home where significant time might
have been spent away from the farm
during the growing season. Review
of personal checks is also suggested
from the standpoint of indicating
where and when they were cashed, to
suggest the dates when the decedent
may have been residing away from
the farm.
(f) Phone bills for the decedent's vaca-
tion home may also indicate when
the decedent was in residence and
how often conversations with the
tenant occurred.
(3) Retired/Disabled Decedent.
The ability of a retired or disabled
decedent to use the time period prior to
retirement or disability to meet the
five-of-eight-year test is acknowledged.
The Handbook indicates that the retirement
disability must be continuous in order
for the exception to apply: if there is
D-21
any break, the five-of-eight-year period
ends as of the last date of retirement
or disability.
(4) Tenants.
The Handbook recommends that all of the
tenants should be interviewed and detailed
questions asked concerning every step in
the operation of the farm, not only as
to who did the task, but who decided
that the task needed to be done and how
and when it was to be done. A 72-question
list is included in the Handbook for the
agent to use in questioning the tenant.
These provide an excellent outline for
anyone attempting to prepare a material
participation lease. The tenant should
be asked such questions as, who decided:
What to plant?
Where to plant?
What crop rotation to follow?
Whether to fertilize?
The type of fertilizer?
When to fertilize?
How to fertilize?
The supplier for fertilizer?
Where to buy the fertilizer?
When the fertilizer was to be
delivered?
Payment arrangements for the
fertilizer?
Whether to apply herbicides?
The type of herbicides?
When to apply the herbicides?
How to apply the herbicides?
The supplier for herbicides?
Where to buy the herbicides?
When the herbicides were to be
delivered?
Payment arrangements for the
herbicides?
Whether to apply pesticides?
The type of pesticides?
When to apply pesticides?
How to appy the pesticides?
The supplier for pesticides?
Where to buy the pesticides?
When the pesticides were to be
delivered?
Payment arrangements for the
pesticides?
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When to plough, disk or harrow?
How to plough, disk or harrow?
The type of seed?
The quality of seed?
The quantity of seed?
If seed treatment was needed?
When to plant?
Where to plant?
How to plant?
How to handle weeds?
Wether to cut weeds?
If ditches were needed?
If waterways were needed?
If ditch maintenance was needed?
If irrigation was needed?
How to irrigate?
Whether to plough crops under?
Whether to replant?
When to combine, harvest or pick
the crop?
How much seed to save?
Whether to clean seed?
Whether to bale hay?
When to bale hay?
Whether to sell?
When to sell?
How much to sell?
Where to sell?
Whether to hire help?
How to hire help?
Who was to be hired?
How much the hired help was paid?
How to arrange for credit for the
farming operation?
Whether to enter a government program?
What supplies to purchase?
Whether to rent equipment?
Who to rent equipment?
What controls or records to keep?
How the equipment would be main-
tained?
Whether the stalks would be ploughed
under after harvest?
When it was time to detassle?
The frequence of contact between
the tenant and the landlord?
How often the landlord would inspect
the farm?
How often the landlord and tenant
would meet to discuss operations
How often the landlord would call
the tenant?
D-23
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When the landlord would call the
tenant?
(5) Remainder.
Remainder interests in farm realty owned
by the decedent do not qualify for special-
use valuation, even if a member of the
decedent's family was the life tenant.
Election Procedures.
Guidelines are given on the requirements of
the special-use valuation election documenta-
tion.
(1) Consent.
Section (18)30 of the Handbook indicates
that trust or corporate consent probably
will require more than the signature of
the beneficiaries or shareholders. Reg.
20.2032A-8(c)(2) requires that the trustee
must sign on behalf of a trust, though
the Handbook does not indicate this. In
Ltr. Rul. 8540003, the IRS stated that
the authorization of the corporate execu-
tion of the agreement by a board of directors'
resolution must be made prior to the
time the election is filed. The capacity
of each signatory must be indicated,
according to the Handbook. The Handbook
indicates that co-owners of property
must consent to the collection of any
possible recapture tax. This is incon-
sistent with a Tax Court decision invali-
dating the requirement of co-owner consent
in the special-use valuation Regulations.
(2) Substantial Compliance.
If the election is deficient in certain
respects, it must still be accepted if
it substantially complies with the Regula-
tions. Specific items which may be supplied
after the initial filing include Social
Security numbers, addresses, qualified
heirs, written appraisals obtained prior
to the filing of the return, the legal
description of the property and designation
of an agent.
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(3) Protective Election.
The Handbook acknowledges that an executor
who does not wish to make an irrevocable
election at the time the return is filed
may make a protective election. Implicit
is the ability to make the protective
election even if the estate qualifes to
make the election at the time the return
is filed. Section (18)30 admonishes
agents that they should not shy away
from auditing a return with this protec-
tive election simply because its perfec-
tion may result in a reduction in estate
tax liability, because any estate tax
reduction will be offset by possible
recapture tax, lower income tax basis
and the possible loss of estate tax
deferral benefits under Section 6166.
Even if an agent does not audit a return
in which a protective election is made,
TAM 8802010 indicates that the executor
may perfect the election within 90 days
after receipt of the closing letter.
Determination of Value.
(1) Generally.
In evaluating the proposed special-use
value, agents are advised by Section
(18)40 to compare crop-share figures
submitted by the estate for comparable
property with the indicated yields as
determined by the Department of Agriculture,
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Service. This is to determine if the
rents are truly comparable. This approach
is ironic given the Service's adamant.
position that such average figures may
not be used by taxpayers for purposes of
establishing comparable cash rents.
(2) Minority Interests.
The Handbook also takes the position
that minority interests and undivided
interests discounts are not available as
to trusts, corporations and partnerships
holding realty subject to a special-use
valuation election. This is consistent
with Ltr. Rul. 8302005.
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(3) Recapture.
If the specially valued property is trans-
ferred after the decedent's death to
someone who is not a member of the family
of the qualified heir, recapture results.
Section (18)50 of the Handbook notes
that members of the decedent's family
are not necessarily members of the quali-
fied heir's family.
Professional Fees.
Consistent with the Service's recent position in
rulings and cases, the new Handbook includes more
stringent guidelines for the deductibility of
attorney's and accounting fees.
a. Regulations and Case-Law.
Reg. 20.2053-2 requires that the expenses be
actually and necessarily incurred in the admini-
straton of the estate. In Estate of Park,
475 F.2d 673 (CA-6, 1973), the Sixth Circuit
considered only whether the expenses were
allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction
where the estate was being administered, holding
the further limitation in the Regulations
invalid. The Seventh Circuit took the same
approach in Ballance, 347 F.2d 419 (CA-7,
1965). However, the Second, Fifth and Ninth
Circuits have upheld the limitation in the
Regulations.
The deductibility of attorney's fees has also
been faced by district courts. In First National
Bank of Nevada, DC Nev., 8/25/77, the Service
had asserted that the reasonableness of the
attorney's compensation was not a state law
question, and could not be determined without
considering the amount of time spent performing
services for the estate. However, the court
allowed a deduction on the basis that the
local probate court had approved the fee and
the fee had been paid. It held that the Service
had no authority to disallow any part of the
fee, absent fraud or collusion. The same
court allowed an attorney's fee equal to 5%
of the estate, in Bank of Nevada, DC Nev.,
5/22/80. The award had been approved by the
probate court, based on the size of the estate
and the customary billing practices in the
area.
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More recently, the Service attempted to
subpoena an attorney's time records concern-
ing an estate in order to determine the reason-
ableness of the fees paid, in White, 650 F.
Supp. 904 (DC N.Y., 1987). The local surrogate's
court had already approved the payment of the
fees, with the written consent of the heirs.
The district court quashed the subpoena on
the basis that the state law standard was the
same as the Federal, and had been properly
applied by the surrogate.
In TAM 86365100, the attoney's fees had also
been approved in a probate court proceeding,
after testimony by the attorney as to the
services rendered, and with the heirs' written
consent. The National Office, however, stated
that it was not bound by the probate court
decision since the state supreme court had
not established a definite standard for allowing
attorney's fees under state law. But, because
the estate was in the Seventh Circuit the
fees were deductible, given the deference
shown by that circuit to state court decisions.
b. Handbook's Approach.
The deductibility of accounting and attorney's
fees is given a new challenge. Under Section
(15)42, accounting fees are to be disallowed
as deductions if the services rendered are
actually the executor's normal duties, and
the executor has taken a full executor's fee.
Attorney's fees are to be challenged if not
reasonable, as determined under the multi-
factor tests set forth in the ABA Model Code.
Section (15)52 suggests that the agent obtain
an affidavit stating what legal services were
performed, how long the service took, and who
did the work. The attorney's time records,
itemized bills and fee agreements should be
examined to verify the reasonableness of the
fee. This instruction is consistent with the
Service's litigating and ruling position, but
may not succeed in the courts if the local
probate court has approved the fee payment.
Other Estate Tax Changes.
Several other changes in the Handbook are worthy
of brief mention.
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Closely Held Corporations.
In determining the value of a closely held
corporation, the 1980 Handbook urged the agent
to keep an open mind. Although the agent was
instructed not to compromise once a valuation
decision was reached, he was urged to give
the estate's position a full hearing before
arriving at his figure. The 1987 version
omits this section. Given that the estate
now faces the possibility of an addtion to
tax for undervaluation under Section 6660,
this apparent change in tone on valuation
issues is somewhat ominous for taxpayers.
The new Handbook gives virtually no guidance
to agents in assessing or waiving the addi-
tional tax under Section 6660, so this impor-
tant matter will be left to each agent's own
discretion.
Joint Property.
Where property is owned jointly by the dece-
dent and another who is not the decedent's
spouse, agents are cautioned that some joint
owners may intentionally not prove contribution,
and instead include the full value of the
property in the estate. This is done to
increase basis and obtain higher depreciation
deductions. Section (10)60 of the Handbook
contends that the examiner may determine contri-
bution independently, and exclude the part of
the property attributable to the contributon.
Notes.
The valuation of notes is gi~en additional
attention. Demand notes cannot be discounted
based on interest rates, according to the
Handbook. In valuing term notes, the remaining
payments due at death are to be discounted
based on a constructed rate, rather than the
IRS general valuation rate (currently 10%
under Reg. 20.2031-7). This constructed rate
is to be based upon rates paid by lending
institutions on savings certificates, increased
for negative factors such as late payments,
inadequate security and amounts necessary to
determine a fair rate of return.
If the note is secured, the taxpayers must
also show that the collateral is insufficient
to secure the debt. To the extent that discounts
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are taken on receivables, the agent is to
inform the taxpayer that any principal received
in excess of the value will be subject to
income tax. If the notes or receivables are
from children or other related entities and
are discounted, the agent is to determine if
there was a gift when the notes were made.
Trust Income.
Agents are advised by Section (11)44 to include
accumulated but unpaid or accrued income of a
deceased trust income beneficiary in the gross
estate, subject to the income distribution
provision of the governing instrument. Inclusion
apparently can be avoided by a trust provision
granting the accumulated and accrued income
to the remainder beneficiaries. The Handbook
also indicates that income for this purpose
includes not only dividends and interest pay-
able in the usual way, but also income appor-
tionable from extraordinary dividends payable
from accumulated earnings on stock held in
trust earned after creation of the trust.
This rule is said to apply under New York
law, for example.
Gross and Taxable Estate.
Agents are instructed by Section (12)40 to
gross up net gifts for purposes of including
the gift tax in the taxable estate, consistent
with the recent decision in Estate of Sachs,
88 TC 769 (1987).
Sections (12)20 and (12)60 set forth the general
rule under Section 2035 that if a decedent
has made an incomplete transfer that would
otherwise be includable under Sections 2036,
2037, 2038 or 2042, and then completes the
transfer within three years of death, the
assets are includable in the gross estate.
In connection with whether a gift was completed
prior to death, agents are alerted to scrutinize
gifts made by an attorney-in-fact pursuant to
a power of attorney, or by a guardian or con-
servator appointed by a court. As to the
former, the agent is to determine whether the
power is durable, i.e., effective after disa-
bility. As to guardians and conservators,
the agent is directed to determine whether
state law permits the fiduciary to make gifts
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under the doctrine of substituted judgment.
In both cases, the agent is to determine if
fiduciaries are permitted by applicable .state
law to make gifts to themselves, where such
gifts were in fact made.
The 1980 version of the Handbook instructed
the agent to exclude property which the executor
incorrectly included in the gross estate under
the mistaken conception that the property was
subject to a general power of appointment.
The 1987 version omits this instruction.
Annuities and Death Benefits.
In the section on annuities, the agent is
instructed not to include death benefits paid
pursuant to a post-death resolution by the
decedent's former employer where there is no
legal obligation, understanding or custom as
to such death benefits. However, the Handbook
characterizes such a transfer as a gift to
the survivor, creating the implication that
the decedent may have made a taxable gift.
This is consistent with Rev. Rul. 81-31, 1981-
1 CB 475, but inconsistent with at least one
court opinion.
Agents are also encouraged to determine if
the decedent was receiving employment benefits
during life which resulted in a total arrange-
ment which required the inclusion of survivor
benefits in the gross estate under Section
2039, even if the decedent had no right to
any lifetime payments under the specific survivor
benefit program. This has been the litigating
position of the Service, which has had mixed
success. The annuity section acknowledges the
excludability of a surviving spouse's community
property interest in death benefits, but only
as to the noncontributory portion of the quali-
fied plan. No instructions are included in
the Handbook on the application of the new
excess retirement accumulation tax under Section
4981A.
Other Provisions.
(1) In evaluating whether a trust qualifies
for the marital deduction, the agent is
to determine if there are remarriage
conditions or discretion to distribute
income to any beneficiary other than the
D-30
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
12.
surviving spouse, either of which results
in disqualification.
(2) In determining whether reasonable cause
exists for a failure to file an estate
tax return on a timely basis, Section
(22)22.2 of the Handbook, in accordance
with Boyle, 469 u.S. 241 (1985), states
that reliance on an attorney does not
constitute reasonable cause.
(3) In Section (22)40, agents are alerted to
potential application of Section 6701 to
representatives and third parties who
advised the taxpayer with respect to the
preparation of presentation of any portion
of the return, and who know that their
appraisal or advice will cause an underpay-
ment of tax. The penalty is to be applied
even though the taxpayer was unaware of
the underpayment potential.
(4) No guidance is given to agents in dealing
with the complex new rules of Section
6166 with respect to holding companies
and passive assets. The former permits
an executor to elect deferral for estate
tax on holding company stock if certain
requirements are met, under Section 6l66(b)(8).
The latter generally excludes assets not
used in a trade or business from being
used to meet the percentage tests necessary
to qualify for deferral, under Section
6166(b)(9). However, recognition is
given in Section (23)65 to the method
for claiming estate tax deductions for
interest paid each year on deferred estate
tax, in accordance with Rev. Proc. 81-
27, 1981-2 CB 548. The ability of the
executor to elect the new Section 6324A
lien, added in 1976, in lieu of a bond
or personal liability for deferred estate
tax, also is recognized.
Gift Tax Audits.
Agents are given several suggestions for finding
unreported gifts made during lifetime. They include
the following:
a. Agents are to check prior transfers of stock
in a family-owned business, if the financial
information discloses that the donor's family
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owned interests in the business not reflected
on a gift tax return for prior periods.
Questions should be asked about any funding
of gifts to a trust where the gift trust was
established several years before, and no gift
tax returns have been filed in the interim.
Any premium payments made by the donor after
transferring life insurance policies should
be included as gifts.
If the donor makes gifts to nieces and nephews,
the gift tax returns of the donor's sibling
should be examined to see if there were reci-
procal gifts, in which event the annual exclu-
sion is disallowed. This result is consistent
with Rev. Rul. 85-24, 1985-1 CB 329, and Ltr.
Rul. 8717003.
If loans are reported on the estate tax return,
agents should check to see if no interest or
below-market rate interest was charged, in
which event there were gifts in the intervening
years.
If the decedent was retired, agents are encouraged
to look for a gift which occurred if the taxpayer
elected to take a reduced pension, so that an
annuity would be paid to the surviving spouse.
This inquiry results from the recent repeal
of Section 2517, but will be reversed under a
provision of the proposed Technical Corrections
Bill if the annuity is a required form of
distribution under the Retirement Equity Act.
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ESTATE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO ENTITY SELECTION*
Norvie L. Lay
Professor of Law
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky
The purpose of this outline and presentation is to examine some
of the estate planning considerations related to the selection of a
particular entity in the operation of a c1ient1s trade or business. It
is presumed that the basics of a partnership, a C corporation and a S
corporation, as well as the general reasons for selecting one from an
operational and income tax standpoint, are understood with the focus
of this outline being limited to the estate planning issues in the
disposition of these ownership interests. It would be impossible to
mention, much less adequately cover, all areas of concern so those of
major importance will be highlighted with more emphasis being placed
on the S corporation.
I. Transfers by Gift
A. Tax Considerations
\
1. Annual Exclusion
IRC § 2503(b) provides that the first $10,000 of gifts
to each donee per annum shall not be considered in
the amount of gifts made during the taxable year.
a. Exceptions
The annual exclusion does not apply to gifts of
future interests. IRC § 2503(b).
(1) Gifts to Minors
A gift to a donee under 21 at the date of
the transfer will not be treated as a gift of
*AII Rights Reserved by Norvie L. Lay
E-l
a future interest if the property and the
income may be expended by or on behalf of,
the donee before he reaches age 21, and will
to the extent not so expended pass to the
donee when he reaches 21, and if he should
die before that date it is payable to the
donee's estate or he has a general power of
appointment over the property. IRC §
2503(c}.
(2) Use of Crummey Trust
In Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F. 2d 82
(9th Ci r. 1968), the beneficiaries had the
right to demand a distribution of the amount
of the contributions made to the trust each
year. The court held this to be a gift of a
present interest even though some of the
beneficiaries were minors and would have
had to have guardians appointed to make the
demands. The right to withdraw may be
conditioned on its being exerc:ised within 30
days of notice.
(a) Knowledge of Withdrawal Rights
The beneficiaries must have knowledge
of their right to withdraw. Rev. Rul.
81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474, and must have a
reasonable opportunity to exercise these
rights.
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(b) Problem of Power of Appointment
Such a power to withdraw assets for
the beneficiary's own benefit constitutes
a general power of appointment, IRC
2514, and the lapse of such a power
gives rise to a gift if the value of the
withdrawal right that lapses exceeds the
greater of $5,000 or 5% of the assets
out of which it could be satisfied.
Hence, the trust should provide that no
withdrawal will lapse if such a lapse
would result in the holder of the power
being treated as making a gift to the
trust.
2. Gifts by Spouses
A gift by one spouse to a third party is deemed to be
made one-half by the actual donor spouse and one-half
by the other spouse provided that they consent to this
treatment. IRC § 2513(c). Hence, the spouse may
make gifts of $20,000 per year per donee.
3. Gifts Between Spouses
A gift of an interest in property to a donee spouse
shall be allowed as a deduction in computing taxable
gifts. IRC § 2523. State inheritance or estate tax
provisions should be checked to determine the extent
of the free spousal transfer on the local level.
E-3
4. Gifts with Retained Interests
While any detailed discussion of the problems of IRC §§
2036, 2037 and 2038 are well beyond the scope of this
paper some mention should be made with regard to the
obstacles these sections pose for life time transfers
since the donors will often have a desire to retain
some control over purported gifts.
5. Valuation Date
Any gift of property shall be valued on the date of
the gift. IRC § 2512(a).
6. Unified Credit
The unified credit is now $192,800 reduced by the sum
of the amounts previously allowed as a credit for all
preceding calendar periods. IRC § 2505. This trans-
lates into the ability to make transfers of otherwise
taxable gifts of $600,000 without incurring any gift tax
liability.
7. Equalizing Estates
Some consideration should be given to the use of gifts
for the purpose of equalizing the estates of the
spouses. Much has been written on this, and more
has been said, but it bears repeating lest it simply be
overlooked.
B. Non-Tax Considerations
1. In General
These may be more worthy of consideration than some
of the tax considerations but rather than attempt to
list them collectively at this juncture they will be
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interspersed throughout the outline where they may
appear to have more relevance and be understood more
easily.
II. Gifts of Partnership Interests
A gift of an interest in a partnership can be structured in such
a fashion that the $10,000 annual exclusion can be obtained.
A. Some Problem Areas
1. Possible Gain to Donor
A donor may be required to recognize a gain on the
gift of a partnership interest if his share of the
partnership liabilities attributable to the donated
interest exceeds his adjusted basis in the interest.
This is caused due to the Code treating the donor as
receiving a distribution of cash to the extent of these
transferred liabilities. IRC § 752.
2. Distributive Share where Partner's Interest Changes
A gift of a partnership interest doing the taxable year
will result in the distributive share of any income,
gain, loss, deduction or credit being allocated between
the donor and the donee according to the number of
days in the partnership's taxable year before and after
the gift. IRC § 706(d). The same rule would apply
to a gift of S stock. IRC § 1377(a). These problems
mayor may not be of great magnitude but can be
eliminated by making the gift at the beginning or the
end of the tax year.
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3. Inability to Shift Earned Income
A gift of an interest in a partnership on the cash
basis, after an item of income has been earned but
before it has been included in gross income, may not
shift the income tax liability of that income to the
donee. Rev. Rule. 60-352, 1960-2 C.B. 208.
4. Gifts of Installment Obligations
A gift of an installment obligation results "in a re-
alization of gain by the donor to the extent of the
difference between the basis of the obligation and its
fair market value at the time of such disposition."
Rev. Rul. 60-352, 1960-2 C.B. 208 at 209. May not
be as great a problem for transfers of obligations
created after 1986 because of the more strigent rules
of reporting on the installment basis but they pose a
trap for the unwary on previously existing installment
obi igations.
5. Family Partnership Problems
A donee will have to meet the requirements of IRC §
704(e) with regard to the family partnership rules
before he will be deemed a partner for purposes of
income taxation. In short, he will be recognized as a
partner "if he owns a capital interest in a partnership
which capital is a material income-producing factor,
whether or not such interest was derived by purchase
or gift from any other person." IRC § 704(e).
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a. The Regulations Tests
The regulations set forth the basic tests for
determining whether a donee of a partnership
interest is a real partner. Treas. Reg. §
1, 704-1(e).
(1) In General
The regulations provide that it must be
ascertained from all the facts and circum-
stances and that isolated facts are not
determinative. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e) (2).
(2) Crucial Factors
Treas. Regs. § 1,704-1(e)(2).
(a) Retained control of the donor over the
distribution of income or restriction on
the distributions of amounts of income.
(b) Limitation on the right of the donee to
sell or liquidate is interest at his
discretion without financial detriment.
(c) Retention of control over the assets
essential to the partnership business.
(d) Retention of management powers or
voting control inconsistent with normal
relations among partners.
(e) Whether there is substantial participa-
tion by the donee in the control and
management of the business.
(f) Actual distribution to a donee of the
entire amount or a major portion of his
E-7
distributive share of the business
income for the sole use and benefit of
the donee.
(g) Treatment of the donee as a partner in
the operation of a business.
(h) Whether the donee is held out publicly
as a partner in the conduct of the
business, in relations with customers or
creditors, etc.
(i) Whether there has been compliance with
local partnership, fictitious names and
business registration statutes.
(j) Whether the donee has his fair share of
control over business bank accounts.
(k) Recognition of the donee's rights in
distributions of partnership property
and profits.
(I) Recognition of donee's interest in
insurance policies, leases and other
business contracts.
(m) Existence of written agreements or
records contemporaneous with the
taxable years involved, establishing the
nature of the partnership agreement
and the rights and liabilities of the
respective partners.
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(n) Whether required partnership tax
returns have been filed.
(3) Other Cons iderations
Despite a formal compliance with all of the
above listed factors, other circumstances may
indicate that the donor has retained such a
substantial ownership of the interest pur-
portedly given to the donee that it will be
ineffective for tax purposes.
b. Supreme Court Test
Even if the above requirements are seemingly
complied with or are not met, the answer is not
mechanical because the safe harbor tests are not
exclusive. As the Supreme Court has said, the
issue "is not whether the services or capital
contributed by a partner are of sufficient impor-
tant to meet some objective standard .•. , but
whether, considering all the facts - the agree-
ment, the conduct of the parties in execution of
its provisions, their statements, the testimony of
disinterested persons, the relationship of the
parties, their respective abilities and capital
contributions, the actual control of income and
the purposes for which it is used, and any other
facts throwing light on their true intent - the
parties in good faith and acting with a business
purpose intended to join together in the present
E-9
conduct of the enterprise. II Commissioner v.
Culberston, 337 U.S. 733 at 742 (1949).
c. Income Taxation of the Donee Partner
Even if a donee is recognized as a partner under
IRC § 704(e)(1), the distributive share of the
donee will not be included in his gross income if
it was determined without allowance for reasonable
compensation for services performed by the donee
to the partnership or if the portion of the share
attributable to the donated capital is proportion-
ately greater than the share of the donor attrib-
utable to his capital. IRC § 704(e)(2).
d. Additional Factor in Limited Partnership
In the case of a limited partnership, consideration
shall be given to the fact that a general partner,
unlike a limited partner, has his credit at risk in
the partnership business. Treas. Reg. §
1.704-1(e)(3)(ii)(c).
B. Non-Tax Factors
A discussion of the tax consideration involved in the gift of
a partnership interest, particularly those of a family part-
nership, highlight the non-tax factors such as loss of
income, loss of control, acceptance of the new partner by
other partners as well as outsiders. They will not be
examined again in limbo.
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JJI. Gifts of S Corporation Stock
A. Control Issues and the SElection
A major concern of the controlling shareholder or family
group is the retention of corporate control and the re-
tention of S corporation status. The control issue and
preventing the loss of the S corporation election are sepa-
rate issues.
B. Ways of Protecting Corporate Control Without Jeopardizing
the SElection
1. Voting Trust
The stock of an S corporation may be placed in a
voting trust under Section 1361 (c) (2)-(A) (iv). How-
ever, because each beneficiary of the trust is con-
sidered to be a shareholder, care must be exercised
not to exceed the 35 shareholder limit. Kentucky
allows a voting trust for a period of ten years.
2. Irrevocable Proxy
An irrevocable proxy may be used as a substitute for
a voting trust under a pre SSRA (Sub-chapter S
Revision Act of 1962) law ruling of the Tax Court.
See Parker Oil Co. v. U.S., 58 T.C. 985 (1972).
Kentucky law recognizes an irrevocable proxy for only
three years unless it is coupled with an interest.
3. Shareholder Agreements
Restrictive shareholder agreements have not been
construed as a second class of stock by the Internal
Revenue Service. See Rev. Rul. 73-611, 1973-2 C.B.
312. Further, since the SSRA allows for differences
E-ll
in voting rights, restrictive shareholder agreements
should continue to be permissible.
4. Voting and Nonvoting Common Stock
One of the best ways to shift income to family members
with the retention of corporate control is the use of
voting and nonvoting common stock. Such stock is
permitted under § 1361(c)(4). Since each share of
stock carries a proportionate amount of income, the
use of two classes of common stock is an excellent way
to shift income to family members without transferring
corporate control. Note, however, that all shares
must have equal rights with respect to the other
attributes of common stock.
C. Drafting Buy/Sell Agreements
1. Scope
S corporation buy/sell agreements are an important
part of estate planning for estates with significant
amounts of S corporation stock. This section of the
outline will cover in limited detail some of the basic
considerations in drafting such agreements. For a
more detailed analysis see an article by David Gray
and Lorence Bravenec, Buy/Sell Agreement of S Cor-
poration Stock Affected by Corporation's Special Tax
Status, The Journal of Taxation, October 1985, at 202.
2. The Form of S Corporation Shareholder Agreements
a. Provisions relating to revocation and termination
of the Selection
E-12
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(1) The agreement should prevent transfers of
stock to ineligible shareholders and transfers
of stock which will cause the corporation to
exceed its maximum number of shareholders
(i.e., 35). To accomplish this the agree-
ment should require prospective transferors
of stock to provide the other shareholders
with notice of the possible transfer and the
right of first refusal to purchase the stock
at fair market value or the price offered to
the third party.
(2) The agreement should state the intention of
all shareholders to continue the Selection
and require a unanimous or high voting
percentage consent to revoke the election.
Without such an agreement the shareholder
or shareholders holding more than fifty
percent of the shares can revoke the
election.
(3) Provisions should be contained in the agree-
ment to prevent a trust from becoming an
ineligible shareholder.
(4) The parties should consider including in the
agreement a provision in each shareholder's
will recognizing that the surviving share-
holders receive a right of first refusal upon
the death of the shareholder.
E-13
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b. Adequate distribution to pay taxes
The agreement should require a corporation to
distribute sufficient cash annually, so that the
shareholder can pay his share of tax on the S
corporation's pass through income.
c. Tax matters shareholder
The agreement should also contain a provision
establishing the procedures for selecting a tax
matters shareholder. This will facilitate the
administration of any tax dispute between the
Internal Revenue Service and the S corporation.
d. Entity v. Cross Purchase Agreements Compared
(1) Funding
Generally the funds used to purchase S
corporation shares will come from the corpo-
ration. This applies whether an entity
agreement or a cross purchase agreement is
utilized. Because of the nature of an S
corporation the double tax problem which
faces shareholders of C corporations is not
present.
(2) Insurance
The common method of being certain that a
prospective purchaser of stock will have the
necessary funds with which to purchase the
stock is to acquire insurance policies on the
life of each shareholder. With an S
E-14
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corporation whether the entity or cross
purchase approach is utilized, a corporation
can be the purchaser of the stock (assuming
the cross purchase plan is pro rata). In
the case of a C corporation entity agreement
provides for a simplification of the insurance
program. Where pro rata cross purchase
agreements are utilized in an S corporation
context, the complexity is eliminated.
(3) Basis
The major difference in an entity and cross
purchase agreement is the increase in basis
of the purchased stock in the hands of the
purchasing shareholder. Since losses are
limited to a shareholder's basis in his S
corporation stock, the cross purchase method
provides an advantage to S corporation
shareholders.
Price
Generally the purchase price for the stock is set
in the agreement by formula or annually adjusted
amount. Many times the value is too low creating
what is known as the "russian roulette" situation.
The best method for determining price is an
independent appraisal. Even then it is advisable
to make every effort to have the parties
E-15
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periodically review the determined price to see
whether it still has currency.
Fixing estate tax values
Determining the rights of the parties to purchase
or sell S corporation stock, four possible forms of
agreement exist:
(1) Binding obligation to sell and binding
obligation to purchase.
(2) The estate "put" (i .e., the personal rep-
resentative has an option to sell and the
corporation or the surviving stockholders
have an obligation to purchase.).
(3) The corporate "call" agreement (i.e., An
option to purchase on the part of the corpo-
ration and the personal representative is
under a binding obligation to sell).
(4) Rights of first refusal agreement (i.e., the
personal representative must first offer the
stock to the corporation or to the surviving
shareholders.) •
The tax consequences of these four types of
agreements are as follows:
(1) Binding obligation agreement normally will fix
the value of the stock for federal estate tax
purposes.
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(2) The "put" type of agreement is a tax disas-
ter. It sets a minimum value but does not
establ ish a maximum.
(3) The "call" type of agreement may fix the
estate tax values if supported by separate
consideration.
(4) Right of first refusal agreement does not fix
the value.
IV. Gifts of C Corporation Stock
A. Some Problem Areas
1• Type of Interests
There are more types of "preferred" interests which
can be created in C corporations than in S corpo-
rations. For example, the only difference in stock
permitted in as S corporation is voting and non-voting
stock. IRC § 1361(b)(l) and § 1361(e)(4).
a. Non-Dividend Paying Stock
A gift of such stock may not quality for the
marital deduction. Treasury may argue that the
donee spouse does not have a beneficial interest
since there is no vote and there is no income
being generated.
(1 ) Contrasted with S Corporation or Partnership
Shouldn't pose a problem because there is no
separate taxpayer as in a C corporation and
there should be a "distribution" of the cash
flow.
E-17
2. Income Spl itting
There may not be as much opportunity for income tax
splitting with C corporations because you are dealing
with at least two taxpayers and payouts (dividends)
will be taxed twice.
a. Contrasted with 5 Corporation; or Partnership
Holders of 5 stock or partners have their distrib-
utive share of corporate or partnership income
included in their gross income even if it is not
distributed. IRC § 702, 1366. This may be a
real incentive to give these interests to children
who are in a lower tax bracket but some of that
benefit may have been lost with the creation of
the two bracket system in the 1986 Act.
B. Non-Tax Considerations
Most of what has been said above with regard to partner-
ships and 5 corporations is also relevant here.
C. Benefit of Familiarity
While familiarity sometimes breeds contempt there may be
more certainty in the planning for dispositions of C stock
than 5 stock simply due to the age of the two corporations
and the amount of time that practitioners have devoted to
each. However, don't confuse familiarity with utility.
E-18
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v. Transfers at Death
A. Tax Considerations
1. Marital Deduction in General
IRC § 2056 provides for a deduction from the dece-
dent's gross estate in an amount equal to the value of
any interest in property passing on which has passed
from the decedent to the surviving spouse to the
extent that the interest was included in the decedent's
gross estate.
a. Limitations
The marital deduction is inapplicable in the case
of a life estate or other terminable interest. IRC
§ 2056(b).
(1) General Rule
No marital deduction where, either on the
lapse of time, or the occurrence of an event
or contingency, or on the failure of an event
or contingency to occur, an interest passing
to the surviving spouse will terminate and an
interest in such property passes or has
passed from the decedent to any person
other than the surviving spouse (or to the
estate of such spouse), and if by reason of
such passing, such person may possess or
enjoy the property after such termination or
failure of the interest of the interest passing
to the surviving spouse. IRe § 2056(b)(1).
E-19
(2) Interest In Identified Assets
Where the interests out of which the proper-
ty passing to the surviving spouse may be
satisfied include any asset with respect to
which no deduction would be allowed if it
passed to the surviving spouse, than the
value of the interest passing to the spouse
shall be reduced by the aggregate of such
assets. IRC § 20S6(b)(2).
(3) Interest Conditioned on Survival
An interest passing to the surviving spouse
wi II not be deemed a terminable interest
which will fail on the death of the spouse if
the death will cause a termination only if it
occurs within 6 months after the decedent's
death or only if it occurred as a result of a
common disaster resulting in the death of
both spouses and such failure or termination
does not in fact occur. IRC § 2056(b)(3).
(4) Valuation of Interest Passing to Survivor
The value shall be determined by considering
the effect which the estate or any inheri-
tance tax has on the net value passing to
the surviving spouse as well as the amount
of any encumbrance assumed by the surviv-
ing spouse. IRC § 20S6(b)(4).
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(5) Li fe Estate with Power of Appoi ntment
The terminable interest rule may be avoided
by granting a life estate to the surviving
spouse, with the income payable at least
annually coupled with a general power of
appointment. IRe § 2056(b)(5).
(6) Life Insurance with Power of Appointment
Same general as in (5) above is applicable to
life insurance proceeds provided they or the
interest therefrom is payable at least annual-
ly and begin not later than 13 months after
the decedent's death. IRC § 2056(b)(6).
(7) QTIPs
In the case of qualified terminable interest
property, it shall be treated as passing to
the surviving spouse and no part shall be
treated as passing to any other person.
IRC § 2056(b)(7).
(a) QTIP Defined
It means property which passes from
the decedent in which the surviving
spouse has a qualifying income interest
for life which means the survivor is
entitled to all of the income, payable
annually or more frequently and no
person has a power to appoint any of
the property to any person other than
E-21
the surviving spouse; provided, howev-
er, that this last power shall not apply
to one exercisable only at or after the
death of the surviving spouse. IRC §
2056(b)(7)(B). Lastly, in order to
qualify the QTIP interest for the marital
deduction, an election must be made by
the executor on the required by § 2001.
IRC § 2056(b)(7)(B)(V). This will
necessitate its inclusion in the survi-
vor's estate when he or she dies. IRC
§ 2044.
2. Transfers with Retained Interests
See § IA4 above where this problem was alluded to in
the gift tax discussion.
3. Valuation
a. In General
The value of the gross estate is determined by
the value of the property at the date of the
decedent's death to the extent of his interest
therein. IRC §§ 2031, 2033.
b. Alternate Valuation
The value may be determined 6 months after the
date of the decedent's death if not sold or dis-
tributed before that date; at the time of the sale
or distribution if made before that date; and, any
interest which is affected by the mere lapse of
E-22
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time shall be included at date of death value.
I RC § 2032.
c. Special-Use Valuation
A topic unto itself but it is included here because
it is often used in the valuation of farm property.
I RC § 2032A. If the business is such that the
decedent's relationship to it is an interest in a
closely held business under IRC § 6166(b)(1),
regulations indicate how the section is to apply.
4. Unified Credit
The estate tax unified credit is now $192.80 but this
must be used in connection with the gift tax credit.
IRC § 2010.
5. Equalizing Estates
As was mentioned under the gift tax discussion, some
consideration should be given to equalizing the estates
of the spouses so as to minimize the total amount of
estate taxation upon the death of both spouses.
VI. Death-Time Transfers of Partnership Interest
A. Some Problem Areas
1. Valuation of Decedent's Interest
a. Alternative Valuation
As is always the case, the possibility of the
alternative valuation should not be overlooked.
However, it may be even more important in the
valuation of a partnership interest where the
decedent was the sole partner or the one that was
E-23
the productive force in the business. In such a
situation a substantial drop in value may occur
between the date of death and six months there-
after.
b. Special Use Valuation
The special use valuation may be used for assets
owned indirectly through the ownership of an
interest in a partnership as well as in a corpo-
ration. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032(a)-3(b).
c. Valuation Discounts
(1) In General
There are not as many cases in the area of
partnerships relative to discounts as there
are in the corporate area but a couple of
cases will be examined.
(a) Minority Partnership Interest
Harwood v. Commissioner, 82 T. C. 239
(1984) was a gift tax case but it serves
as a basis for showing the court's
reasoning in permitting a discount on
the transfer of a minority partner's
interest because of the lack of mar-
ketability and which was also subject to
restrictive transfer clauses.
(b) Limited Partnership Interests
Take a look at Estate of Bischoff v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32 (1977) to see
the factors used by the Court in grant-
ing a 15% minority discount in
E-24
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determining the fair market value of the
decedent's limited partnership interests.
(c) Comparison
It should be more difficult to obtain a
discount in the valuation of a general
partnership interest than in a limited
partnership because of the powers and
rights normally possessed by general
partners.
(2) Use of Buy-Sell Agreements
The use of buy I sell agreements can be used
to bind the service with regard to the
valuation of partnership interest. Much of
this was previously discussed in III C above
and will not be repeated here.
2. Use of the Marital Deduction
There should be relatively few problems in qualifying
the post-death transfer of a partnership interest for
the marital deduction if that is desirable from an estate
planning standpoint.
VII. Death-Time Transfers of S Corporation Stock
A. The Executor Holding S Corporation Stock
1. Timing - How long do you Hold The Estate Open
Since an estate is an eligible S corporation shareholder
during the period of administration, the question
arises as to how long can the administration period be
without jeopardizing the S corporation election. If the
E-25
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period of administration is extended beyond the time
required to complete the ordinary steps of adminis-
tration a risk exists that the Service will stop recog-
nizing the estate as a shareholder.
It appears under Rev. Rul. 73-23, 1976-1 C. B. 264
that the administration can be prolonged solely for the
purpose of making installment payments of estate taxes
under § 6166 without jeopardizing the status of the
estate as an S corporation shareholder.
Taxation Issues
a. Lack of distributable cash
If an S corporation has substantial undistributed
taxable income and does not make substantial
distributions, the estate may have to deplete
other assets to pay the tax. Consider a share-
holder agreement regarding a corporate cash
distribution policy as a solution to this problem.
b. A "Phantom" income problem
Where the income beneficiary and the residuary
beneficiary of S corporation stock are different
individuals a residuary beneficiary may incur an
unfair income tax burden if the will provides that
all taxes are to be paid out of the residue. A
simple solution to the problem is a special will
clause addressing the issue.
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c. Undistributed taxable income and distributable net
income (" 0 NI" )
Since ON I is computed on the basis of taxable
income, the estate pro rata share of undistributed
taxable income can effect the taxation of dis-
tributions to beneficiaries. S corporation undis-
tributed taxable income can cause otherwise tax
free distributions to be taxable. Finally, because
of the per share, per day rule of income
computation, the executor may not know the tax
consequences of a distribution until after the
fact.
B. Proper Disposition of S Corporation Stock
1. Outright Bequest
Unless such a bequest causes the requisite number of
shareholders (35) to be exceeded, or is to an ineligible
shareholder (such as a nonresident alien), such
bequest should not jeopardize the S corporation
election.
2. Use of A Marital Trust
Unless the trust is an eligible shareholder, the be-
quest of S corporation stock to such a trust will
terminate the election. Either a QSST or a Section 678
trust must be used. Either of these types of trusts
can qualify as marital deduction trust under § 2056.
a. QTIP trust
A QTIP trust will generally qualify as QSST.
Note that if the executor wants the trust to
qualify as a QTI P trust and a QSST, two separate
elections must be made. The executor must elect
under § 20S6(b) (7). Further, the income benefi-
ciary must make an eJection under § 1361(d)(2).
b. Power of appointment trust and § 678
A power of appointment trust which qualifies
under § 20S6(b) (S) can also be eligible to hold S
corporation stock under § 678. In order to be
eligible, the surviving spouse must be given an
inter vivos general power of appointment or other
right which would cause him/her to be treated as
the deemed owner of the trust under § 678.
c. Testamentary trust as a beneficiary
A testamentary trust which is not a QSST or a §
678 trust is allowed to hold S corporation stock
for up to 60 days after receipt by the trust. §
1361 (c) (2)-(A) (iii) requires that the stock must
have been transferred to the trust under terms of
a will. The 60 day period is designed to allow
the executor of an S corporation shareholder to
remove the S corporation stock from an ineligible
trust which is the beneficiary of a specific be-
quest of S corporation stock. Note that the trust
need not be created under a will in order to
qualify for the 60 day grace period. Thus, a
specific bequest or pourover residuary device
under a shareholder's will to an inter vivos trust
will qualify for the 60 day grace period.
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d. Grantor trust as a beneficiary
A grantor trust is also allowed a 60 day holding
period to hold S corporation stock after the date
of the grantor's death. If the trust's entire
corpus is includable in the grantor's gross estate,
the holding period is extended to two years.
3. Special planning considerations
Special powers should be given to the executor to
distribute S corporation stock.
a. Non pro rata distributions
Executors should be given specific authority in
the will to make non pro rata inkind dis-
tributions. This power will avoid the risk of the
shareholder being required to distribute the stock
to all beneficiaries and exceeding the 35 share-
holder rule. Also, the executor should be given
the authority to make such distributions without
regard to the income tax basis of the assets
distributed.
4. Powers to protect the Selection
Powers should be given to the executor to prevent S
corporation stock from being allocated to a disqualified
trust. Example, the executor should be given the
power to divest a funded trust, if necessary, to
preserve the Selection. Further, power given to
beneficiaries, either through rights of withdrawal or
powers of appointment, should be limited so that the
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beneficiary cannot unilaterally terminate the election by
exercising the power in a manner which causes the 3S
shareholder limit to be exceeded.
S. Allocation problems
Substantial problems exist in determining whether the
income from S corporation stock should be treated as
"income" or "principal." Carefully defining these
accounting terms can eliminate the potential conflicts
among beneficiaries.
C. Changing In Status of the Corporation After the Death of a
Shareholder
1. Terminating the election
In order for the executor to terminate an S corpo-
ration's status, the estate must own more than one half
of the S corporation's shares in order to revoke the
election without the consent of other shareholders. If
the estate owns fifty percent or less of the stock, the
S election can only be revoked with the consent of a
sufficient number of shareholders holding (in the
aggregate) more than one half of the shares of stock.
2. Executor's Role in Making an S corporation Election
a. Electing for an existing C corporation.
In order to elect S corporation status, the
executor must get the unanimous consent of all
shareholders. If the stock is still held in the
estate, it is the executor not the beneficiaries
who must consent.
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b. Forming a Corporation and Making the S Corpo-
ration Election
Many times the executor is given the power to
incorporate a sole proprietorship so that it may
be continued for the benefit of the decedent's
family. In such a case the executor may want to
consider making an S corporation election. The
decedent's will should give the executor express
authority to make such an election. Under the
TRA 86 changes an S corporation must adopt a
"permitted year. II A permitted year is defined in
Section 1378 to be a year ending December 31, or
any other accounting period for which a corpo-
ration establishes a business purpose.
The executor must consider the effect of a calen-
dar year S corporation coupled with a fiscal year
estate.
D. Effect of S Corporation Stock in a Revocable Trust
1. General Planning Scheme
Typically the tax planner will suggest the use of
trusts where S corporation shares are involved. Most
plans involving married shareholders will include the
establishment of a QTIP trust (to take advantage of
the unlimited marital deduction) and a bypass trust (to
utilize the $600,000 unified credit equivalent).
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If it is assumed that a husband and wife each have a
one billion dollar estate, an estate planner might
suggest the use of an inter vivos trust which is
revocable during the life of the husband and wife. As
part of the estate plan for H & W, S corporation stock
and other assets could be transferred inter vivos to
the revocable family trust.
Division of Family Trust
Assuming the above facts, the revocable family trust
might be divided into three trusts upon the death of
either H & W. The surviving spouse's property would
continue to be held in a revocable trust known as a
"Survivor's Trust." $600,000 of the decedent's prop-
erty could be allocated to a bypass trust, with the
remaining $400,000 allocated to the QTIP trust.
Allocation of S Corporation Stock
a. Bypass Trust Problems
If the estate planner decides that it is beneficial
to accumulate income in the bypass trust, S
corporation election problems arise. In order for
the bypass trust to be a qualified S corporation
shareholder, the trust must qualify as a grantor
trust under Section 671-678 of Subpart E, a
testamentary trust, or a QSST. During the
lifetime of H & W, the revocable family trust
constitutes a grantor trust under Subpart E.
However, after H dies the bypass trust is
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established. If the trust provides for an
accumulation of income, it cannot qualify as a
QSST trust. Such a trust is required to
distribute all of the income currently to the
income beneficiary. Finally, if the trust receives
a pourover of assets from the probate estate, it
can qualify as a testamentary trust, but for only
60 days after receipt of S corporation stock.
b. Interim Trust Problems
In the case of a grantor trust, the 60 day period
after the grantor's death during which the trust
is a permissible shareholder is extended to two
years if the entire principal of the trust is in-
cluded in the gross estate of the grantor and the
trust continues in existence.
At the death of H, H's interest in the family
trust is no longer subject to revocation. There-
fore, H's interest is held by an irrevocable trust
which at some later date will terminate and be
divided into two other trusts (QTIP trust and
bypass trust). This irrevocable trust may be
referred to as the "interim trust." Because of
the existence of this "interim trust" it is arguable
that the continued existence requirement will not
be met. Thus, the QTIP and bypass trusts will
E-33
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not be permissible shareholders for the two year
period after HIS death.
c. The Four Trust Format
There are several ways around the above prob-
lem. The easiest and safest method of avoiding
the termination issue is to establish four trusts.
H & W's 5 corporation stock should be held in a
separate grantor 5 trust. The revocable family
trust will hold all other assets of H & W. The
grantor 5 trust can al so act as a QT IP trust after
HiS death. A second revocable trust can continue
as the bypass trust. This technique should
prevent the interim trust from coming into exis-
tence by operation of law. Note that WI S proper-
ty would be held in a similar fashion, thus creat-
ing a IIfour trust format. II Excess assets in the
bypass trust could be allocated under a marital
deduction clause to the QTIP trust. The use of
the QT IP election can control the amount of 5
corporations stock subject to tax.
The QSST Election
a. Timing -- General Rule
The QSST election must be made within a two
month and sixteen day period starting on the date
that S corporation stock is initially transferred to
the trust or the effective date of the Selection.
which is later. In the case of a grantor S trust
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which ever continues in existence after the death
of the grantor, the filing period for the QSST
election will not expire until the sixteenth day
and two month period has expired after the
earlier of [1] the termination of the two year (or
sixty day) period following the grantor's death,
or [2] the date of the transfer of the S corpo-
ration stock by the trust.
Depending upon whether the four trust format or
an interim trust is established, timing of the
QSST election is different. If an interim trust is
established, the period for filing the QSST
election for the QTI P trust begins at the time of
the transfer of the S corporation stock from the
interim trust to the QT IP trust. If a four trust
format is used, the QTI P trust will qualify as a
grantor S trust which continues to be in exis-
tence after the death of H with the entire princi-
pal includable in His gross estate. Therefore,
the QSST election for the QTIP trust begins upon
the expiration of the two year period after His
death.
b. Timing - The Interim Trust Problem
Many times an interim trust is not officially set
up after His death. It comes into existence by
operation of law. In such a case many practition-
ers take the position that the assets were
E-35
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transferred to the QTI P and bypass trusts on the
date of His death and that those trusts came into
existence on that date. Unfortunately, consistent
treatment would require a QSST election within
two months and sixteen days after His death. To
the contrary, IRS could contend that the interim
trust did exist and that the QTI P trust did not
receive the S corporation stock until the actual
allocation of assets from the interim trust. In
that case the QSST election period begins when
the QTI P trust receives assets. The easiest way
to avoid this problem is the four trust format. If
an interim trust is used, safe practice would be
to make dual QSST elections.
Insuring the SElection
a. Use of a by-sell or shareholder agreement
The importance of a buy-sell agreement or share-
holder restriction agreement cannot be overem-
phasized. It is a critical document preventing
the accidental termination of an Selection.
b. Key terms
Buy-sell agreements have been discussed in more
detai I in Section III C., but a few key terms are
reviewed here.
(1) The agreement should provide that only
grantor S trusts or QSST trusts may be
recipients of S corporation stock.
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(2) The agreement could provide revocable family
trusts must include the requirement that the
QTI P and bypass trusts be formed within
sixty days of HIs death.
(3) The agreement could also provide that S
corporation stock be automatically allocated
to the QTI P trust.
(4) Finally, the agreement should provide that if
all conditions of the agreement have not been
met there will be an immediate and automatic
buy-out of the S corporation stock at the
time of the shareholder's death.
Inadvertent Termination
a. The Relief Provision of Section 1362 (f)
The Code provides a safe harbor in the case of
inadvertent terminations. The provision allows
the Secretary to allow S corporation status to
continue, notwithstanding that a termination event
took place. In order to meet the qualifications of
the Code, the IRS must determine the following:
(1) The termination was inadvertent;
(2) Within a reasonable period of time after the
termination, the corporation has corrected
the violation; and
(3) The corporation and all of its shareholders
agree to any IRS requirements to make
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adjustments consistent with S corporation
treatment.
b. Rev. Rul. 86-110
The Service recently issued Rev. Rul. 86-110,
IRB 1986-38, 11. One of the problems with the
Ruling is that it is based upon the premise that
the individual would not have made the transfer,
but for the advice of counsel that the transfers
would not jeopardize the S election. Unfortunate-
Iy, for the planning practitioner, a key element
of relief appears to be improper (possible mal-
practice) advice of a tax advisor. Thus, reliance
on the inadvertent termination relief provisions
can be dangerous. It is interesting to note that
the committee reports state that lithe committee
intends that the Internal Revenue Service be
reasonable in granting waivers. II One might
question whether Rev. Rul. 86-110 exemplifies
that intent.
Beyond the problems of the tax advisor, no
assurance exists that the IRS will allow relief
from inadvertent terminations. When relying upon
section 1362 (f) the taxpayer appear to be at the
mercy of the Service. Also remember. that the
cost of undoing a transaction resulting in a
termination can be expensive and aggravating.
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Some of the above material relating to trusts is
examined in more detail on an article by Gleitman
and Keebanow, Designing Trusts That Will Pre-
serve The SElection, 67 Journal of Taxation 146
(1987).
VIII. Death Time Transfers of C Corporation Stock
A. Some Problem Areas
Marital Deduction
Under § 20S6(b) nondividend paying nonvoting stock
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which is transferred to the spouse may not qualify for
the marital deduction because the surviving spouse
must have the beneficial enjoyment of the property
during her lifetime.
Valuation
Many of the same problems exist here that were previ-
ously discussed with regard to partnership interests
and S corporation stock and will not be repeated here.
Recapture of Special Use Valuation upon Creation of C
Corporation After Death
Decedent died owing certain farm land and other assets
which were valued under the special valuation proce-
dures authorized by IRC § 2032A. It was subsequent-
ly determined that the farming operations could be
more efficiently conducted through a corporate form of
ownership and it was proposed that the special valued
property be transfi!rred to the corporation with the
shares of stock being issued to the heirs. The
E-39
officers, directors and shareholders of the corporation
are all "qualified heirs" as that term is used in the
applicable section. Furthermore, all of the interested
parties, including the corporation, agreed to an in-
crease in the tax liability which would be occasioned if
the property ceased to be used for farming purposes
by qualified persons within the applicable time period.
The issue was whether such a transfer will be treated
as requiring a recapture of the additional taxes.
The ruling was in the negative. It was provided that
the incorporation of the farming operation, the ex-
change of the specially valued real property for voting
common stock of the corporation and the subsequent
distribution of the stock to the heirs would not be
considered either a disposition or cessation of qualified
use causing a recapture. The ruling was conditioned
on the agreements executed by the corporation and by
the qualified heirs in their capacities as shareholders
that they would be responsible for any additional tax
liability if the special use property ceased to be used
as such within the applicable time period. The ruling
was in line with the regulations which provide "that
real property that is specifically valued property may
be owned directly or may be owned indirectly through
ownership of an interest in a corporation. Reg. §
20.2032A-3(b)(1). Letter Ruling 8617026.
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B• Non-Tax Consideration
Same as previously discussed for S corporation and part-
nership interests.
IX. Tax Aspects of Life Insurance Funded Buy/Sells
A. In General
IRC § 101(a)(1) provides that gross income does not include
amounts received under a life insurance contract if such
amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured.
Hence, the recipient would be able to exclude such pro-
ceeds even though they were received under a life insur-
ance funded buy/sell agreement.
1 . Exception
The above stated rule of exclusion does not apply in
the case of a transfer of a life insurance contract or
any interest therein; for a valuable consideration.
IRC § 101( b) . In that instance the amount excluded
shall not exceed the sum of such consideration and the
premiums subsequently paid by the transferee. For
example, if the transferee paid $40,000 to a transferor
for a pre-existing $100,000 policy and had paid an
additional $10,000 of premiums when the insured died,
only $50,000 could be excluded from gross income.
a. Exceptions to the Exception: IRC § 101(a)(2)
The normal exclusionary rule would apply even
where there was a transfer for value
(1) If the contract has a basis for determining
gain or loss in the hands of the transferee
determined in whole or in part by reference
E-41
to such basis of the contract in the hands of
the transferor.
(2) If the transfer is to be insured.
(3) If the transfer is to a partner of the
insured.
(4) If the transfer is to a partnership in which
the insured is a partner.
(5) If the transfer is a corporation in which the
insured is a shareholder or officer.
(a) Caveat
Notice that the transferee for value rule
would still apply if the transfer was to
a fellow shareholder or officer and not
to the corporation itself.
B. Illustrations Utilizing § 101
1. A Two Party Partnership Cross-Purchase Plan
Assume an A & B Partnership, capitalized at
$1 ,000,000, with a cross purchase buy/sell agreement
funded by life insurance with A owing a policy on the
life of B in the amount of $500,000 and B owning a
policy on A's life in the same amount.
a. Death of Either Partner
Upon the death of the first partner, the survivor
would be able to exclude the $500,000 from
his/her gross income under § 101(a)(1) because it
was paid as a result of the death of the insured.
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b. Transfer of Policy by Decedent's Estate
As a result of the death of the first partner,
his/her estate now is the owner of the policy on
the life of the surviving partner. For a lot of
business reasons, the survivor may wish to buy
that policy. Even though there has been a
transfer for a valuable consideration, the recipi-
ent of the proceeds upon the death of the second
partner will still be able to exclude the entire
amount of the proceeds from gross income because
the transfer was to the insured. IRC §
101 (a)(2)(B).
2. A Partnership Cross-Purchase Plan Where There
Are More than Two Partners
Same facts as in B1 above except there are three
partners in the ABC Partnership which is capi-
talized at $1,500,000. A has a $500,000 policy on
the lifes of both Band C; B has a $500,000
policy on the lifes of both A and C; and, C has a
$500,000 on the lifes of both A and B.
a. Death of Either Partner
The surviving two partners would be able to
exclude the entire amount of the proceeds
under IRC § 101(a)(1).
b. Transfer of Policies by Decedent's Estate
The deceased partner's (A) estate now owns
a $500,000 policy on the life of Band C.
For obvious business reasons, B buys the
E-43
policy on the life of C and C buys the policy
on B's life. Upon the death of either, the
proceeds will be excluded from gross income
because the transfer was to a partner of the
insured. IRC § 101(a)(2)(B). The same
result would occur if the policies had been
transferred to the partnership.
3. A Partnership Entity Plan
Same facts as in B2 above except we now have an
entity as opposed to a cross-purchase plan.
a. Death of Either Partner
Proceeds would still be excluded under §
101(a)(1).
b. Transfer of Policies on Survivors' Lifes
There would be no transfer of the policies
on the lifes of the surviving partners since
they are already owned by the partnership.
Hence, when the remaining partners die, the
proceeds would all be excluded under §
101 (a)(1) because there had been no trans-
fer for value.
4. A Corporate Cross-Purchase Plan
Same facts as in B2 above except there is a
corporation and not a partnership.
a. Death of Shareholder
Entire amount of the proceeds would be
excluded under § 101(a)(1).
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b. Transfer of Policy
In order to avoid the transferee for value
rule the transfer must be to the corporation
in which the insured is a shareholder or
officer. IRC § 101(a)(2)(8).
5. A Corporate Entity Plan
Same facts as in 84 above except there is a
entity plan.
a. Death of First Shareholder
Same result of exclusion as in 84. IRC §
101(a)(2)(8).
b. Transfer of Policies on Survivor's Lifes
Again, there would be no transfer since they
are owned by the corporation and, when
another shareholder dies, the proceeds would
be excluded under § 101(a)(1) since there
was no transfer for value.
C. New Corporation Alternative Minimum Tax
Even though the above discussion of the exclusion of life
insurance proceeds is the norm, beware of changes in the
corporate alternative minimum tax, IRC § 55, and in par-
ticular IRC § 56(c)(1) and (f)(1) which provides that the
alternative minimum taxable income of any corporation shall
be adjusted for book income. For taxable years beginning
in 1987, 1988 and 1989 it shall be increased by 50 percent
of the amount by which the adjusted net book income of the
corporation exceeds the alternative minimum taxable income
E-45
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for the taxable year. Hence, excluded life insurance
proceeds may be included in the determination of the corpo-
ration's adjusted book net income but not in the alternative
minimum taxable income thus causing the recognition of an
alternative minimum tax even though they are excluded from
gross income ••
x. Conclusion
As stated at the beginning, this outline was started with no
ideas of it being totally inclusive but was intended to call atten-
tion to some of the estate planning problems involved in the
disposition of these various property interests. It would be
unwise to close without at least calling attention to the obvious:
the testator's desires should not necessarily be tax-driven.
However, planning in a vacuum is just as unwise. Hopefully,
the outline will call attention to some of the problem areas even
if it does not always furnish absolute answers.
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my appreciation to Thomas J. Luber of
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Louisvi lie, Kentucky for permitting me
to use so freely, including some verbatim use, from an outline
he prepared entitled "Estate Planning for S Corporation Stock
Ownership. II In particular I have reference to pages 11 to 17,
and 2S to 39.
E-46
J
~.:>';';1;,kY"
,>·1
I
d:;§i~,
a'·,r
iiII
1,<$1
I
I"'iff _
I
I
IiiI
I
I
I
fIII
I
I
;1I
r,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
i'
r
r
r
r
r
Copyright 1988
Barry V. Bond
PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THE IMPAIRED BENEFICIARY
Barry V. Bond
Bank One, Lexington NA
Lexington, Kentucky
SECTION F
J
~.'
I
~
I··
•··
Y'~
it
I
1
~I·.'
..
~
I
I'·'i'"
I
I
-
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
,.
,
r
r
r
r
r
r
,.
1
r
r
r
r
PROBLEMS IN
DEALING WITH THE IMPAIRED BENEFICIARY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Classes of Disabled Individuals
B. TWO FINANCIAL CONCERNS OF PARENTS
C. GOVERNMENTAL BENEFITS
1. Where Assets Are Unimportant
2. Strict Assets Tests
3. Cost of Care
a. KRS Section 205.227 (1972)
b. SSI and Medicaid
(1) KRS Section 205.520 (1982)
D. SELECTED TYPES OF TRUSTS
1. Mandatory Trust
2. Support Trust
3. Discretionary Trust
E. BASIC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
1. Obtain Certain Data
F. PLANNING OPTIONS
1. Disinherit
2. Gift to Guardian
3. Gift to Child
4. Trust
5. Discretionary Trust
G. PRECATORY LANGUAGE
H. THE SITUATION IN KENTUCKY
1. KRS Section 205.200(1)
2. KRS Section 205.010(3)
3. KRS Section 205.210(1)
4. KRS Section 205.210(2)
5. KRS Section 205.227(2)
I. INTENT OF THE SETTLOR
1. Department of Public Welfare v.
Meek
2. Lang v. Department of Public
Welfare
J. SELECTION OF THE TRUSTEE
1. Corporate
2. Individual
K. CONCLUSION
SECTION F
Page
F-l
F-2
F-3
F-4
F-4
F-5
F-5
F-5
F-5
F-9
F-IO
F-12
F-13
F-15
F-17
F-17
F-18
F-18
F-19
F-20
F-21
F-22
F-22
F-23
£-23
F-23
F-24
F-24
F-24
F-26
F-26
F-28
F-31
F-32
F-33
F-34
..
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
ESTATE PLANNING SEMINAR
1988
PROBLEMS IN
DEALING WITH THE IMPAIRED BENEFICIARY
By Barry V. Bond
Trust Division Manager
BANK ONE, LEXINGTON, NA
Lexington, Kentucky
INTRODUCTION
For the most part, Americans tend to be "eternal optimists,"
often reluctant to plan for tomorrow because tomorrow will take
care of itself. Therefore, as a general rUle, Americans do not
like to plan for their futures, and are not particularly adept at
r
r
r doing so. The consequences of non-planning to the average,
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mature beneficiary may be costly and time-consuming. To the
disabled beneficiary, however, because of his or her vulnerabil-
ity, non-planning can be devastating.
Disabled beneficiaries need comprehensive estate and finan-
cia1 planning that encompasses the concerns that both the elderly
and the families of disabled individuals have about the future
such as housing, medical needs, extended care, educational needs,
etc. As advances in medical science continue to extend life
expectancy, and as governmental programs become more pervasive as
well as complex, comprehensive planning, while always important,
will become an absolute necessity. Although such planning cannot
anticipate all contingencies or guarantee happiness, it can have
F-l
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their parents. Many of the planning concepts recommended here,
Very often the thrust of planning articles is directed toward the
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There areof this discussion is the disabled benef iciary.
several different classes of disabled:
6. persons who are at risk of becoming members of
one of these groups in the near future.
1. mentally retarded and developmentally disabled
persons;
life change.
It almost goes without saying that almost everyone can
benefit from comprehensive planning. However, the primary focus
a positive influence on what happens during and after a major
2. chronically mentally ill persons;
3. severely physically disabled individuals;
4. older individuals, particularly the frail
elderly;
5. individuals with drug and alcoholdependencies;
older American; this discussion will focus primarily on the
planning needs of mentally disabled children or young adults and
however, can also be utilized for the frail elderly.
The term mentally disabled can be used to define a person
sUffering from a loss or lack of mental capacity to an extent
that gives cause to believe that the person has or will have
diminished capability to handle financial affairs. Moreover, the
mental disability is likely to be permanent although subject to
amelioration by education, training or rehabilitation. Mental
disability is to be distinguished from mental illnesses such as
depression or schizophrenia, disorders which mayor may not be
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curable and mayor may not be permanent afflictions. Frolik,
Discretionary Trusts for a Disabled Beneficiary: a Solution Q£ ~
Trap fQ.!: the Unwary? U. OF PITT. L. REV. 335, 336 (1985)
TWO FINANCIAL CONCERNS OF PARENTS
Parents with a mentally disabled child must deal with what
will happen to that child when both parents are dead or unable to
take care of that child because of their own disability. The
parents of a disabled child have two primary financial concerns.
First, they want to be sure the assets they leave or set aside
for their child are appropriately invested as well as spent to
provide for the child's entire lifetime. Second, they want to be
sure the assets are used in a manner that will not negatively
interfere with the child's right to receive governmental
financial assistance or in a manner that results in the assets
being exhausted by governmental or creditor claims. In other
words,the parents of a disabled child want to insure they are
making a gift to their child rather than a gift to their govern-
ment If there are other non-disabled children involved, there
is also concern that the entire estate not be exhausted by the
needs of the disabled child leaving the other children with
little or no inheritance.
An additional valid concern--of equal importance--is insur-
ing that someone will be there to look after the child's needs
and to protect the child's rights. They want to insure that even
after their death the child will continue to receive proper
physical care as well as a generous measure of love.
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documents could result in the denial or loss of such benefits.
GOVERNMENTAL BENEFITS
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The planner must integrate normalneeds of the disabled.
Government benefits for the disabled may be grouped
into three categories. First, some government
programs are available without regard to the amount
of the individual's income or assets. Examples
include Social Security benefits to an insured
retired worker, Medicare to persons over age 65,
planning tools and techniques with the specialized planning needs
of the disabled child. For instance, the planner cannot simply
assume that the disabled child's condition will maintain its
Estate planning for parents of the mentally disabled
requires knowledge of fundamental estate planning techniques
combined with an awareness of the particular opportun~ties and
based upon stringent eligibility requirements. Carelessly drafted
current degree of severity. On the contrary, the cautious plan-
ner will structure the estate plan to accomodate the possible
worsening of the child's condition (for example, eventual insti-
tutionalization). Futhermore, the planner must take into account
both current and future availability of governmental benefits.
Governmental financial assistance available to the disabled are
Owens and Jordan, "Estate Planning for Parents of Mentally
Disabled Children," Trusts! Estates, September 1987
government assistance programs is necessary.
Since the need to integrate governmental programs with
comprehensive planning arrangements is the singular feature which
distinguishes the planning needs of the parent of a disabled
child from the planning needs of other parents, a review of
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and an appropriate education program for any
school-aged child.
Second, some benefit programs are available only to
individuals who qualify under strict income and
assets tests. These need-based benefits are not
ex c 1us i vely for the dis a b1e d 1 rather, ind i v i dua~l s
qualify on account of their poverty. If the
disabled individual is poor enough, receipt of the
benefit follows. Supplemental Security Income,
Medical Assistance, and federal food stamps are
typical of such welfare programs.
Third, some government programs called cost-of-care
are made available to specified individuals without
regard to income and assets, but the cost of these
programs is charged to the individual in proportion
to the individual's ability to pay. Frolik, Estate
Planning for Parents of Mentally Disabled Children,
U. OF PITT. L. REV. 303,315 (1979)
In Kentucky, per KRS Section 205.227 (1972), the State has a
statutory right to reimbursement for the costs of institution-
alized care of mentally disabled individuals. The amount of the
reimbursement charge increases proportionately with the income
and assets of the institutionalized individual.
Of particular concern to the estate planner are two
federal, need-based assistance programs: Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI) and the Medical Assis-
tance Program (Medicaid). SSI is designed to pro-
vide a guaranteed minimum annual income to the
aged, blind, and disabled. Reflecting its original
conception as a supplement to Social Secur i ty
insurance, SSI provides a monthly cash grant to
qualifying individuals which is periodically
adjusted to reflect increases in the Consumer Price
Index. SSI is meant to be a "safety net," so that
any other source of income will cause dollar for
dollar reduction in the amount of SSI. "Income"
for purposes of SSI is defined as "anything you
receive in cash or in kind that you can use to meet
your needs for food, clothing or shelter." Income
includes both "earned income" (e.g. wages) and
"unearned income" (e.g. dividends and rents).
Unearned income specifically includes gifts and
inheritances. An individual, for example, who
received $100 monthly from Social Security or from
a trust would have his SSI reduced by $100 per
month. If an individual's income exceeds the SSI
F-5
maximum payment amount, the individual is no longer
eligible for SSI. (Frolik-198S)
SSI eligibility is achieved through establishing n~ed based
on an income and a resource (asset ownership) test. A.. disabled
single child is generally eligible for SSI benefits of up to
$4,080 annually if he or she has "income" of less than $4,080
(after taking into account certain exclusions), and whose
resources are $1,900 or less in 1988. (Owens, Jordon. See 20
C.F.R. 4l6.l20S. Income figures change annually based upon the
CPI, 20 C.F.R. 410.40S, 410.410)
It is equally as important to keep in mind that
certain items are specifically excluded from the
def ini tion of income for SSI purposes. These
exclusions include:
1. Real estate tax refunds:
2. Payments received under state or local pro-
grams based upon need:
3. Grants, scholarships or fellowships received
for use in paying educational tuition and
fees:
4. Home produce utilized by the household for its
own consumption:
S. One-third of child support payments received
from an absent parent:
6. Foster care payments for an ineligible child
living in the home of the claimant where the
child was placed in the home by a child-
placement/child-care agency:
7. Disaster relief assistance:
8. Income necessary for fulfillment of a plan of
self-support for a blind or disabled
recipient:
9. Certain assistance based on need received to
assist in meeting the costs of home energy:
10. Medical care and services paid directly to the
provider by someone else:
11. The value of any support and maintenance
furnished during a medical confinement.
In addition to these exclusions are two other
excluded sources of receipts. The first is the
receipt of property or services which cannot be
utilized for food, clothing and shelter such as the
payment of a telephone bill by a trustee or
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personal services provided the child such as lawn
care or housekeeping. Second is the receipt of
small amounts of earned as well as unearned income.
(Owens, Jordan)
As indicated earlier, the resources of the disabled child
can also result in a disallowance of 551. An unmarried and
otherwise eligible individual cannot have over $1,800 of non-
excludable resources. A resource is defined as cash, liquid
assets or any real or personal property that the individual owns
and could convert to cash to use for his support and maintenance.
The key is the ability to liquidate the property. The regulation
states: "If the individual has the right, authority or power to
liquidate the property, or his share of the property, it is
considered a resource. If a property right cannot be liquidated,
the property will not be considered a resource of the individual.
(Frolik 1979)
If the individual is married the resources of the spouse are
included in the calculation of resources, although the allowable
r limit is increased. Retention of non-excludable property in
excess of the allowable resource limitation will result in a
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r complete denial of 551 payments. (Frolik 1979)
However, certain assets are excluded from the determination
of resources. Since these assets can affect estate planning,
r they need to be reviewed in detail. A home owned and occupied as
I
a principle residence by the eligible person is excluded regard-
r
I
r
r
r
less of the value of the home. Some of the other exclusions are:
1. Household goods and personal effects whose total market
value are less that $1,9001 if the value is in excess
r, F-7
of $1,900, the excess will be counted against the
resource limitation of $1,900;
2. An automobile or other vehicle up to a current market
value of $4,500 (if used to provide necessary ~ranspor­
tat ion to a job or to a place for regular treatment of a
specific medical problem, or if modified for use by a
handicapped person);
3. Life insurance policies up to a death benefit value of
$1,500 (otherwise the cash surrender value of the policy
is counted as a resource);
4. Bur ial insurance of any value (if the terms of the
policy specifically limit its use to the payment of the
burial expenses of the insured);
5. Insurance proceeds used in a timely manner to repair or
replace an excluded asset/resource. (Frolik 1979)
In addition, there is another exclusion defined in terms of
"other assets essential to the self support of the individual."
This exclusion was designed as a "catch-all" for the other
illiquid assets/resources which are necessary for the disabled
individual to function in life. Finally, the principal of a
trust is generally an excluded resource where the beneficiary has
limited access to the principal, such as an irrevocable trust in
which only the trustee can invade principal. (Owens, Jordan)
Disabled individuals may also qualify for the "Medical
Assistance Program, commonly known as Medicaid, a program of
Federal financial assistance to States for payment of medical
costs for 55I recipients and other medically needy persons.
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Operating under HEW guidelines, States administer approved
assistance plans for needy persons who are over 65, blind,
disabled, or members of f amil ies with dependent children.
Eligibility is determined by the state in accordance with Federal
regulations. Many States, including Kentucky, determine Medicaid
eligibility by the Federal SSI standard. (See KRS Sec. 205.520
(1982» Thus, a Kentucky resident who qualifies for SSI is
automatically eligible for Medicaid. The same eligibility.
standards in terms of income and resources apply to Medicaid that
apply to SSI. In light of rising medical costs Medicaid may well
be of greater significance to particular individuals than SSI.
(Frolik 1979)
The basic direct Federal assistance programs for the
mentally disabled are run by the Social Security Administration.
If the disabled person is a child of an individual entitled to
Social Security insurance benefits, then the child will be
eligible for Social Security benefits if the disability began
before the child attained the age of 22, with monthly payments to
begin upon the retirement or death of the insured parent. The
amount of the payment, however, is subject to an earnings test
and may be reduced in proportion to the earnings of the child.
The child's benefits will not be affected by gifts or accumulated
assets. Although many of the disabled are employable, the
monthly earnings may be too little to adversely affect their
Social Security entitlement and the theraputic benefits of
employment may offset any loss of Social Security benefits.
F-9
Moreover, the employment may qualify the child for Social
Security insurance as a covered employee. (Frolik 1979)
The cost-of-care category of government benefits those that
are available to all persons who fall within specified cate-
gories, but are free only to those persons who cannot afford to
pay. If a recipient has the resources to underwrite such pay-
ments, the government will seek reimbursement for its services.
The most common cost-of-care program available to disabled per-
sons is State-subsidized residential care. Such residential care
is generally available regardless of the recipient's financial
status. However, State statutes often require the institution-
alized person, his estate or responsible relative to reimburse
the State to the extent of their "financial ability". (See KRS,
Chapter 205, Public Assistance Program)
This category of cost-of-care programs/benefits must be
carefully considered during the drafting process. This is the
area most vulnerable to careless planning and/or draftsmanship.
Ineffective planning or drafting can lead to the complete
exhaustion of the parent's and child's assets if the disabled
child qualifies for one or more of the cost-of-care programs and
such assets become reachable by the State to pay the child's
maintenance costs. (Owens, Jordan)
SELECTED
TYPES OF TRUSTS
.' A trust which imposes a duty on the trustee to distribute
all of the income to one benef iciary is a simple mandatory trust.
In this type of trust, the trustee has no discretion to choose
F-IO
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who will receive the income or the amount to be distributed. The
beneficiary possesses an interest in the trust which may be
alienated either voluntarily or involuntarily and is available to
creditors for the beneficiary's debts. Restatement i2nd) of
Trusts, Sections 132, 147, 182 and 186 (1959)
A trust which directs the trustee to dist,ribute only so much
of the income and/or principal as is necessary for the support
and maintenance of the beneficiary is commonly referred to as a
support trust. Because the settlor intended that the trust be
used specif ically for the beneficiary's support, both voluntary
and involuntary alienation of the beneficiary's interest are
ordinarily prohibited. One recognized exception to this rule
provides that the beneficiary's interest can be reached by
creditors to satisfy an enforceable claim against the beneficiary
for necessary services or supplies furnished to him. (Restate-
ment, Sees. 154, 157 (b), 155)
The trust which gives the trustee complete freedom to
distribute any amount of income and/or principal or none at all
is a discretionary trust. A purely discretionary trust includes
no standard in the trust instrument against which to evaluate the
trustee's exercise of discretion. A beneficiary of a discretion-
ary trust has no realizable interest in the trust until the
trustee actually exercises his discretion to distribute from the
trust. The limited nature of the beneficiary's interest in a
discretionary trust has the effect of making trust assets un-
available to the beneficiary's creditors--at least as long as the
trustee does not distribute any of the assets to the beneficiary.
F-ll
Because the beneficiary cannot compel payment to himself or
application of them for his own benefit, and because the
creditor's rights are derivative from the beneficiary's, the
beneficiary's creditors cannot compel the trustee to pay anything
to them. (Restatement, Secs. 155, 187, Comment j, 128, 155(1),
Comment b)
Although not necessarily related to the trustee's discre-
tion, spendthrift provisions have an effect upon the availability
of trust assets. Spendthrift trusts expressly prohibit the
voluntary and involuntary alienation of a beneficiary's interest.
Where recognized, spendthrift provisions will protect the trust
assets from the claims of ordinary creditors. Like support
trusts, however, spendthrift trusts are subject to the claims of
certain creditors; the beneficiary's interest may be attached by
creditors who provide the beneficiary with necessities.
(Restatement, Secs. 152, 157 (b»
MANDATORY TRUSTS
Mandatory trusts by their very definition subject the
assets of the trust to State reimbursement claims. Because the
distribution requirements are mandatory upon the trustee, the
trustee is powerless to prevent trust distributions from
displacing otherwise available State or Federal assistance.
A trust with required income distributions might cause a
disabled child to be ineligible for SSI or Medicaid, while one
providing education benefits might relieve the State of its
financial burden to provide special education for the child.
Because the distributions are mandated, a trustee who acts in
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good faith has no choice but to fulfill the distribution
obligations provided for in the trust instrument. Of course, if
the trust proves inadequate to meet the minimum requirements of
the beneficiary, assistance from the State or Federal government
may still be forthcoming. However, the use of mandatory trusts
leaves to happenstance whether there will be Federal or State
benefits available for the child. The trust principal may be
exhausted to aid the state or Federal government rather than the
child. Therefore, mandatory trusts are not recommended as a
planning tool when the intent is to supplement rather than
supplant public assistance. (Frolik 1979)
SUPPORT TRUSTS
If the settlor·s objective is to have the beneficiary·s
basic needs supplied by the government and to have the trust
provide "extras", a trust for support should also be avoided. A
State·s claim against a trust for reimbursement of the cost of
maintaining the disabled person in a State institution is more
likely to succeed if the trust contains language indicating that
the trust assets are to be used for support. (Mooney)
Governmental right to reimbursement from the trustee for
support furnished to the beneficiary may be dependent upon the
beneficiary·s right to compel distribution from the trust. The
beneficiary of a support trust has an enforceable claim of
minimal support. Support standards impose a duty on the trustee
to exercise his power to distribute or apply assets, leaving to
his jUdgment only the extent or manner of doing so. The trustee
must apply at least the minimum amount necessary for the
F-13
beneficiary's support and no more than the maximum amount
considered reasonably necessary. (B~~~g~~m~nt, Sec. 187,
Comment i)
Since the beneficiary can compel distribution from the trust
of amounts needed for his support and the State is a creditor
which has furnished necessary support, the State may reach trust
assets to the same extent as the beneficiary. (Mooney) In
addition, trust language that gives the trustee discretion to
determine the amount needed to provide support and maintenance
for the beneficiary does not hamper the State's ability to
successfully press a claim against the trust. (Mooney)
Support trusts sometimes instruct the trustee to take into
consideration other resources available to the beneficiary. The
beneficiary of such a trust has the right to trust distributions
only to the extent that they are needed to supplement other
resources available to him, so that outside resources and the
trust distributions together provide at least minimal support.
Courts have interpreted these provisions to not include support
at public expense. Even trust language that gives the trustee of
a support trust discretion, or that instructs him to take into
consideration other resources available to the beneficiary, has
not sufficiently attenuated the beneficiary's interest. The
State may still successfully seek reimbursement from such a trust
for the cost of institutional care given to the beneficiary.
(Mooney)
A trust which authorizes the trustee to make distributions
for the cost of a beneficiary's maintenance and support made
F-14
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necessary by illness, accident or emergency conceivably gives the
trustee narrower distribution authority than a pure or true
support trust. Nevertheless, courts have treated such trusts
like support trusts1 that is, when the issue is reimbursement
for care given in a state institution, the trust assets are
deemed to be the benef iciary' s and available for his basic
maintenance. (Mooney) Therefore, presumably the use of a dis-
cretionary trust which grants the trustee authority to make
distribution by reference to some standard of support, does not
represent the best solution to the planning-for-a-disabled-child
dilemma.
DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS
An absolute discretionary trust is one which grants the
trustee unlimited authority to distribute income or principal
without any accompanying standard. (Frolic 1979)
In theory, if the distribution powers given to the trustee
are not limited by any standard against which the reasonableness
of his conduct can be judged, the beneficiary has no enforceable
claim to the trust assets unless the trustee's failure to
distribute property is occasioned by dishonesty or an improper
motive. In the absence of such improper behavior, to the extent
that a State's right to recovery is derivative from the
beneficiary's claim to the assets, the State cannot assert a
claim to trust assets. It is reasoned, therefore, that assets in
a purely discretionary trust are not available to the State.
(Mooney)
F-15
Good theory, unfortunately the general rule that the assets
of a discretionary trust are beyond the reach of the
beneficiary's creditors has also been successfully challenged.
So what's left? Cautious draftsmanship.
However, despi te the general rule that the assets of a
discretionary trust are beyond the reach of the beneficiary's
creditors, even those who have furnished necessities, a State
financial responsibility statute may make the trust assets
available to the State. Presumably such statutes are based upon
a strong policy that any resources available to a public welfare
recipient ought to be available to reimburse the State for its
expenditures on behalf of that person. On the other hand, some
State statutes evidence an equally strong policy: a trust
created to provide the "extras" that lend dignity to the lives of
disabled, institutionalized persons ought to be allowed to con-
tinue. Clearly, individual State statutes must be consulted to
determine whether or not a discretionary trust may evade the
grasp of the State. (Mooney)
Unfortunately most State statutes do not address the issue
of discretionary trusts; they simply state that the patient and
certain other relatives are held financially responsible for the
care given to the patient. Case law does not provide any clear
answers either. In the absence of an explicit statutory direc-
tive, several courts have held that a State, like any other
creditor, cannot compel a discretionary trust to bear the cost of
the institutionalized individual's care. Others have enunciated
a policy that trust assets not be allowed to remain intact when
F-16
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the trust beneficiary is being supported at public expense. Many
of the latter cases involve support trust or trusts where the
settlor's general intent appears to be to provide c for the
beneficiary's basic needs. The policy, however, is not ~xpressly
limited to any particular type of trust. (Mooney)
BASIC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Mental disabilities represent a broad range of severity,
from visual dyslexic impairment to complete disfunctional
status. The estate plan needs to be tailored to the individual
and specific needs of the child. The planner needs to engage the
parents in a candid discussion to learn as much as possible about
the evolution of the child's disability, paying particular regard
to potential future changes in the child's condition. At a
minimum, the planner should obtain the following data pertaining
to the disabled child:
1. Nature and degree of the mental disabilitY1
2. Educational and, if available, 1Q leve11
3. Functioning capabilities and autonomy of the disabled
child (i.e. whether or not the child can fend for
himself or herself, so to speak) 1
4. Medical background and special or specific needs of the
child1
5. Work/earnings history of the child if anY1
6. Assets (if any) of the disabled child, including the
manner in which such properties are owned1
7. Special planning which has already been completed on
behalf of the disabled child (e.g. irrevocable
F-17
beneficiary designations, other trusts, either living or
testamentary, revocable or irrevocable, etc.),
8. Current living arrangements of the child (is the child
living at home, by himself or herself, in an institution
or some sort of special school, etc.). (Owens, Jordan)
PLANNING OPTIONS
With an understanding of the governmental programs available
to assist the disabled child, the estate planner is prepared to
offer meaningful planning assistance to the parents.
The available options include:
1. Disinheriting the disabled child,
2. Providing for the child through a gift and a
corresponding moral obligation to a possible guardian or
caretaker;
3. Leaving the child an outright gift,
4. Leaving money in trust for the child,
5. Using a sophisticated discretionary trust in an attempt
to avoid or minimize the loss of Federal assistance or
being charged for otherwise gratuitous State benefits.
(Frolik-1979)
For parents at either end of the financial resource spectrum
the option selected and the attendant estate planning may be
relatively simple. Wealthy parents are not going to be particu-
larly concerned that an outright gift to the child may reduce the
benef its available to that child under governmental assistance
programs. Although careful planning is always important, wealthy
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parents do not have to be overly concerned that the dispositive
provisions of their estate plan avoid denial of governmental
assistance.
At the other end of the spectrum, poor parents with little
or no estate need little estate planning.
There is no question that most parents lack an estate of the
size required to absorb completely the cost of lifetime support
of a disabled child, including individualized educational pro-
grams, extensive medical care, humane living arrangements, and
adequate food and shelter. Unless the parent has sufficient
assets to warrant the use of trusts, the parent may conclude that
the best solution is to disinherit the disabled child and to
leave the estate, such as it is, to any non-handicapped children.
This leaves the parents in the less-than-comfortable position of
having to accept the fact that eventual responsibility for their
disabled child will fall upon Federal and State government.
(Frolik 1979)
A more palatable alternative to outright disinheritance
frequently used by parents with other non-handicapped children is
the approach of a gift coupled with a promise. The parents leave
their estate to another child (in some instances another rela-
tive) with whom the parents have an informal agreement that a
certain portion of the property will be used for the benef it of
the disabled child. Granted, if the estate is small this type of
disinheritance might be workable, nonetheless, it has several
disadvantages.
F-19
In the first place, the third party has no legal obligation
to use the inherited property for the benefit of the disabled
child. Secondly, the informal agreement does not distinguish
ownership of the property, therefore the third party will be
liable for income taxes on the income produced by the property in
spite of its use for the benefit of the disabled child. Thirdly,
even if the client has no doubt that the third party will use the
property for the benefit of the disabled child, there is always
the possibility that the third party will die before the disabled
child. Under these circumstances, the property will pass to the
heirs of the third party, not the beneficiary. Hence, the dis-
abled child may outlive the caretaker and simultaneously lose the
use of the property. Mooney, Estate Trusts: An Estate Plan !Q
Supplement Public Assistance for Disabled Persons, ARIZ L. REV.
939 (1983)
An outright gift to a disabled person could result in an
equal loss or reduction of government benefits. If the intention
was to supplement rather than replace government benefits, the
outright gift to the disabled child has not been a gift to the
child, but rather a gift to the government. However, an outright
gift to a disabled child may have certain benefits; therefore,
this option should not be automatically discounted. A modest
outright gift may help the child develop or learn financial
management. Such a gift should probably only be considered,
however, where the child does have the capability to learn to
handle money.
F-20
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Another option is to leave money to a guardian or a conser-
vator for the disabled child. This alternative does solve cer-
tain financial management problems, however, such a gift will
have the same adverse impact on eligibility for governmental
assistance as an outright gift since the property held by the
guardian is legally the child's. (Restatement (2nd) of Trusts
Section 7)
By far the best planning alternative available to the dis-
abled child's parents is a trust. A trust is like a bolt of
cloth that can be cut to whatever pattern suits the needs of a
particular client. If carefully drafted, a trust can help a
parent avoid the unsavory prospect of disinheritance or the
uncertainty of third party goodwill.
While the design of a trust is limited only by the imagina-
tion of the draftsman, the planner must be very cautious about
using classic "boilerplate" language in any trust instrument.
Each provision needs to be closely examined in light of govern-
mental limitations and requirements. As stated earlier, careless
drafting could result in the loss of the assets to the State
under a cost-of-care program and disqualification of the disabled
child for other governmental assistance. This precaution even
extends to typical testamentary bequests of the home and personal
effects which the planner usually takes for granted. Remember
there is a limitation on the market value of the non-excluded
assets which a child can own and still qualify for SSI benefits.
SSI requirements will allow the parents to leave their home to
the disabled child only if it is occupied by the child as that
F-21
child's principle residence. In addition, the disabled child can
only own household goods and personal effects which do not exceed
a market value of $2,000. Finally, caution should be exercised
when using dispositive language such as ·per stirpes·, ·per
capita· or ·heirs-at-Iaw· to insure the disabled child does not
inherit should such provisions become effective. (Owens, Jordan)
Other than these potentially dangerous provisions which must
be approached with caution, the draftsman needs to be primarily
concerned with the amount of discretion accorded the trustee.
The extent of the trustee's discretion is the major determinant
as to the accessibility of trust assets to state reimbursement
claims.
Variation in the discretionary powers of a trustee over the
distribution of income and principal is the factor which
determines the nature of the trust. While the variations can be
relatively unlimited, most trusts fall into the following
patterns.
PRECATORY LANGUAGE
Using a purely discretionary trust may limit reimbursement
claims but may create a zone of discomfort for both the settlor
and the trustee. Precatory language is part and parcel of trust
law; it has the advantage of putting within the trust instrument
a clear definition of the purposes of the trust and the state of
mind of the settlor at the time of its creation. While not
legally binding it is nevertheless strong evidentary proof of
what the settlor hoped the trust would accomplish. Ideally, such
language states the purpose of the trust, the factors to be
F-22
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considered in making distribution and the general attitude
expected of the trustee. Courts then have a built-in standard of
measurement to determine whether or not a trustee has abused his
discretion. Failure to use precatory language may cause
difficulties in finding someone willing to serve as trustee in an
absolute discretionary trust. Corporate trustees, for example,
fearful of possible legal challenges to their actions, might very
well be reluctant to serve as trustee under an instrument in
which their duties are not clearly defined. Similarly an
individual trustee may also be unwilling to accept undefined
duties. (Frolik 1979)
THE SITUATION IN KENTUCKY
KRS Sec. 205.200 (1) states "a needy aged person, a needy
blind person, a needy child, a needy permanently and totally
disabled person, or a person with whom a needy child lives shall
be eligible to receive a public assistance grant only if he has
made proper application or an application has been made on his
behalf in the manner and form prescribed by regulation."
KRS Sec. 205.010(3) defines public assistance as "money
grants, assistance in kind or services to or for the benefit of
needy aged, needy blind, needy permanently and totally disabled
persons, needy children or persons with whom a needy child lives
or a family containing a combination of these categories•••"
Subsection (9) defines needy permanently and totally dis-
abled as "a person 18 years of age or older who has a permanent
physical or mental impairment, disease or loss that substantially
F-23
precludes him from engaging in useful occupations within his
competence and who is unable to provide for himself and who does
not have otherwise provided for him a subsistance compatible with
decency and health. H
KRS Sec. 205.210(1) directs that "public assistance awards
be based upon consideration of individual needs as well as the
resources of the individual involved and his family."
Subsection (2) goes on to define resources as
"(a) the income and any property belonging to any applicant
or recipient: except the exemptions of the kind and the amount of
income prescribed by regulations within the scope of public assis-
tance titles of the Social Security Act, its amendments and other
federal acts and regulations:
(b) the income and any property of the spouse living with
any needy aged, needy blind or needy permanently totally disabled
person:
(c) such income and resources as may be available to
applicants or recipients from persons legally liable for their
support."
Subsection (3) includes within the definition of resources
the value of any property "voluntarily transferred by any
applicant or recipient or the spouse living with any applicant or
recipient for the purpose of establishing eligibility for public
assistance."
. Finally KRS Section 205.227 (2) authorizes the State to
"institute an action in circuit court against a parent or other
personal legally liable for support who has failed to provide
F-24
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support for the person to whom an obligation of support is owed
for reimbursement of public assistance payments.
Kentucky's pUblic assistance statutes do not define the term
·other person legally liable for support", so while Kentucky's
pUblic assistance statutes definitely establish a right of
reimbursement, it is not clear against whom a claim of
reimbursement may be asserted. Obviously, an institutionalized
adult is normally liable for reimbursement to the state for the
cost of the institutionalization, as would be the parents of
either a child or an unemancipated, adult incompetent child.
Because most institutionalized individuals have few, if any,
assets, the State has little hope of reimbursement however.
Since the cost of institutionalization can be extraordinarily
high, the State is naturally eager to have some other revenue
source designated as the primary support. Therefore, if the
individual receiving public assistance, either through institu-
tionalization or some other form of extended care, is the bene-
ficiary of a discretionary trust Kentucky may very well contend
that the trustee should use the trust assets for reimbursement.
If the trustee refuses to pay for the cost of public assist-
ance, under KRS Sec. 205.227 (1972) Kentucky may sue for
reimbursement under the theory that even a discretionary trust is
responsible for the support costs of the beneficiary. The narrow
question to be litigated is whether the particular discretionary
trust in question is liable for the costs of the institutional-
ization of the beneficiary. The broader question is whether a
discretionary trust should ever be allowed to supplement State
F-25
supplied services while avoiding the burden of supporting the
costs of institutionalization.
INTENT OF THE SETTLOR
To date, the Courts in the majority of cases have upheld the
right of a trustee with discretionary powers to resist the claims
of the State and to withhold distributions from an
insti tutiona1 ized benef iciary. Some Courts, however, have
reached the conclusion that discretionary trusts have the
responsibility to support the beneficiary. As such, the trust may
be required to reimburse the State for the costs of
institutionalization. (Fro1ik 1985) Those courts which have
considered the issue have decided the question on the basis of
the intent of the settlor of the trust. 21 ALR4th 729
Kentucky appears to only have one case wherein this specific
issue was actually addressed. Under the terms of a trust pro-
viding that the beneficiary should have an amount nnot to exceed
$250 each yearn from the fund, the Court in Department Qf Public
Welfare ~ Meek (1936) 264 KY 771, 95 SW2d 599, held that the
Department of Public Welfare, which had provided support for the
beneficiary while he was a resident of a state mental institu-
tion, was entitled to reimbursement from the trust fund only to
the extent of the stated limitation of $250 per year. Noting
that the Department's right to reimbursement depended upon
whether the beneficiary had such an interest in the trust that he
could demand it from the trustee, the Court found that the Will
creating the trust clearly intended for the beneficiary to have
the benefit of the trust fund so long as the amounts required by
F-26
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the beneficiary did not exceed $250 in any year and did not give
the trustee absolute discretion to withhold all payments from the
beneficiary. The Court additionally noted that during the short
time the beneficiary had resided outside the institution, the
trustee had paid claims for his support provided by a relative1
the Court stating that it could not reasonably be insisted that
the relative could not enforce a right to reimbursement against
the trust and that there was no reason why the claim of the state
hospital stood on a different footing. (21 ALR4th 729)
If Meek is Kentucky·s controlling precedent, it is clear
that mandatory trusts and support trusts or discretionary trusts
coupled with a support standard are potentially reachable by
Kentucky for reimbursement. The language of the Court in noting
that the terms of the trust "did not give the trust the absolute
discretion to withhold all payments from the beneficiary" appears
to support the argument that in Kentucky the assets of absolute
discretionary trusts are not reachable by the State of Kentucky
without limitation.
The court in Meek (citing Dority L.. w. ~ Rogers k Co., 223
KY 238, 3 SW2d 636 (1928» stated "the test in every case is:
Has the beneficiary such an interest in the trust estate that he
may demand {payment} from the trustee? If so, it is subject to
his debts. If not, it is beyond the reach of his creditors, who
stand in his shoes." Both Meek and Dority have been cited as
controlling precedent in Calloway L.. Smith 299 KY 623, 186 SW2d
640 (1945) and Huffman YL Chasteen 307 KY 1, 209 SW2d 705 (1948).
Although Dority, Calloway, and Huffman deal with creditors rights
F-27
of recovery, all three cases support Meek's rule that the right
of recovery against a beneficiary through trust assets is
limited to the extent of the beneficiary's rights to enforce a
claim against the trust.
However, Meek does support the argument that an absolute
discretionary trust would be responsible to the state at least to
the extent that the trustee has exercised his absolute discretion
in favor of the beneficiary by making distributions to or for the
trust beneficiary. Therefore, in Kentucky, if Meek is Kentucky's
controlling precedent, trustees having absolute discretion should
exercise caution in establishing any predictable pattern of
distribution.
Kentucky is not blessed with either a wealth of case law to
provide planning pointers or a clear statement of public policy.
For the most part, therefore, planners can refer to the case law
of other jurisdiction s for drafting "pointers". A recent
Pennsylvania case has improved the estate planning environment by
validating the use of discretionary support trusts. In Lang .y.!..
Department of Public Welfare, Pa. Commw., 506 A2d 530 (1986),
rev'd Pa., 521 A2d 1335 (1987), after a discussion of statutory
policy of the state of Pennsylvania, the Court turned its atten-
tion to determining the testator's intent in establishing the
trust. The Court expressed dissatisfaction with the rigid
categorization of trusts utilized by many Courts in other states
to ascertain the intent of a settlor: a "pure support trust"
(where settlor has created a duty in the trustee, independent of
any statutory duty, to provide basic support for a beneficiary)
F-28
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can be depleted by the State's claims for reimbursement because
the beneficiary could compel distribution for his or her basic
support. On the other hand, a ·pure discretionary trust- is safe
from State claims for reimbursement, but the beneficiary is
likewise unable to compel distribution despite standards for
distributions included in the trust document.
The Court eloquently validated the use of discretionary
support trusts by explaining that often neither a pure support
trust nor a pure discretionary trust is appropriate:
A settlor should should not be required to either
bankrupt his family or run the risk of leaving a
handicapped member destitute or in want because of
vagueries in the requirements for pUblic assistance
or in the level of funding for such assistance.
Nor should he be required to place blind faith in
the uncontrolled discretion of an individual
trustee, whom the beneficiary may survive, or in a
corporate trustee whose ownership, management and
policies may change. We believe a settlor is
entitled to maintain some control by means of a
support standard, and at the same time reasonable
flexibility through a grant of considerable
discretion to the trustee(s), to insure his purpose
of providing reasonable care to the beneficiary who
is or may be institutionalized without effectively
disinheriting the other members of the family.
In summary the Court concluded that the intent of the
testator/settlor was not to create a pure support trust in that
he intended the trust to supplement other sources of support and
to provide for the beneficiary's basic support only if those
other resources proved inadequate or were discontinued;
therefore, the settlor intended to establish a discretionary
trust limited by a support standard based on the beneficiary's
situation. The Court held that because the intent was to create
F-29
a trust to supplement rather than supplant other sources of
support and to provide for the beneficiary's support only if
other sources proved inadequate or were discontinued, the t~ustee
~
had not abused its discretion by refusing to use trust income or
principal to provide for the beneficiary's basic support when
public funds were available and that the State of Pennsylvania
did not have the right to consider the trust an available source
of reimbursement for the beneficiary's care. Verbofsky, "Parents
of Disabled Children Benefit From Lang Case", Trusts k Estates,
December 1987
On a practical level, even for Kentucky planners, Lang is an
important case because of the gUidelines it provides for
planners. If it is the intent to establish a discretionary
support trust which will supplement, but not supplant, government
benefits, that intent should be manifested by drafting into the
instrument some of the specific Lang factors:
1. Trustee power to capitalize income;
2. Trustee power to distribute income and principal to
individuals other than the disabled beneficiary;
3. The words "welfare" and "benefit" which indicate
authority for the trustee to provide more than basic
health, education, maintenance and support for the
disabled beneficiary;
4. Modif iers to broaden the trustee's discretion such as
"absolute", "unlimited" and "complete";
5. An expression of the settlor's intent that the trustee
consider the disabled beneficiary's other resources.
F-30
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At first blush, Lang appears to contradict earlier caution
against using support trusts as planning devices for the disabled
child's estate. Upon closer examination, however, the court in
Lang is recommending neither a pure discretionary trust nor a
pure support trust but rather a hybrid between the two. Rather
than calling this trust a discretionary trust with a support
standard or a support trust, perhaps a better term would be a
discretionary supplement trust because the intention of the
settlor (the controlling factor) is to supplement rather than to
supplant pUblic assistance. Lang is also a useful decision in
that it solves the precatoty language problem.
SELECTION OF THE TRUSTEE
Once the threshhold decision to use a trust as a vehicle to
provide benefits for the disabled child is made, the next
question becomes who should serve as trustee. An accurate and
succinct answer was given by A. James Casner in his treatise on
estate planning. "No intelligent selection of a fiduciary can be
made without careful consideration of the duties the fiduciary is
to perform." The duties of a trustee may be divided into two
categories, custodial and distributive. Custodial duties consist
of holding and investing the assets, gathering the income, paying
the taxes, selecting the investments, managing the enterprise--in
short, all those acts required of the modern prudent manager of
money. The distributive function is the other side of the coin.
Rather than husbanding the assets, the trustee is expected to
make distributions of income and principal to the beneficiary.
F-31
The distributive function may be mechanical, such as when the
trustee is required to distribute all the income to a single,
named beneficiary, or it may be discretionary. Unfortunately,
the qualities of the trustee most desired in a custodian/invest-
ment manager are not necessarily the same qualities desired in
the distributive manager. By their very nature the two are
potentially conflicting. If the former demands prudence and
caution, the latter requires imagination and sympathy, especially
when the beneficiary is a disabled child. (Frolik 1979)
The trustee may be either a corporate trustee, such as a
bank, or it may be an individual. Corporate trustees are almost
without exception qualified to act as trustee and are particu-
larly adept at balancing the conflicting demands of both roles.
Only an exceptional individual will be as experienced and
knowledgeable as a corporate trustee in the efficient management
of money. In addition, the investment performance of corporate
trustees is quite competitive. According to a new study of
comparative performance for the period 1983-1987 by CDA
Investment Technologies, stock funds managed by trust
institutions averaged higher annual returns than common stock
mutual funds. Trust institutions also outperformed investment
advisory firms.
In addition, corporate trustees have extensive experience in
balancing their primary duty of loyalty to the beneficiary with
their duties to protect and conserve trust property and their
duty to make trust property productive.
Finally the corporate trustee offers what no individual, no
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matter how exceptional, can offer--continuity_ The need for
continuity is particularly important to a trust designed to last
for the lifetime of a disabled child. A corporate trustee does
not die or become incapacitated, nor do the pressures o£ personal
life ever cause the corporate trustee to regret his acceptance of
the fiduciary obligation; nor is the corporate trustee likely to
become apathetic, bored, overworked or tired of his charge. On
the contrary, because the role of the trustee is the business of
the corporate trustee, one can expect and demand unflagging
devotion to duty. (Frolik 1979)
Individuals are oftentimes (although not always) better or
more suited to understanding the personal needs of the disabled
beneficiary. In the long run, the most effective fiduciary
arrangement is some combination of both corporate and individual.
The individual does not necessarily have to serve as co-trustee,
the settlor might want to consider appointing an advisory commit-
tee to work with the trustee in determining the personal needs of
the beneficiary. The advisory committee might be given the power
to remove the corporate trustee and name a successor trustee;
such a power would most likely insure continued attendance to
duty on the part of the corporate trustee. The point is, there
are a number of different combinations which can be utilized by
the settlor to insure that the physical, mental and financial
needs of his disabled child are met throughout the child's life-
time. Use of a corporate trustee should not be automatically
discounted because of limited personal touch nor should use of
an individual be discounted because of limited management skills.
F-33
Use of the skills of both in tandem is essential to the interests
of the disabled child1 and the planner who fails to creatively
utilize such available skills is doing a disservic~ to his
client.
CONCLUSION
In planning for the lifetime needs of the disabled
beneficiary, a discretionary trust in some form is by far the
best alternative available to a planner. With creativity,
imagination, and a working knowledge of governmental programs and
the limitations and requirements thereof, an estate planner can
create a plan for the disabled beneficiary workable both now and
in the future that will truly allow the beneficiary's parents to
ftsleep better at night ft •
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Disclaimer defined.
Any person who is the intended transferee of a bequest,
legacy or a lifetime gift has the ability to refuse to accept
that interest in property. Such a refusal is called a disclaimer
and the effect will be as though the person disclaiming has made
a gift to the person to whom the property then passes. However,
if the disclaimer is a "qualified disclaimer", the effect is as
though the person disclaiming predeceased the transferor; the
property is treated as passing directly from the original trans-
feror to the person entitled to receive the property as a result
of the disclaimer. Thus, the disclaimant is not treated as mak-
ing a transfer subject to either gift or estate taxes.
B. Purposes of disclaimers.
1. Shifting income within the family unit.
A disclaimer can be used to reduce or eliminate
taxes imposed on an intermediate generation. For exam-
ple, a child can disclaim property passing from his
parent's estate so that a distribution is made to his
own children; the disclaimed property will then not be
included in the child's estate at his death. Alterna-
tively, the child may wish to disclaim some or all of
his interest in his father's estate to enable his wid-
owed mother to receive more property (consequently giv-
ing the father's estate a larger marital deduction).
G-l
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2. Post-mortem uses.
As will be discussed in greater detail later in
this outline, the disclaimer is a useful tool for sav-
ing estate taxes resulting from improper estate plan-
ning or poorly drafted instruments.
3. Pre-death uses.
The disclaimer can also be used as a flexible
planning tool, permitting the postponement of some dis-
positions until the circumstances of all beneficiaries
have been considered. Several planning techniques for
use of the disclaimer will be discussed later in this
outline.
II. BACKGROUND
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") Section 2518, which codifies
the tax law of disclaimer, was not enacted until the Tax Reform
Act of 1976. Prior to January 1, 1977, the law of disclaimer was
nonstatutory and based on case law and various regulations. For
example, there were four requirements under Treas. Reg. §25.2511-
1(c) that a disclaimer had to satisfy in order not to be treated
as a gift to the subsequent taker. The disclaimer had to be
(1) recognized and effective under local law; (2) made within a
reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer;
(3) made before acceptance and (4) unequivocal. Kentucky law at
that time provided only for disclaiming testamentary gifts in KRS
394.320 (repealed July 15, 1980). The disclaimer had to be by
G-2
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deed recorded within one year after notice of probate, with a
copy filed with the district court in which probate was made. It
was not clear from the statute whether it applied only to inter-
ests in real estate or to dispositions of personal property as
well.
Effective June 21, 1974 the Kentucky Legislature enacted the
Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers by Will, Intestacy or Appointment
Act, found in KRS 394.610-394.670. These provisions still lim-
ited the right to disclaim to only those interests created by
testamentary instruments. In addition, the time within which to
exercise the right of disclaimer was shortened to six months
after the death of the decedent and the right to disclaim did not
survive the death of the person holding such right.
III. CURRENT LAW OF DISCLAIMERS
A. Requirements for a Qualified Disclaimer.
1. Who may disclaim.
Under IRC §2518(a), any person to whom an interest
in property is transferred can disclaim that interest.
The person who creates the interest cannot disclaim.
The executor of an estate may disclaim for the estate,
if permitted under local law. PLR 8015014. Parents may
disclaim on behalf of their minor children if they have
been appointed guardians and the disclaimers are
accepted in a proceeding in which the minors are repre-
sented by guardians ad litem. PLR 8510023. The
G-3
Internal Revenue Service (" IRS") has even ruled that
guardians appointed for unborn children in probate pro-
ceedings may disclaim on behalf of those children who
are potential beneficiaries of a trust. PLR 8622018.
Under KRS 394.035(a) and 394.610, a person or rep-
resentative of an incapacitated or protected person may
disclaim the right of transfer of property to him if he
is a grantee, donee, surviving joint tenant, successor
to a disclaimed interest, heir, next of kin, legatee,
devisee or beneficiary under a testamentary or
nontestamentary instrument or contract, or an appointee
under a power of appointment exercised by a testamen-
tary or nontestamentary instrument.
2. Requirements.
There are four requirements under IRe S2518 for a
qualified disclaimer. Under S2518(b), a qualified dis-
claimer is an irrevocable and unqualified refusal to
accept an interest in property that satisfies the four
requirements. These requirements are discussed below.
(a) Refusal must be in writing.
There are no specific requirements in §2518
for a written disclaimer but Reg. §25.2518 2(b)(1)
states that the writing must identify the interest
being disclaimed and be signed by the disclaimant
..or his legal representative. In PLR 8515005 a
G-4
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written identification of property was waived
where an examination of the estate tax returns of
the disclaimant and his spouse clarified which
property was disclaimed.
(b) Refusal must be received within nine months.
§2518 (b)(2) states that the written dis-
claimer must be received by the transferor, the
transferor's legal representative, or the holder
of legal title to the property no later than nine
months after the later of:
(i) the day the transfer creating the inter-
est is made, or
(ii) the day the disclaimant reaches age 21.
Although §25l8 uses the term "received"
by the transferor, the regulations state
that the disclaimer must be "delivered"
by the above dates. The timely mailing
requirements of Regs §30l.7502-l(c)
apply for this purpose. With lifetime
transfers, a taxable transfer (for pur-
poses of (i) above) occurs on the date a
completed gift is made; testamentary
transfers occur on the date of death.
With general powers of appointment, the
transfer to the holder of the power
G-5
occurs at the creation of the power;
transfer to appointees or takers in
default occurs when the power is either
exercised or lapsed. Special powers of
appointment are transferred when cre-
ated. Regs. §25.25l8-2(c)(3).
When the state provides a shorter
period within which to file the dis-
claimer, state law controls. State law
may not, however, extend ~he nine-month
deadline. PLR 8022021; Reg. §25. 2518-
2(c)(5), example (5).
(c) Acceptance must not have occurred.
If the person wishing to disclaim has already
accepted the interest or any of its benefits, a
qualified disclaimer cannot be made. IRe §2518
(b) (3) . Proprietary actions that could indicate
acceptance include:
(i) use of property;
(ii) acceptance of dividends, interest or
rents from the property;
(iii) acceptance of consideration for making
the disclaimer;
(iv) payment of mortgage or taxes on the
property;
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(v) directing beneficial enjoyment of the
property. A disclaimant is treated as
directing the transfer of the interest
if an express or implied agreement
exists that the interest is to go to a
person specified by the disclaimant. A
qualified disclaimer is made, however,
if the disclaimant of a beneficial
interest in property has a fiduciary
power to distribute to designated bene-
ficiaries as long as the disclaimant has
no discretionary power to direct the
enjoyment of the interest and there is
fiduciary authority to make the dis-
claimer. Reg. §25.2518-2(e)(1).
In PLR 8702024, the intestate decedent had
named his sister beneficiary of a life insurance
policy. The sister received a claim form which
she completed and the insurance company notified
the sister than an account had been established in
her name, sending her checks with which to draw
upon the account. Sister attempted to disc laim
one-half of the amount in the account. The Serv-
ice found there was no qualified disclaimer
because the sister had accepted the benefits of
G-7
the property by the act of accepting the checks
and returning the completed claim form.
There is no deemed acceptance of an interest
by virtue of actions taken by a beneficiary (or a
custodian) before the beneficiary I s twenty-first
birthday. Reg. S25.251892(d) (3). For example, a
minor who receives distributions of income from a
trust, or dividends from stock gifted under the
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act before the minor
reaches age 21 may disclaim the shares or the
interest in the trust income as long as no income
or dividends are received between the date of the
twenty-first birthday and the date of disclaimer.
Regs. SS25.2518-2(d)(4), Examples (9)-(11).
(d) No direction by disclaimant.
The interest in property must pass, without
any direction on the part of the disclaimant, to a
person other than the disclaimant. However, if
the disclaimant retains a power to redirect dis-
tribution of the property and is limited by an
ascertainable standard, the disclaimer will not
fail. Reg. S25.2518-2(e) (1). The spouse of the
transferor may disclaim an interest and still
retain the same interest in the property but the
spouse may not retain the right to direct
G-8
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beneficial enjoyment of the interest unless such
right is limited by an ascertainable standard.
Thus, retention of a power to invade corpus (sub-
ject to an ascertainable standard, a "5 and 5"
power, or through a trustee) should not constitute
a prohibited power. Reg. S25.2518-(e)(5), example
(6). However, while S25.2518-2(e)(5), example (4)
makes it clear that a surviving spouse can dis-
claim property which passes to a trust in which
she has an income interest, the retention of a
special power to appoint among designated benefi-
ciaries will disqualify the disclaimer. Reg.
S25.2518-2(e)(5), example (5).
Forms of Disclaimers.
1. Disclaimer of a partial interest.
It is possible to make a qualified disclaimer of a
separate interest in property. However, the separate
interest must be one that was created by the trans-
feror; the disclaimant can't himself separate the
interest received. Reg. S25.2518-3(a) (1) (i). Local
law determines whether separate interests have been
created; thus were principal payments to remaindermen
of a residuary trust treated as separate from the
remainder interest. PLR 8706066. Powers of appoint-
ment are deemed separate interests in property and
G-9
disclaimers of severable property (such as corporate
stock) are considered disclaimers of separate interests
in property. Regs. S25.25l8-3(a)(l)(ii) and (iii).
In PLR 8702023, decedent left his entire estate in
fee simple to his wife. The wife wished to disclaim
all or a part of the shares of stock in a corporation
she would receive under the will. In that shares of
stock are severable property which can be divided into
separate parts and maintain complete and independent
existence after severance, the Service found the pro-
posed disclaimer to be a qualified partial disclaimer
of a separate interest in severable property.
2. Disclaimer of an undivided interest.
A disclaimer may also be made of an undivided por-
tion of a separate interest in property. IRe s
2518(c)(l). The disclaimer must be of a percentage or
fraction of each substantial interest the disclaimant
owns in the property and must cover the entire term of
the disclaimant's interest in that property and in
property to which the property is subsequently con-
verted. Reg. S25.2518-3(b). For example, if A is the
devisee of an income interest for life from Blackacre,
he may make a disclaimer of 30% of the income from that
property. However, if A is the devisee of a fee simple
interest in Blackacre, a disclaimer by A of a remainder
G-IO
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interest while retaining the life estate is not a qual-
ified disclaimer. Regs. §2518-3(d), example (4) and
25.2518-3(b) .
3. Disclaimer of a pecuniary interest.
As long as no income or other benefit inures to
the benefit of the recipient of a pecuniary or
nonpecuniary bequest or gift either before or after the
disclaimer, a disclaimer may be made of a specific
pecuniary amount out of such bequest or gift. Reg.
§25.2518-3(c).
The amount disclaimed, as well as income from that
amount, must be segregated from the portion of the
bequest not disclaimed following the disclaimer of the
specific pecuniary amount. The segregation of the dis-
claimed amount is made on the basis of fair market
value of the assets on the date of the disclaimer or on
a basis fairly representative of value changes that
have occurred between the date of transfer and the date
of the disclaimer. Acceptance of a distribution from
the bequest or gift is considered an acceptance of a
proportional amount of income earned by the bequest or
gift.
G-ll
C. Types of property that may be disclaimed.
1. Joint tenancies.
To qualify, a disclaimer of an interest in a joint
tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety must be made no
later than nine months after the date of the taxable
transfer creating the tenancy. Reg. S25.25l8-2(c)
(4)(i); Rev. Rul. 83-35, 1983-1 CB 234.
In Gladys L. McOonald, 89 T.C. 26 (1987), the Tax
Court found an untimely disclaimer when a wife's renun-
ciation of her decedent husband's one-half interest in
real property was made nine months after the decedent's
death. The Court concluded that the timeliness of the
disclaimer is tested at the time of the creation of the
joint tenancy rather than at the death of the other
owner. This case is in direct conflict with the deci-
sion in Kennedy v. Commissioner, 86-2 U.S.T.C. Section
13,699 (7th eire 1986). In Kennedy the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a disclaimer of a joint ten-
ancy interest is timely if made within nine months of
the death of the other joint tenant. The Court reached
its conclusion by noting that the joint tenant had no
vested interest in the property until the other joint
tenant died; before that time, the interest of either
joint tenant could be terminated by exercise of the
right of partition or by divorce. The Tax Court still
G-12
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refuses to follow the Seventh Circuit, however, and has
recently reaffirmed its holding in McDonald in Estate
of Edward O'Brien, T.e. Memo. 1988-240.
Creation of a nominal joint interest does not
trigger the start of the nine-month period. This means
that transfer of funds by one spouse, for example, to a
joint bank account where the other spouse does not draw
upon the account for his or her own benefit, will not
start the nine-month disclaimer period. PLR 8619002;
Reg. S25.2518-2(c)(5), example (9).
There are special rules for pre-1982 tenancies in
real property between spouses. If a joint tenancy or
tenancy by the entirety in real property was created
between spouses before 1982 and no election was made
under IRC S2515 to treat the creation of the tenancy as
a gift, then the nine-month period begins on the date
of the first spouse's death. Reg. S25.2518-2(c)
(4)(ii). Electing gift treatment would create a tax-
able transfer that results with the nine-month period
beginning at the time of creation of the tenancy.
2. Life insurance and death benefits.
Transfers of interests in life insurance proceeds
or death benefits under employee benefit plans occur
when the designation of the beneficiary becomes irrevo-
cable -- either upon the death of the employee or
G-13
insured, or when the insurance policy is placed in an
irrevocable trust. KRS 394.035 authorizes the dis-
claiming of these types of interests unless there is a
written waiver of such a right.
3. QTIP transfers.
When an interest is trans ferred to a person for
life with provisions for successive life interests and
remainders to other persons, every beneficiary - exist-
ing or potential, vested or contingent - must make
their disclaimers within nine months of the original
transfer. Although the original transfer is not neces-
sarily a "taxable transfer" since the assets of the
QTIP trust qualify for the marital deduction, the Serv-
ice chooses not to look at the death of the second
spouse as the starting date for the disclaimer period.
Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3).
4. Revocable Inter Vivos Trust Interests.
KRS 394.035 permits disclaimer of interests cre-
ated by revocable inter vivos trust agreements. Such
interests vest on the death of the settlor and that is
the date which commences the running of the nine-month
period. PLR 9003020.
5. Powers of Appointment.
A power of appointment is treated as a separate
interest in property that may be disclaimed; it may be
G-14
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
disclaimed independently from other separate interests
created in the property by the transferor. IRe
S2518(c)(2); Reg. SS25.2518-3(a)(1)(iii). For example,
if a trust beneficiary under a will receives income for
life and a general testamentary power of appointment,
the beneficiary may disclaim the right to appoint any
or all of the principal or income from the trust while
retaining the right to lifetime distributions from the
trust. PLR 8603030.
D. Effect of the Disclaimer.
According to KRS 394.035(3), the effect of disclaiming
property or interests under nontestamentary instruments is
as though the disclaimant died before the effective date of
the instrument or contract. KRS 394.630 discusses the effect
of disclaimers of testamentary transfers and provides that
disclaimed property or interests devolve as if the disclaim-
ant had predeceased the decedent unless the decedent pro-
vides otherwise. Similarly, if the property or interest is
one the disclaimant is designated to take under a testamen-
tary power of appointment, the effect of the disclaimer is
as though the disclaimant had predeceased the donee of the
power, unless the donee provides otherwise.
A word of caution is in order, however, regarding the
generation-skipping transfer tax. If the use of a dis-
claimer results in property passing to a person at least two
G-15
generations below that of the transferor, a generation-skip-
ping tax will be imposed on the transfer. There is an
exception to the tax when a transfer is made to a grandchild
whose parents are deceased. Under those circumstances, the
"predeceased child exemption", as it is called, operates to
treat the grandchild as a child of the transferor so that
only a transfer to the immediately following generation will
be deemed to have occurred. For purposes of a transfer made
by disclaimer, however, the disclaimant may not be treated
as having predeceased the transferor for purposes of the
generation-skipping tax exemption.
As to creditor's claims, Reg. S25.2518-1(c)(2) indi-
cates that a creditor has the capability of voiding a dis-
claimer and that, if the disclaimer is so voided, it cannot
be a qualified disclaimer. However, the fact that a dis-
claimer is merely voidable by the creditors of the disclaim-
ant does not affect whether the disclaimer will be quali-
fied. A disclaimer may also be subjeFt to attack by the
creditor if it is determined it was made with intent to
defraud. Stein v. Brown, 480, N.E.2d 1121 (Ohio 1985).
IV. THE DISCLAIMER AS A CURATIVE TOOL
Disclaimers may be used effectively in post-mortem estate
planning in several ways: to save estate taxes, to change be-
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quests to best suit changed financial circumstances and to remedy
errors in drafting will and trust documents.
A. Improper estate planning.
In situations where there is either an inadequate
estate plan or lack of any estate plan, the disclaimer may
be used to save estate taxes. For example, if there were no
provisions in the will for utilization of the exemption
equivalent for the assets of the first spouse to die, a dis-
claimer by the surviving spouse of an amount equal to that
exemption would pass those assets to the next generation tax
free. Because of the special treatment accorded spouses in
IRC § 2518 (b) (4), the disclaimed portion can pass into a
by-pass trust in which the spouse has an income interest and
the disclaimer will not fail to qualify.
B. Defective Grantor Trust.
If a grantor trust agreement were drafted improperly,
for example giving a beneficiary a prohibited unrestricted
right of withdrawal, the disclaimer could remedy the effect.
Instead of such income being taxable to the beneficiary
under IRC §678, the beneficiary could disclaim the power.
C. Defective Charitable Remainder Trust.
Charitable remainder trusts, because they must meet the
strict requirements imposed on private foundations under IRC
Sections 4941 through 4945, may easily fail to qualify,
thereby causing a 1055 of a charitable deduction under IRC §
G-17
664. In such a situation, it would be possible for the
noncharitable beneficiaries to disclaim their income inter-
ests and allow the trust property to pass outright to the
charitable remainderman.
D. Defective QTIP Trust.
If a will contains a poorly drafted qualified termina-
ble interest property ("QTIP") trust, the disclaimer can be
utilized to cure some defects. If the trust provided for
the "sprinkling" of income among the spouse and other bene-
ficiaries, the trust would fail as a QTIP trust. The other
beneficiaries could disclaim their interests and thereby
save the trust. PLR 8725063. If the trustee were given a
principal encroachment power for the benefit of beneficia-
ries other than the spouse during the spouse's lifetime, the
beneficiaries might be willing to disclaim their interests
in principal during the spouse's lifetime since they could
still retain their remainder interests. PLR 872506; PLR
8706066; Reg. §2S.2S18-3(d), example (11). The trustee's
disclaimer of its encroachment power would in all likelihood
not constitute a qualified disclaimer. PLR 8605004; PLR
8618067.
v. THE DISCLAIMER AS A PLANNING TOOL
To achieve a flexible estate plan, it is often desirable to
prepare a will or trust document for the potential use of a dis-
claimer. Dispositions in the event of a disclaimer should be
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indicated in order to fulfill the objectives of the original
transferor and the disclaimant.
The disclaimer is ideal for those couples with assets that
are currently less than the unified credit but who are likely to
increase their assets over their expected lifespans. The couple
may wish to have wills with each leaving everything to the other.
If those wills were drafted so that each spouse left his or her
residuary estate to the other, a provision could be added that
any portion disclaimed by the surviving spouse would pass to a
credit shelter trust with income to the surviving spouse. Use of
the disclaimer in this situation would permit postponement of the
decision whether a credit-shelter trust was needed until after
the first spouse's death.
Another use for the disclaimer is to salvage the marital
deduction for the estate of the first spouse to die. In PLR
8704023, the decedent's will created a trust that paid income for
the surviving spouse's life to the surviving spouse and
decedent's children. The trustee had discretion to distribute
principal to the spouse and the children, with primary considera-
tion to be given to the needs of the surviving spouse. The
decedent's children made a disclaimer of their rights to receive
income or principal from the trust during their mother's life-
time. In that the trust would not otherwise have qualified for
the marital deduction even with a QTIP election (because the
spouse would not receive all of the income during her life and
G-19
the existence of the right to invade principal for the children
during the spouse's life), the disclaimer saved the marital
deduction.
Similarly, in Estate of Boyd v. Commissioner, 87-1 U.S.T.C.
Section 13.720 (7th Cir. 1987), the decedent's son disclaimed all
of his interest in his father's estate so that the estate would
pass to his stepmother. In addition, the son was the beneficiary
of a life insurance policy and the will stipulated that taxes on
the proceeds should be paid out of the probate estate. The son
disclaimed his rights to have the probate estate pay any taxes on
the property passing to him outside the probate estate. The Court
found that a direction in the will to pay estate taxes on prop-
erty passing to the son was a further distribution of property to
the son which could be disclaimed (likening it to a forgiveness
of debt by a testator which an intended recipient insists on
repaying). The son's disclaimer of the tax allocation clause and
of his interest under the will qualified the entire estate for
the marital deduction.
A third use for the disclaimer is for situations when both
spouses die within a short time of each other. The disclaimer
could be employed by the surviving spouse to equalize the tax
burden on the two estates. The surviving spouse could make a
partial disclaimer of the portion passing outright to the surviv-
ing spouse so that a greater amount would go to a credit shelter
trust (and thus avoid estate tax on the survivor's death).
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VI. FINAL REGULATIONS
Ten years after the federal tax law of disc laimer became
codified by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 in IRe §2518, final regu-
lations were promulgated on August 7, 1986. Proposed regulations
had been in effect since July 1980 and, in the six years of their
existence, many formal hearings, articles, Private Letter Rulings
and Technical Advice Memoranda have been held and issued. The
final regulations clarify many issues which remained uncertain
under the proposed regulations. Following are a list of issues
left unanswered or unclear by the proposed regulations and an
explanation of their treatment in the final regulations.
The proposed regulations failed to consider two important
transfer questions. The first question was what the date of the
taxable transfer would be in those instances in which there were
two transfers. For example, a transferor may have made a gift of
a remainder interest in a trust in which he has a life estate.
There is a transfer when the gift is made (for gift tax purposes)
and there is a transfer when the transferor dies (for estate tax
purposes because the value of the trust is included in the
estate). The final regulations make it clear that for purposes
of starting the disclaimer period, it is the first transfer which
starts the running of the period. Regs. §25.2518-2(c)(3).
A second transfer issue involves the transfer of interests
in a QTIP trust. As discussed earlier, the final regulations
stipulate that the starting date for an effective disclaimer
G-21
begins on the date the first spouse dies and leaves assets in a
QTIP trust. Although the transfer is not taxed on the first
spouse's death because of the marital deduction, the regulations
do not defer the running of the disclaimer period until the date
of death of the surviving spouse. Regs. S25.2518-2(c)(3).
A potential problem that was not resolved by the proposed
regulations was the required timing period for successive dis-
claimers. Both sets of regulations made it clear that both the
life tenant and the remainderman had the same nine-month period
within which to disclaim their interests whenever a transfer cre-
ated such interests. Prop. Regs. S2518-2(c)(2); Regs. S
25.2518-2(c) (3). For example, a situation may arise where the
adult children of a decedent may wish to disclaim their interests
in their parents' estate in order for the entire estate to pass
to their surviving parent. The effect under common law in some
states may then be that the children would receive an intestate
interest in the parents' estate, thus necessitating a second dis-
claimer by the children. The regulations state that the timing
for the second disclaimer is the same as for the first: nine
months from the date of the decedent's death. All successive
disclaimers must occur within the same time period set for the
first disclaimer or that first disclaimer will not be qualified.
It is important to note here that all potential disclaimants who
are under age 21 at the time of the transfer have until nine
months after their twenty-first birthday to disclaim. IRe S
G-22
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2518(b)(2)(A) and (B). Practitioners at one time had to be wary
of local laws which inadvertently would cause an acceptance of
interests before a minor turned 21. For example, Kentucky's age
of majority is 18 and under the state Uniform Transfer to Minors
Act, custodianship ends when the donee reaches 18. Under the pro
posed regulations, such a donee would have had to disclaim within
nine months of his eighteenth birthday. Prop. Regs. §
25.2518-2(c)(1). The final regulations remove this trap by spe-
cifically providing that such an event will not constitute accep-
tance of an interest. Regs. §25.2518-2(d)(3).
VII. SUMMARY
A disclaimer can be a very effective post-mortem estate
planning tool. It can shift property to younger generations
without gift tax liability; it can save those same generations
estate taxes; it can save income taxes for the disclaimant him-
self by shifting income from disclaimed property to others; and
trusts can be revised to eliminate powers that would have
resulted in unnecessary taxes.
The final regulations are a welcome aid for the estate
advisor, providing clarification on issues that were not
addressed by the proposed regulations. The strict formalities
and special timing rules for disclaimers, however, marks this a
technique that must be carefully utilized.
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managers are aggressively investing and fiduciaries are viewed as
ments; yet, must compete in an environment where other money
This is from Scott on Trusts, Topic 5. Investment of Trust Funds.
It is an environment
It is the duty of a trustee to preserve the trust property
and to make it productive. It is ordinarily his duty to
invest trust funds in such a way as to receive income
without improperly risking the loss of the principal.
Fiduciary Investing
BY
Marjorie L. Bassler
Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Company
Louisville, KY
In light of recent legal developments, fiduciaries may do
well to heed the advice of Sgt. Esterhaus from the television
show Hill Street Blues, when he warned his troops, "Let's be
careful out there."
In an article by John J. Lombard, Jr. and Raymond H. Young entitled
"Fiduciary Responsibility in Investments", in the June 1985, Trust
& Estates, they closed with a quote which I would like to begin
with ...
stodgy and conservative by beneficiaries.
Fiduciaries are faced with a great challenge in today's environ-
ment. They are challenged by laws which regulate their invest-
which can lead to litigation if we aren't "careful out there."
In conjunction with this, we must consider what statutes regulate
our investment and what the provisions of the trust documents are.
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In Kentucky we are governed by both the Prudent Man Rule set forth
in two statutes, KRS 386.710 and 386.810 and Kentucky Common Law
and the legal list in KRS 386.020. The Prudent Man Rule states:
386.710 Standard of care and performance
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust,
the trustee shall observe the standards in dealing with
the trust assets that would be observed by a prudent man as
defined in KRS 386.800 (3).
Similar to the Uniform Probate Code except for reference
to KRS 386.800 (3) and deletion of provision requiring
persons having special skills or expertise to use them.
Under the Uniform Trustee's Powers Act of KRS under section 386.800
Definitions:
(3) "Prudent man" means a trustee whose exercise of trust
powers is reasonable and equitable in view of the interests
of income or principal beneficiaries or both, and in view
of the manner in which men of ordinary prudence, diligence,
discretion, and judgement would act in the management of
their own affairs.
The legal list of investments from Kentucky as listed in the KRS is
as follows:
386.020 Authorized investments of trust funds; fiduciary
to account for profits
(1) Any fiduciary holding funds for loan or investment may
invest them in:
(a) Bonds or other interest-bearing obligations of the
federal government;
(b) Bonds, state warrants and other interest-bearing
obligations of this state;
(c) Obligations issued separately or collectively by or
for federal land banks, federal intermediate credit banks and
banks for cooperatives under the Act of Congress known as the
Farm Credit Act of 1971, 85 Stat. 583, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 2001 and
amendments thereto;
(d) Notes and bonds secured by mortgage or trust deed insured
by the federal housing administrator, obligation issued or
H-2
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insured by the federal housing administrator, and securities
issued by national mortgage associations;
(e) Obligations representing loans and advances of credit that
are eligible for credit insurance by the federal housing
administrator and the fiduciary may obtain such insurance;
(f) Loans secured by real property or leasehold, that the
federal housing administrator insures or makes a commitment
to insure, and the fiduciary may obtain such insurance;
(g) Real estate mortgage notes, bonds and other
interest-bearing or dividend-paying securities
(including securities of any open-end or closed-end
management type investment company or investment trust
registered under the Federal Investment Company Act of
1940) which would be regarded by prudent businessmen as
a safe investment. The fact that the fiduciary is
providing services to the foregoing investment company
or trust as investment advisor, custodian, transfer agent,
registrar or otherwise shall not preclude the fiduciary
from investing in the securities of such investment or
trust;
(h) Real estate, after obtaining the approval of the district
court for such investment;
(i) Life insurance, endowment and annuity contracts issued by
legal reserve companies authorized to do business in this
state, after obtaining the approval of the district court
for such investment. Said fiduciary may select any optional
settlement provided in a policy maturing by death or as an
endowment;
(j) Notes, other interest-bearing obligations, and purchases
of participations in such instruments, that are guaranteed in
whole or in part by the United States of America or by any
agency or instrumentality thereof;
(k) Certificates of deposit and savings accounts of any
state or national bank whose deposits are insured by the
federal deposit insurance corporation and whose main office
is in this state, including itself, if such fiduciary is a
bank. Such investments shall be insured by the federal deposit
insurance corporation and the amount of the investments shall
not exceed the limits of insurance of the federal deposit
insurance corporation; and
(1) United States government securities or United States
government agency securities, the payment of the principal
and interest on which the full faith and credit of the
United States is pledged, said investments being made under
the terms of a repurchase agreement between the fiduciary
and any state or national bank whose main office is in this
H-3
state including itself, if such fiduciary is a bank.
(2) Fiduciaries holding funds for loan or investment may
make loans with the securities named in subsection (1) as
collateral.
(3) The fiduciary shall account for all interest or profit
received.
Further directions for trustee's with regard to investments are
contained under the Uniform Trustee's Powers Act in KRS 386.810
(3), a copy of which may be found in Appendix "A".
Times change and investment techniques change but the rules
of common sense and prudence will probably remain with
fiduciaries for at least another 155 years.
The above quote is from an article by John W. Church, Jr. and
Richard B. Seidel entitled "Rearming the Prudent Man" on page 24 in
the September 1986 issue of Trust & Estates.
Turney Berry, of Greenebaum, Doll, McDonald recently prepared a re-
search paper which he shared with us, and from his research of the
history of the statutes he concludes that the legal list is permis-
sive only in that the fiduciary "may invest" which is not restric-
tive or mandatory. It "provides express authority for a fiduciary
to invest in the stated ways, but does not prohibit investment in
other forms."
Kentucky has many cases which substantiate that it follows the pru-
dent man rule. The provisions of the trust document will overlay
the statutes, which in turn will be superimposed upon the case law.
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It is possible to make an investment of an asset from the legal
rlist, but it also must be a prudent investment. Likewise, an in-
rvestment can be made in a trust in an asset which is not on the le-
gal list, and it is still proper if it is prudent. One of the
r earlier Kentucky cases which deals with the prudent man rule is the
and
cau-
therethatis
beneficiaries
care, skill and
rule
of Carlick v. Keiler, 375 S.W. 2d 397 (KY
remainderman, unless the trust document di-
cases
KRS 386.800 (3) and 386.710.
principal
recent
a reasonable equitable balance between the investments of
A further concern of the prudent man
l~en an investment is made, judgement of its prudence is as
be
more
future
the
the trust which will benefit the current income
the
1964).
tion.
rects otherwise.
Fiduciary investing requires three elements:
case of Merriwether v. Merriwether, 11 KY. Op. 251 (1881) to one of
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Although each asset must be proper, the fiduciary needs to consider
This includes diversification and equality to both the interests of
in making an investment in addition to those relating to the safety
From Scott on Trusts, Topic 5, Investment of Trust Funds, the fol-
sight
security.
hind
eachjust
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as to its affect on the account.investment
Another consideration is that we judge the pro-
eachof
so clear.
is taken, which lists the factors that should be considered
be
impactthe
of the time it is made and not as of a later date when
the current beneficiaries and the remaindermen.
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listing is contained in the Restatement of Trusts, section 227.
(6) the aggregate value of the trust estate and the nature
of the other investments;
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(7) the requirements of the beneficiary or beneficiaries,
particularly with respect to the amount of the income;
(8) the other assets of the beneficiary or beneficiaries
including earning capacity;
(9) the effect of the investment in increasing or diminishing
liability for taxes.
(5) the probable condition of the market with respect to
reinvestment at the time when the particular investment
matures;
(3) the probable duration of the trust;
(4) the probable condition of the market with respect to the
value of the particular investment at the termination of the
trust, especially if at the termination of the trust the
investment must be converted into money for the purpose of
distribution;
(1) the marketability of the particular investment;
(2) the length of the term of the investment, for example,
the maturity date, if any, the callability or redeemability,
if any;
of the principal and the amount of regularity of the income.
In the decision process, a fiduciary can't rely totally on the ad-
vice of others, since it is the duty of the trustee to use his own
judgement. This is not to say that advice can't be sought, but the
fiduciary must weigh that advice with regard to it being from a
disinterested person, as well as from a knowledgeable person. The
fiduciary must make a proper investigation before making an invest-
ment change. It he properly researches the investment, and at the
time it is a proper investment that complies with the provisions of
the trust, the statutes and law and the value declines he will not
rH-7
properly consider this and
settlor, and the securities are not proper trust assets or become
the corporation, according to Scott on Trusts, the trustee may
hold,
document
to
trust
trust
However, if proper research isn't done,for the loss.
via KRS 287.230 and 287.235 does permit the investment of
liable
the fiduciary could still be liable.
does not specifically authorize it.
trust assets in common trust funds even though the
Kentucky
... dec1ine to invest in, or retain, the securities
of corporations whose activities or some of them are
contrary to fundamental and generally accepted ethical
principles. They may consider such matters as pollution,
race discrimination, fair employment, and consumer
responsibility.
With the many concerns of people about the social performance of
improper assets, then under KRS 386.070 Disposition of unauthorized
If securities are received by a fiduciary from the testator or
proper."
securities, "such ineligible securities shall be sold at such time
and upon such terms and conditions, or shall be held or otherwise
handled in such manner as prudent businessmen would consider
It is not necessary to immediately dispose of improper assets, but
to do so in a reasonable time when a prudent person would. Reason-
able time could depend on circumstances with regard to the asset
r be
even if the investment was a proper asset for the
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and the account. One consideration in such a sale would be the li-
ability for capital gains, which might be generated by the sale.
If the trust directs the fiduciary to retain a security specif-
ically, but it does not appear proper or prudent to continue to do
so, the fiduciary can apply to the court for permission to sell.
According to Scott on Trusts, just because the trust terms author-
ize the retention of specific securities, it does not allow the
trust to invest in the security. Also, if the trust terms do not
authorize retention of specific securities, they can be retained
even though they are not necessarily proper trust investments, if
the trust permits the fiduciary to invest in the security.
From the Restatement of Trusts, section 231, as quoted in Scott on
Trusts, section 230.2 Time conversion comes the following factors
for consideration in determining how long to retain securities:
(1) the character of the property and the amount of risk
involved in its retention;
(2) the amount which the trustee would receive on an
immediate sale as compared with what he reasonably regards
as its intrinsic value;
(3) the amount which the trustee would receive on an
immediate sale as compared with the value of the property at
the time when it became a part of the trust estate;
(4) the original value of the trust estate as a whole;
(5) the general state of the market, as for example whether
the prevailing prices are generally considered unduly low as
in the case of a general depression or are considered unduly
high;
(6) the available opportunities for reinvestment;
(7) the question of incurring tax liabilities;
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be time to look at this rule and decide if it also means that if we
As I mentioned earlier, we are competing in a new investment arena,
ties that were not proper trust investments, he needs to be able to
At what point in time do economic changes become so fundamental
that it is imprudent not to develop new investment strategies?
At what point in time do new investment vehicles become so
tried and true that it is imprudent not to use them? At what
point in time is the fiduciary making his decisions out of a
fear of being surcharged rather than acting in the best
interest of his beneficiaries?
is
of
new
pru-
It may
securi-
securi-
the
case
chip
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ignore
If this can be shown then he
In the Trust & Estates, September
fiduciary from surcharge, because we cana
wishes to escape surcharge because of a lost that
exempt
on page 24, entitled "Rearming the Prudent Man" John
to surcharge, just because he made an error in judge-
have advanced so in our abilities to analyze companies
not
exercised good prudent judgement and fully considered the
trustee
we
article
he
may
subject
the
(8) the purposes of the trust and the effect thereon of a
possible loss on the investment in question.
occurs when there is a delay in selling or failure to sell
show
facts and conditions at the time.
but we are relying on the prudent man rule from the
not
menta
1986
intend to be a prudent fiduciary that we will not
investment tools and techniques.
dent fiduciary:
Church Jr. and Richard B. Seidel pose these questions for the
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and investments and measure risks, just holding blue
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measure the risk of investments. No investment is totally free of
risk. With period of inflation and the eroding value of money,
even an investment in a government security can have risk which
would be associated with inflation and change of interest rates.
The fiduciary still has to determine how much risk is acceptable
and there is not currently a guideline for this other than the pru-
dent man rule. The prudent investor will have to weigh the risk
versus the reward to determine what is appropriate at the point in
time when the investment is to be made and based on the skill
available to the fiduciary.
Another problem area for the fiduciary through which he can open up
the possibility of a surcharge is through the lack of communi-
cation. In several articles and through my own experience, more
problems can result when communication with the beneficiary is not
often and understandable. Not only do you need to communicate what
you are doing with the trust and its investments, but you also must
develop a customer relationship with the beneficiary so that you
feel comfortable communicating with each other. Many times the
beneficiary may feel inhibited in asking a person who appears to be
a stranger to them, the trustee, some questions or to express what
their needs really are. We must become communicators, but we also
must become good listeners too! In the February 1988 issue of
Trust &Estates, in an article on page 62 entitled, "Protecting the
Corporate Fiduciary's Tender Backside" the author, Rohan Kelley de-
velops a Fiduciary Creed which is an excerpt from an article by
William J. Wilkie
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rThus, in summation, the fiduciary has to know the trust document
if we hope to service them as trust customers and avoid litigation.
Another element for communicating is that we have a new breed of
customer and they want more sophisticated investments, reports and
He has to be able to relate those
We have to be ready to adapt to their changing needs
It is also essential for trustees to avoid all appearances
of professional arrogance. There is nothing to be gained by
trustees, in the exercise of responsibilities that are solely
theirs, not communicating regularly with beneficiaries and
remaindermen. This is especially important when unusual
assets are involved. Obtaining their written wishes and
acquiescence may not always help, but it should not hurt
either. It is essential to communicate, communicate,
communicate.
information.
The future of the trust industry rests with this new aggressive
customer and we must be prepared to make the necessary changes in
our environment to meet these challenges. We must remember that
the beneficiary and remaindermen have objectives and those must be
continually considered in the management of the trust.
law which governs the investments of the trust, be able to document
the process by which investment decisions are made, be knowledge-
and understand it thoroughly.
provisions to the beneficiaries and remaindermen, understand the
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communicate with the beneficiary frequently and involve them in
fiduciary must understand the beneficiary needs,
concerns, and listen to his questions. The fiduciary must be
is.
able
~osomeonetoaccess
H-ll
the
to
Furthermore,
r able in the investment arena or have
r
r
r
r
{ .. '?""-------------------------------------------------,
the account management process, so that they understand what is
happening to their money. We must communicate, communicate, commu-
nicate.
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APPENDIX "A"
386.810 Powers of trustees conferred by this chapter
(1) From time of creation of the trust until final distribu-
tion of the assets of the trust, a trustee has the power to
perform, without court authorization, every act which a
prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust
including but not limited to the powers specified in subsec-
tion (3).
(2) In the exercise of his powers including the powers
granted by this chapter, a trustee has a duty to act with due
regard to his obligation as a fiduciary, including a duty to
give consideration to available tax exemptions, deductions,
or credits for tax purposes. "Tax" includes, but is not lim-
ited to, any federal, state, or local income, gift, estate, or
inheritance tax.
(3) A trustee has the power, subject to subsections (I)
and (2) of this section:
(a) To collect, hold, and retain trust assets received from
a trustor until. in the judgment of the trustee, disposition of
the assets should be made; and the assets may be retained
even though they include an asset in which the trustee is
personally interested;
(b) To receive additions to the assets of the trust;
(c) To continue or participate in the operation of any
business or other enterprise, and to effect incorporation,
dissolution, or other change in the form of the organization
of the business or enterprise;
(d) To acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset in
which the trustee, in any trust capacity, holds an undivided
interest;
(e) To invest and reinvest trust assets in accordance with
the provisions of the trust or as provided by law;
(f) To deposit trust funds in a bank, including a bank
operated by the trustee;
(g) To acquire or dispose of an asset, for cash or on
credit, at public or private sale; and to manage, develop,
improve, exchange, partition, change the character of, or
abandon a trust asset or any interest therein; and to encum-
ber, mortgage, or pledge a trust asset for a term within or
extending beyond the tel m of the trust, in connection with
the exercise of any power vested in the trustee;
(h) To make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or altera-
tions in buildings or other structures, to demolish any
improvements, to raze existing or erect new party walls or
buildings;
(i) To subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use;
or to make or obtain the vacation of plats and adjust bound-
aries; or to adjust differences in valuation on exchange or
partition by giving or receiving consideration; or to dedicate
easements to public use without consideration;
(j) To enter for any purpose into a lease as lessor or
lessee with or without option to purchase or renew for a
term within or extending beyond the term of the trust;
(k) To enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration
and removal of minerals or other natural resources or enter
into a pooling or unitization agrcement;
(I) To grant an option involving disposition of a trust
assct. or to take an option for the acquisition of any asset;
(111) To vote a security, in person or by general or limited
proxy:
(n) To pay calls, assessments, and any other sums
chargeable or accruing against or on account of securities;
(0) To sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion
rights; to consent, directly or through a committee or other
agent, to the reorganization, consolidation, merger, dissolu-
tion, or liquidation of a corporation or other business
enterprise;
(p) To hold a security in the name of a nominee or in
other form without disclosure of the trust, so that title to the
security may pass by delivery, but the trustee is liable for
any act of the nominee in connection with the stock so held;
(q) To insure the assets of the trust against damage or
loss, and the trustee against liability with respect to third
persons;
(r) To borrow money to be repaid from trust assets or
otherwise; to advance mone~ for the protection of the trust,
and for all expenses, losses, and liability sustained in the
administration of the trust or because of the holding or
ownership of any trust assets, for which advances with any
interest the trustee has a lien on the trust assets as against
the beneficiary;
(s) To payor contest any c1aipl; to settle a claim by or
against the trust by compromise, arbitration, or otherwise;
and to release, in whole or in p;lrt, any claim belonging to
the trust to the extent that the claim is uncollectible;
(t) To pay taxes, assessments. compensation of the trus-
tee, and other expenses incurred in the collection. care.
administration, and protection of the trust;
(u) To aI' )cate items of income or expense to either trust
income or principal, as provided by law, including creation
of reserves out of income for depreciation, obsolescence, or
amortization, or for depletion ;n mineral or timber
properties;
(v) To pay any sum distributable to a beneficiary under
legal disability, without liability to the trustee, by paying
the sum to the beneficiary or by paying the sum for the use
of the beneficiary either to a legal representative appointed
by the court, or if none, to a relative;
(w) To effect distribution of property and money in
divided or undivided interests and to adjust resulting differ-
ences in valuation;
(x) To employ persons, including attorneys. auditors,
investment advisors, or agents to advise or assist the trustee
in the performance of his administrative duties; to act with-
out independent investigation upon their recommendations;
and instead of acting personally, to employ one or more
agents to perform any act of administration, whether or not
discretionary;
(y) To prosecute or defend actions, claims. or proceed-
ings for the protection of trust assets and of the trustee in
the performance of his duties;
(z) To execute and deliver all instruments which will
accomplish or facilitate the exercise of the powers vested in
the trustee.
HISTORY: 1976 H 98. § 46, cff. 6-19-76
SOURCE NOTE (1976)
Virlually identical to the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act
§ 3. .
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Now that the legal framework of statutes and cases has
been established, I would like to describe the invest-
ment process. How do we actually go about investing
the dollars we hold as a fiduciary? What are the
guidelines? How do we accomplish the goals of our
trust customers by investing in financial assets?
There are, of course, many different capacities in
which we serve as a fiduciary, and the investments we
choose for an account will vary accordingly. For
instance, if we are serving as Executor of an estate
which, after administration, will go out fee we are
charged primarily with:
(a) selling enough assets to raise cash for the
expenses of administration; and
(b) preserving capital until distribution.
As Executor in this situation, we don't take on the
long term management role of maximizing investment
returns and protecting the dollars under management
against the effects of inflation. With trusts, on the
other hand, be they revocable or irrevocable, we do
take on a long term management role and make invest-
I-I
ments appropriate to the objectives of the individual
beneficiary or beneficiaries involved.
When we are taking on the job of Trustee and long term
management of assets, we start by setting investment
objectives. Each account must have a documented and
updated investment objective. To arrive at an objec-
tive, we analyze the return we desire. Return is a
combination of the:
1. income produced by the assets (i.e. dividends
or interest); and
2. the capital appreciation or depreciation over
the period.
We also analyze the level of risk we can tolerate. We
measure risk by "standard deviation" or variability of
returns time. 1 The following chart showsover
historical return and risk information for asset
classes:
lMaginn, John and Tuttle, Donald, Managing Investment
Portfolios, Milne, Robert, "Determination of
Portfolio Policies: Individual Investors," p. 130-31
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return, but have involved less risk. So, we consider
October 19, 1987, served as a harsh reminder of this.
Bonds, as you can see, have historically offered less
5.5
3.4
4.8
21.1
35.9
8.5
8.5
Standard
Deviation
Monday,
4.8
3.5
3.0
9.9
12.1
4.9
4.3
Geometric
Mean
Summary Statistics of Annual Returns
1926-1987
Series
Small-company stocks
Common stocks (%)
Long-term corporate bonds
Long-term government bonds
Intermediate-term
government bonds
u. S. Treasury Bills
Inflation Rates
Source: Ibbotson, Roger G., and Rex A. Sinquefied,
Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation, (SBBI),
1982, updated in SBBI 1988 Yearbook, Ibbotson
Associates, Chicago
As you can see from the chart, stocks have historically
afforded the highest return, but also involve the
highest standard deviation, or risk.
the risk/return trade off when setting investment
objectives.
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In setting investment obj ectives and beginning the
investment process for trusts, we have five basic
investment constraints to consider:
1. Time horizon - What is our time frame for the
investments? Are we dealing with a 99-year-
old who has a very short time frame and thus
calls for very conservative investments and
little risk? Or we are investing for a
30-year-old who has a long life ahead of him
and has just inherited money? With the
longer time horizon of the 30-year-old, we
can take more risk and achieve greater
returns over the years.
2. Liquidity needs - How much liquidity will be
needed in the trust? How much should be set
aside in a safe, liquid asset such as a money
market fund for quick withdrawals? Revocable
trust customers will usually let us know how
much to keep on hand. Irrevocable or
testamentary trusts may need money for
encroachments or taxes. These liquidity
needs must be considered.
1-4
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4.
5.
Regulatory and legal constraints must be
considered. What are "legal" investments in
the state? The "prudent man" rule must be
considered.
Taxes - What is the tax situation of our
beneficiaries? What is their income tax
bracket? Do we need taxable or tax-free
bonds? In a revocable trust, all of the tax
effects of our investments will flow through
to the personal income tax return of the
Grantor. Usually, in an irrevocable or
testamentary trust, the trust as a separate
taxpayer will report and pay tax on capital
gains and the income beneficiary will report
and pay tax on the income generated by the
trust.
The last constraint we consider in establish-
ing investment objectives and beginning the
investment process is the special needs and
circumstances of the beneficiaries or trust.
For example:
1-5
a. Do we have a concentration in one stock
or asset which will have to be slowly
diversified over time?
b. Does the trust customer have emotional
or sentimental ties with the assets?
Often, beneficiaries ask that certain
stocks not be sold. Perhaps it is a
stock inherited from a relative or a
stock "Daddy gave me and told me never
to sell.,,2
After setting an investment objective for the trust,
by considering the return needed, the risk tolerance,
and the investment constraints in the situation, we
decide upon an asset allocation. That is, how much
money will be invested in, typically, bonds, stocks,
and cash.
For example, if we have an elderly nursing home patient
who has established a living trust, we would allocate
more dollars to bonds than stocks. If we have a young
professional who has just inherited money and
2Maginn, John and Tuttle, Donald, Managing Investment
Portfolios, Milne, Robert, "Determination of
Portfolio Policies: Individual Investors," p. 134-140
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established a living trust, we would allocate more
dollars to common stocks than bonds.
Asset allocation is a challenge in the so-called "split
interest trust". For example, a trust under will
established for the life of one person, remainder to a
different individual. The income is paid out to the
life tenant during his or her life. Upon death of the
life tenant, the corpus of the trust goes out in fee to
the remaindermen.
Here we are investing money to meet the needs of two
different trust customers. The life tenant, income
beneficiary, wants as much income to be generated by
the trust as possible. The life tenant, since he is
usually entitled to only the income, would love to see
us invest the entire trust in high yielding bonds. The
remainderman on the other hand, wants us to achieve
growth in the assets over time. He will inherit the
assets at the death of the life tenant. The remain-
derman is happy if the trust has a high allocation to
common stocks for growth of principal.
The Trustee has to deal with this conflict between
beneficiaries. KRS 386.800 (3) speaks to this in
defining the "Prudent Man." The "Prudent Man" means a
1-7
trustee whose exercise of trust powers is reasonable
and equitable in view of the interest of income or
principal beneficiaries or both ... " The remaindermen
or income beneficiary could potentially take legal
action against the Trustee if their interests are
ignored. A happy median must be found between an
all-stock or all-bond allocation.
Now that we've set our investment objective, considered
our constraints and corne up with an appropriate asset
allocation, we are ready to choose individual assets.
A Kentucky case, Peoples State Bank & Trust Co. v.
Wade, 106 SW 2nd 74 (KY 1937) gives some guidelines,
and reads as follows:
"The tests by which a Trustee should ordinar-
ily measure the advisability of a particular
investment are thus stated in the Restatement
of the Law of Trusts, vol. 1, § 227, subsec.
(m) :
"Among the matters which the Trustee should
consider in selecting a given investment in
addition to those relating to the safety of
the fund invested and the amount and regular-
ity of the income, are: (1) the marketability
of the particular investment; (2) the length
1-8
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of the term of the investment, for example,
the maturity date, if any, the callability or
redeemability, if any; (3) the probable
duration of the trust; (4) the probable
condition of the market with respect to the
value of the particular investment at the
termination of the trust especially if at the
termination of the trust the investment must
be converted into money for the purpose of
distribution; (5) the probable condition of
the market with respect to reinvestment at
the time when the particular investment
matures; (6) the aggregate value of the trust
estate and the nature of the other invest-
ments; (7) the requirements of the benefi-
ciary or beneficiaries, particularly with
respect to the amount of the income; (8) the
other assets of the beneficiary or benefi-
ciaries including earning capacity; (9) the
effect of the investment in increasing or
diminishing liability for taxes."
In addition to the above, it may be
added that the Trustee should consider the
advisability of diversifying his investments
in order to insure against adverse conditions
in any particular field."
1-9
As the case states, a key point in posturing the
account will be to diversify the investments, so that
we don't have all of our "eggs in one basket." This is
an important tenent in portfolio management. In the
bond portion of the portfolio, we will diversify as to
maturity and perhaps issuer. We will stagger matur-
ities so that we will have bonds maturing at different
times and in different interest rate environments. In
the stock portion of our portfolio, we will diversify
by purchasing stocks of different industry sectors. By
diversifying, we can eliminate much of the "non-
systematic" risk of the companies. When one industry
is doing poorly, perhaps another will be at its peak.
We cannot eliminate "systematic risk," however, or the
risk that the the stocks will move together as the
overall market moves.
As we invest and reinvest the assets, who calls the
shots? Who makes the decisions? Usually, when we act
as Trustee, we are given investment discretion to act
as we see fit. We usually do not have to consult with
anyone for prior approval. Even in these circum-
stances, however, we try to communicate with our
beneficiaries and inform them of the whys and hows of
our investments. In some circumstances, however, the
trust document requires that we consult an individual
1-10
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advisor or advisory committee and obtain official
approval before making investment changes. We are
perfectly comfortable with either a discretionary or
advisory set-up. However, practically speaking,
the advisory set-up can be cumbersome. Sometimes the
advisors are hard to find when time is of the essence!
As you have seen, there is a definite procedure which
we, as a fiduciary, follow in investing money. The
process is an ongoing one. Our investment objectives
and constraints may change as the needs and circum-
stances of the beneficiaries we serve change. The end
result, our goal, is solid and successful management of
assets.
Thank you.
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ASSET TRANSFERS AFTER "DICKMAN"
Dickman - The Decision.
In Dickman v Commissioner, 84-1 USTC (CCH) ~113,560 (1984), the Supreme
Court, by a majority of seven, determined that an interest-free demand
loan results in a transfer subject to the federal gift tax. The Court
indicated that the "property" interest involved is the right of the
borrower to use the funds loaned for an undetermined period of time.
The holding was buttressed by the Court's feeling that the result was
necessary to avoid undermining the federal estate and income tax laws.
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the holding could be
applied in an absurd manner to everyday transactions such as the loan
of a cup of sugar to a neighbor or lunch money to a colleague ("When
the government levies a gift tax on routine neighborly or familial
gifts, there will be time enough to deal with such a case." Id. at
84,430).
In two footnotes, the Court very briefly touched on the issue of
valuation in the demand loan context. The Court indicated that the
lender's failure over time to call the loan would cause the gift to
become complete and that this component of the transaction, i.e.,
completeness over time, would affect the value of the gift. Id. at
84,429 n. 7. In addition, the Court stressed that the IRS would not
be required to establish that the loaned funds produced a certain
amount of revenue; instead, it would be sufficient to prove that a
J-1
particular yield could have been secured by the borrower and that the
reasonable value of the use of the funds can be readily ascertained.
Id. at 84,431 n. 14. Of course, since the valuation question was not
before the Court, both of these footnotes constituted nothing more than
dictum.
In his dissent, Justice Powell, who was joined by Justice Rehnquist,
criticized the opinion of the majority because of the reliance of
taxpayers on the Service's past inaction regarding this issue and the
belief that Congress would be the appropriate forum for enactment of
any substantive law change. Most importantly, however, Justice Powell
predicted that the broad scope of the holding might result in the
future in unanticipated application of Dickman to other fact situations.
He wrote:
The Court, aware of the potential for abuse of its new inter-
pretation, "assume[s}" that the Internal Revenue Service will
exercise the power conferred on it in a reasonable way. Ante, at
10. This assumption is not likely to afford much comfort~
taxpayers and the lawyers and accountants who advise them. The
Commissioner, acting with utmost goodwill, is confronted with a
dilemma. This Court today holds that the plain language of the
statute mandates, and that Congress intended, the "gift tax
statute to reach all gratuitous transfers of any valuable interest
in property." Ante, at 3. No discretion is given the Commissioner
and the IRS to read "all" and "any" as meaning only such valuable
interests in property that it seems reasonable to tax. The Court
identifies no statutory basis for such discretion, and even if the
Court itself undertook to confer it I am not aware that we have
ever before "assumed" that tax laws would be enforced---not
according to their letter--but reasonably. Id. at 84,434.
(Emphasis in original.)
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II. Essence of Dickman.
The barebones essence of Dickman involves the concept of forbearance or
the forgoing of an opportunity that results in some benefit (resulting
from the use of an interest in property) accruing to another. This
proposition is fairly clear in the context of interest-free demand
loans. However, it is much less so where other somewhat analogous
facts are involved. Unfortunately, the concerns of the Dickman dis-
senters regarding the scope of the opinion appear to have been justified
because the IRS has cited Dickman in various fact settings not involving
demand loans.
III. The Aftermath of Dickman.
Following the decision of the Supreme Court, the IRS announced that it
would apply Dickman retroactively, and the rules regarding valuation of
demand loan gifts for years prior to 1984 were set forth in Rev. Proc.
85-46, 1985-2 C.B. 507.
Subsequently, Congress enacted Section 7872 of the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) as a part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. This
statute contains comprehensive rules regarding valuation of low interest
and interest-free loans for gift and income tax purposes. IRC Section 7872
also contains several very important exceptions.
J-3
Finally (or is it only the beginning), in 1987, the IRS began applying
the Dickman rationale to fact settings involving GRITs and the rights
of shareholders in closely held corporations. The balance of this
outline will address these matters.
IV. Applicability of Dickman to a GRIT.
A GRIT (Grantor Retained Income Trust) is an irrevocable transfer of
assets to a trust in which the grantor retains an income interest for a
term certain. The gift involved is that of the remainder interest.
The tax advantage of a GRIT is derived from the 10% valuation tables
that the Service promulgated in 1983 under IRe Sections 2031 and 2512.
These tables inflate the value of the grantor's retained interest,
which has the effect of reducing substantially the value of the gift of
the remainder interest for gift tax purposes. If the grantor survives
the term certain, then he has successfully transferred at a low gift tax
~ (1) the assets originally transferred to the trust and (2) all
appreciation in value of such assets after the transfer. At the same
time, the grantor has benefitted from the income earned on the assets
during the term certain.
A client may desire to transfer to a GRIT shares of stock in a closely
held corporation, the dividend history of which has been low. In such
a case, many tax advisors have felt that inclusion of a provision
permitting the grantor to compel the trustee to convert nonproductive
J-4
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
I
I
I
I
I
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
f
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
or underproductive assets to income-producing property is necessary to
assure that the Service will permit the use of the advantageous 10%
valuation tables (See Letter Ruling 8642028).
The IRS has recently applied Dickman to this type of provision in
Letter Ruling 8806082. There, the grantor had transferred closely held
stock to a GRIT in which he retained an eight-year income interest. The
dividend rate of the stock during the 10 years preceding the transfer
had ranged from zero to .9%. The trust instrument included language
permitting the grantor to direct the trustee to dispose of unproductive
or underproductive trust assets. The Service determined that (1) a
completed gift had been made and (2) that the advantageous 10% valuation
tables could be used in the valuation formula (in spite of the low
yield of the stock). However, the Service also ruled, in reliance upon
Dickman, that additional gifts would be effected in years following the
creation of the GRIT if the grantor failed to direct the trustee to
dispose of underproductive assets. The Service stated:
If, after the initial funding, you fail to exercise the
right to make the corpus of the trust normally productive
under the standards usually applicable to simple trusts,
you may lose a continuing stream of your entitled income
and such a loss would cause a continuing increase in the
value of the corpus (in the form of capital appreciation
that results from the retention of earnings) for the
benefit of the remainder and reversionary interests. As
in the case of the lost income on the demand loan money
in Dickman, the lost income on the trust corpus in the
present case would be recognizable as a taxable gift for
each year in which you fail to protect your right to
receive a reasonable rate of income. The valuation of
any gifts made through loss of income after the initial
J-5
funding of the trust should be calculated on a basis
that is consistent with the calculation of the value of
the gift of the remainder interest at the time of the
initial funding. Thus, to be consistent, the valuation
of future annual remainder interest gifts resulting from
lost income of the trust would be based on the assumption
of a 10 percent imputed rate of return for those years
in which the 10 percent rate continues to remain in
effect.
The result of this Letter Ruling is not particularly surprising in view
of the Service's obvious distaste of GRITs. The most troublesome
aspect of the Letter Ruling involves the valuation of the future gifts.
Although the Service indicated in the cited language that a 10% assumed
rate of return will be used to determine the value of any future gift,
it also referred in another portion of the ruling to the use of a state
law standard for purposes of determining whether the trust asset is
underproductive. These two standards are difficult to reconcile in
that the spread between the "state law standard" and a 10% return may
be substantial. As an example, an unproductive asset under Kentucky
law is one that produces less than 1% per year. KRS 386.290(1).
The scope of Letter Ruling 8806082 is disconcerting. For example, its
rationale could be applied to the power of the spouse who is the
beneficiary of a marital deduction trust to compel investment in
income-producing property. (This power is typically included in
marital deduction trusts pursuant to Treas. Reg. 20.2056(b)-4.) No
doubt, the motivation of the IRS on this issue would not be as great,
since the full value of the marital deduction trust will be included in
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the surviving spouse's estate for federal estate tax purposes at' his or
her death. (The same is true with respect to the grantor's retained
interest in a GRIT only if he dies before the expiration of the term
certain.) However, if the trust were quite large in value, the amount
of the gift might exceed the spouse's remaining exemption equivalent,
with the result that a transfer tax would be due sooner rather than
later. This analysis likely would apply only to a QTIP trust, since
any power of appointment trust would always be subject to a changed
disposition and the spouse's failure to "compel" therefore could not be
considered a completed gift for federal gift tax purposes.
With respect to GRITs and the matter of underproductive or nonproductive
assets, the IRS reached similar conclusions in Letter Rulings 8805029
and 8801008.
Applicability of Dickman in the Corporate Setting.
Thus far, the IRS has applied Dickman in two situations involving the
"activities" of an owner of preferred shares in a closely held corporation.
r
r
r
r
r
A. Failure to Declare a Dividend.
In Technical Advice Memorandum 8723007, the taxpayer was the owner
of 21,325 shares of 10% non-cumulative voting preferred stock.
J-7
This number of shares represented 100% of the outstanding preferred
shares and voting control of the corporation. The taxpayer
previously had owned 100% of the voting common stock, but trans-
ferred all of those shares in trust for the benefit of his grand-
children in 1980.
The corporation paid dividends on the preferred stock of 1.5% and
.2% in 1981 and 1982, respectively, but no preferred stock dividends
were paid in 1983 and 1984. No dividends were paid on the common
stock during these years. During the years in issue, the corpo-
ration maintained large cash and short-term investment balances.
The issue addressed was whether the taxpayer had made gifts in the
years in question to the owners of the common stock as a result of
his failure to compel as the controlling shareholder (although he
was only one of two members of the Board of Directors) the dec la-
ration of dividends on the preferred shares. The IRS concluded,
in reliance to a fair extent on the Dickman rationale, that
indirect gifts had been made because the taxpayer had failed to
take any steps to protect his interest in the earnings of the
corporation. In reaching this conclusion, the IRS observed:
The basic questions presented in the present case are (1)
whether the donor as the controlling shareholder (over 70% of
voting power at all times) of the corporation has adequately
protected his economic position against encroachment by the
other minority shareholders, and (2) if not, whether his
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acquiescence or negligence in failing to protect his position
results in a gift to the other shareholders. To properly
consider these questions, it is necessary to verify that (a)
there has been a measurable shift in value from the donor's
stockholdings to the other stockholdings, and (b) that the
donor had the right or power to stop or at least diminish
such shift in value.
In the present case, the earnings of the corporation totaled
$1,195,000 over the last five years. An 83% share of this
total for all of the preferred stock is $988,333. If the
donor had held common stock instead of preferred stock, he
would have realized a fair pro rata (majority share) benefit
of the $1,195,000 earnings total. The realization would have
been in the form of enhanced value of his common stock
through its representative share of the total earnings. As
preferred shareholder, the donor received only $36,905.
Moreover, even if the corporation continues at its recent
rate of profitability (earnings more than the maximum $213,250
annual preferred dividend), the donor as a preferred share-
holder will never be able to recover the dividends not paid
in the prior years.
By foregoing his preferred dividend, the donor has waived his
right as a preferred shareholder to his fair share of earned
surplus. This has resulted in a steady and progressive shift
in value from the donor's shareholdings to the shareholdings
of the present common shareholders.
The Service acknowledged that valid business purposes could
support the decision of a corporation not to declare a dividend;
however, it did not base its decision on this analysis. (The
taxpayer had argued that large cash reserves were necessary to
meet the corporation's bonding requirements [and those of its
subsidiaries].) Instead, the Service concluded readily that the
taxpayer could have protected his interests by alternative means
such as having the corporation (1) declare and pay a dividend and
then loan the paymen.t back to the corporation; (2) distribute its
J-9
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promissory note to him; or (3) declare and E£! pay the dividend.
thus making the unpaid dividend a liability on the corporation's
books. The Service also noted that the corporation had paid a
dividend when cash and cash equivalents were $894.000. but had not
done so when cash and cash equivalents were $2.484.000.
Failure to Convert Preferred Stock to Common Stock.
Technical Advice Memorandum 8726005 involved a taxpayer who had
received in a recapitalization 50% of the outstanding 13% non-
cumulative preferred stock (that was convertible to common stock
at his option) and 50% of the shares of common stock. The pre-
ferred shares were nonparticipating and non-voting. The other 50%
was o~~ed by an unrelated third party. The taxpayer also owned
50% of the shares of another class of preferred shares which
carried the voting rights. (During the period in question. the
common stock was non-voting.)
In 1983. the taxpayer gave all of his common shares to his
children. Also in that year, the taxpayer entered into an agree-
ment with the third party shareholder to purchase his shares
through a redemption by the corporation. The purchase price was
paid with cash and notes. As part of the redemption agreement,
the corporation was prohibited from declaring any dividends so
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long as any of the notes remained unpaid, and the taxpayer was
required to pledge his preferred shares as security for payment of
the notes.
In the calendar years following the redemption, the corporation
realized substantial earnings. However, the taxpayer did not at
any time convert his preferred shares to common stock.
The Service, in concluding that gifts to the common shareholders
had been made, said:
The thrust of Dickman is that the gift tax extends to all
gratuitous transfers of property and property interests
having significant value. The broad sweep of the tax is
necessary to preserve the integrity of the estate tax.
Although the instant case is factually distinguishable from
Dickman in that it does not involve a demand loan, it is
analogous to this case in four significant ways.
Firstly, there is a transfer. Taxpayer, by contracting away
for an extended period his right to preferred dividends and
by failing to exercise his conversion rights for the years in
question, has assured that the earnings for those years were
credited to retained earnings where they would increase the
value of the common shares which Taxpayer had given to his
children.
In short, Taxpayer's failure to convert to common stock
effectively diverted the corporate earnings over a two year
period from Taxpayer's capital interest to that of his
children.
Secondly, the consequent increase in value of the common
stock is, like the use of money in Dickman, an interest
recognized under law.
Thirdly, the transfer was gratuitous in that the individuals
to whom the retained earnings accreted paid nothing for their
J-ll
stock in Corporation X or for Taxpayer's decision not to
convert his Class A preferred shares to common stock.
Fourthly, this transfer of value from Taxpayer's capital
interest to that of his children, like the use of money
transferred in Dickman, represents a significant sum. Thus,
failure to subject the transfer to gift tax would violate the
scheme of subtitle B of the Code.
The Service did not determine the value of the gifts. Instead,
the resolution of that issue was left to the District Office. The
taxpayer had contended that valuation would be too difficult and
that the gift tax therefore should not be imposed, but the
Service rejected this argument.
VI. Conclusion - The Common Thread.
The IRS seems ready to extend the rationale of Dickman far beyond the
interest-free demand loan scenario. In particular, it seems quite
willing to characterize various transactions involving closely held
stock as indirect transfers that are subject to the federal gift tax
laws. However, it seems to fall short in analyzing the whole trans-
action, particularly with respect to any underlying business purposes
or corporate law obligations that may exist. The only IRS mention of
business purposes is included in TAM 8723007. However, the IRS there
saw no need to analyze the subject in reaching its conclusion. Instead,
it merely relied upon a list of acts that the taxpayer could have
undertaken to "protect" his right to dividends. Of course, there are
many situations in the closely held corporate setting where valid
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reasons would exist to support a decision one way or the other to
further the corporation as an entity to the benefit of all of the
shareholders.
Beyond the fact situations of the rulings discussed herein, caution
should be exercised in any transaction where it can be seen that a
taxpayer could, at some future time, be placed in the position of
forgoing some right or opportunity which could benefit another taxpayer.
This is the gist of Dickman.
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INTRODUCTION TO TYPES OF RETIREMENT PLANS
A. Qualified Plans Meeting IRS Requirements for Favorable
Tax Treatment [IRC Section 401(a)]
(1) Two basic types of employer-sponsored retirement
plans: defined contribution plans provide for
annual contributions to a participant's account
with any distribution equal to the participant's
vested account balance; defined benefit plans
contribute amount each year as necessary to fund
participant's actuarial1y predetermined benefit;
participant does not have account balance in a
defined benefit plan, but rather an accrued
benefit.
K-l
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(2) Qualified status refers to qualification under IRC
Section 4~1(a) such that employer contributions
are deductible under IRC Section 4~4 and
contributions and earnings are not taxed to
participants until distributed; Plan is filed with
the IRS which issues a favorable determination
letter following review process.
(3) Forms of distribution:
(a) Defined contribution plans, which are subject
to minimum funding standards, and all defined
benefit plans are subject to joint and
survivor annuity requirements [IRC Section
40l(a) (11)].
(b) Defined contribution plans which are not
subject to minimum funding standards and
provide that a participant's vested benefit
at death shall be paid in full to his or her
surviving spouse, are generally not subject
to joint and survivor annuity requirements,
and normally distribute in lump sum payment
or installments.
Other Types of "Tax Qualified" Plans
(1) Individual retirement accounts/annuities (IRC
Section 4~8).
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A. Uniform required beginning date of April 1 of calendar
UNIFORM MINIMUM DISTRIBUTION RULES APPLICABLE TO QUALIFIED
PLANS [IRC Sect ion 401 (a) (9) ]
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(2) Simplified employee pension plans (IRC Section
408) •
(3) Tax-sheltered annuities (IRC Section 403}.
Non-Qualified Plans.
(1) Types- encompasses all types of deferred
payment/executive compensation plans: e.g.,
noncontractual pensions, rabbi trusts.
(2) Contributions not deductible by employer until
paid or made available to recipient; recipient is
generally taxed at time of distribution.
year following calendar year in which employee attains
age 70-1/2. [IRC Section 401(a) (9) (C)].
(1) Uniform required beginning date in (A) above is
effective for years beginning after 12/31/88;
prior to 1989, same general rule applied for 5%
shareholders only, with other individuals subject
to required beginning date of April 1 following
later of calendar year in which employee attained
age 70-1/2 or retired.
(2) Exception to general rule for person who attained
age 70-1/2 prior to 1/1/88 and was not 5%
shareholder in year he attained age 66-1/2 or
K-3
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D.
later year, or for person with pre-l/l/84
beneficiary election under Section 242 (b) (2) of
TEFRA. [Section 1121(d) (4) (B) of Tax Reform Act of
1986] •
Distributions also subject to "incidental death
benefit" requirements [IRC Section 401 (a) (9) (G)].
(1) In general terms, plan distributions must be
structured to pay plan participant rather than
beneficiary over 50% of present value of benefit.
(2) Exception for surviving spouse.
Distributions commencing before participant's death.
(1) If distributions have commenced, and the
participant dies prior to required beginning date,
beneficiary has some flexibility (if permitted by
the plan) as to the timing and distribution of
remaining benefit prior to required beginning
date.
(2) If distributions have commenced and participant
dies after his required beginning date, the
remaining benefit must be distributed at least at
rapidly as the payment method utilized by the
participant [IRC Section 491(a)(9)(B)(i)].
Distributions commencing after participant's death.
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(1) Two methods of distribution by which to satisfy
IRC Section 40l(a) (9): Five year rule or
exception.
(a) Five year rule- the entire interest of the
participant must be distributed within five
years of the participant's death regardless
of to whom or to what entity the distribution
is made. [IRC Section 40l(a) (9)(B) (ii)].
(b) Exception to five year rule- the benefit or
any portion of the benefit which is payable
to a designated beneficiary must be
distributed, commencing within one year of
the participant's death, over the life of the
designated beneficiary (or over a period not
extending beyond the life expectancy of such
beneficiary) •
[IRC Section 40l(a)(9)(B)(iii)].
(i) Nonspouse beneficiary- distributions
must commence by 12/31 of calender year
following calendar year of participant's
death. [Prop.Reg.Sec.l.40l (a) (9)-1,C-3].
(ii) Spousal beneficiary- distributions must
commence on or before the later of date
in (i) above or 12/31 of calendar year
in which participant would have attained
K-5
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age 70-1/2; provided that if the
surviving spouse dies before such
distributions commence, the distribution
rules are applied as if the surviving
spouse were the participant. [Prop.Reg.
Sec.1.4QJl (a) (9)-1,C-3,C-5].
(2) Determination of designated beneficiary.
(a) Use individual designated by participant or
by the terms of the plan, if no beneficiary
has been designated.
(b) Only an individual may be a "designated
beneficiary"; therefore if a trust is
designated, the beneficiaries of the trust
will be treated as having been designated as
beneficiaries if the following requirements
are met:
(i) The trust is valid under state law, or
would be but for the fact that there is
no corpus.
(ii) The trust is irrevocable.
(iii) The beneficiaries of the trust are
identifiable from the trust instrument.
(iv) A copy of the trust is provided to the
plan. [prop.Reg.Sec.1-401 (a) (9)-1,0-5].
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(c) If special trust requirements are not met,
treated as having no designated beneficiary
and five year rule must be used. [prop.Reg.
"Sec.l.401 (a) (9)-1,0-6].
r
(d) If a participant has multiple designated
beneficiaries, the beneficiary with the
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shortest life expectancy is used as the
designated beneficiary for purposes of
computing the distribution period. [Prop.
Reg.Sec.1.401 (a) (9)-1,E-5].
III. INCOME TAXATION OF RETIREMENT PLAN DISTRIBUTIONS TO
PARTICIPANT OR BENEFICIARY
A. Income Averaging of lump sum distribution from Section
401(a) qualified plan or Section 403(a) annuity plan.
(1) Effective for distributions received after
12/31/86 ten year forward averaging has been
essentially eliminated in favor of five year
averaging once after age 59-1/2. [IRC Section
402(e)].
(a) Lump sum distribution refers to a
distribution or payment within one taxable
year of the recipient of the balance to the
credit of an employee from all plans of the
same type of employer becoming payable to the
recipient:
K-7
(i) on account of the employee's death;
(ii) after the employee attains age 59 1/2;
(iii) on account of a common law employee's
separation from service; or
(iv) after a self-employed individual or
owner-employee has become disabled.
[IRe Section 402 (e) (4)].
(b) Averaging permitted once with respect to an
employee only if the employee had been a
participant in the plan for at least five
years before the tax year of the distribution
(unless the distribution was as a result of
the employee's death), and the taxpayer-
recipient has attained age 59-1/2. [IRe
Se c t ion 402 (e) (4) (B) ] •
(i) Election may be made by individual,
estate or trust on federal form 4972
(copy - Attachment No.1).
(ii) Distribution to two or more trusts
treated as a single lump sum
distribution if meets above
requirements; personal representative of
employee makes election.
(c) Taxable amount.
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(i) Total taxable amount refers to amount of
distribution less voluntary
nondeductible employee contributions,
amount payable to alternate payee under
a qualified domestic relations order,
and net unrealized appreciation
attributable to employer securities
distributed; provided effective for
distributions after 12/31/86, recipient
may elect to include in income net
unrealized appreciation attributable to
employer securities. [IRC Section
402 (e) (4)].
(ii) Tax imposed on lump sum distribution to
two or more trusts is apportioned
between trusts based on respective
interests. [IRC Sect ion 402 (e) (2) ] •
(d) Exceptions providing for use of ten year
averaging.
(i) If participant had attained age 50 by
1/1/86, recipient may still elect ten
year averaging at 1986 tax rates (if
meet other requirements for averaging
treatment). [Sec. 1122 (h) (5) of TRA'86].
K-9
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distribution after 12/31/86 and before
extens ions). [ Se c t ion 1124 (a) 0 f
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from service or disability, distribution
3/16/87 because of employee's separation
date of 1987 tax return (including
therefore eligible for ten year
may be treated as received in 1986 and
averaging; recipient must have filed
amended return with Form 4972 by due
Year
1987
1988
1989
199~
1991
treatment based on the following schedule:
eligible for long-term capital gains
(ii) If recipient received lump sum
Income averaging is not available with respect to
pre-1974 plan participation by employee. [IRe
Phase-out of long-term capital gains treatment for
portion of lump sum distribution attributable to
distributions from individual retirement accounts.
Section 4~2 (e) (4) (L)].
(i) Five year phase-out of amount of distribution
( 3 )
(2 )
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(ii) One time election (with respect to any
employee) available to recipient who had
attained age sa before 1/1/86, to tax capital
gains portion at flat 2a% rate.
Tax-free rollover treatment.
(1) participant may rollover distribution to another
qualified plan, IRA or qualified annuity;
However,spouse receiving distribution after death
of employee may rollover distribution tax-free to
individual retirement account or individual
retirement annuity only. [IRC Section 402 (a) (7)].
(a) Rollover must be made within sixty days of
receipt. [IRC Section 4a2(a)(5)(C)].
(b) Rollover amount is reduced by any
nondeductible employee contributions. [IRC
Section 402 (a) (5) (B)].
(c) Required minimum distributions under Section
401 (a) (9) are not eligible for rollover
treatment. [IRC Section 4a2(a) (5) (G)].
(2) Recipient of distribution eligible for rollover
treatment must be notified in writing by the plan
of rollover option. [IRC Section 402(f)].
Taxation of annuities. (IRC Section 72).
(1) Inclusion in gross income.
K-ll
(a) General rule under Section 72 that periodic
annuity payments or installments are taxed to
recipient at ordinary rates. [IRC Section
72(a)].
(b) Recipient may exclude portion of each payment
which bears same ratio as investment in
annuity (as of annuity starting date) bears
to expected return under the annuity contract
(as of such date)- the exclusion ratio. (IRC
Sec t ion 72 (b) (I) ] •
(2) Treatment of annuity contract not held by natural
person. [IRC Section 72(u)].
(a) Annuity contract owned by other than natural
person is not annuity for federal income tax
purposes and as a result the income is taxed
to owner currently without benefit of the
exclusion ratio.
(i) Exceptions for annuity contract:
(AA) Acquired by estate of decedent by
reason of decedent's death;
(BB) Held by qualified plan, tax
sheltered annuity program, or IRA;
(CC) Which is purchased by an employer
at the termination of a qualified
K-12
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plan and held until the employee
separates from service; and
(DO) Which is an immediate annuity
(single premium with starting date
within one year of purchase).
Special death benefit. [IRC Section l~l(b)].
(1) Beneficiaries or estate of an employee are
entitled to an exclusion from gross income of up
to $5,~~~ of amounts paid by or on behalf of an
employer by reason of an employee's death. [IRC
Section l~l (b) (1), (2)].
(2) Death benefit exclusion does not apply to amounts
in which employee had a nonforfeitable right to
receive while living; provided that this
limitation does not apply to a lump sum
distribution:
(a) by a retirement plan qualified under Section
4~1(a);
(b) under an annuity contract from a 4~3(a)
qualified annuity program; or
(c) under an annuity contract purchased by a
Section 5~1(c) (3) organization pursuant to
Section 4~3(b).
Income in respect of decedent. (IRC Section 691).
K-13
(1) Qualified plan benefits paid to beneficiaries as
result of employee's death have been held to be
taxable as income in respect of a decedent under
section 69l(a). [See Hess v. Comr., 271 F.2d 194
<3d Cir. 1959).].
(2) Nonqualified deferred compensation mayor may not
be an IRD receivable based on specifics of
situation.
(a) If deferred compensation arrangement provides
that compensation or benefits will be paid
directly to employee, with income tax
liability of employee deferred until payment
date, and employee dies prior to such time as
all benefits have been distributed, the
benefits remaining unpaid constitute IRD
receivable. [Reg. Sec. 1.691 (a)-2 (b) (1)].
(b) If deferred compensation arrangement provides
that compensation or benefits will be paid to
employee's estate or designated beneficiary,
some question whether employee had right to
receive benefit such that benefit may not be
IRD receivable.
(3) Deduction for estate tax. [IRC Section 69l(c)].
(a) General rule- recipient of decedent's
qualified benefit or deferred compensation
K-14
I
I······~·,,'f;'
I
1'·8.•• "".
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
IV.
which constitutes income in respect of
decedent may (in year taxed on amount) deduct
amount equal to tax imposed on decedent's
estate as result of distribution. [Reg.
Sec.l.69l(c)-1(a»).
(b) In computing deduction for estate or trust,
exclude from gross income of estate or trust
amount of benefits or deferred compensation
which is distributed to beneficiaries. [IRC
Sec. 691 (c) (1) (B) ).
ESTATE TAX TREATMENT OF RETIREMENT PLAN DISTRIBUTIONS AND
ANNUITIES. (Section 2039).
A. Gross estate includes value of annuity or other payment
receivable by any beneficiary under a qualified plan,
tax sheltered annuity, or similar plan if decedent had
right to receive during his life. [IRC Section
2039(a»).
(1) Amount includible is the value of the annuity or
payment receivable as is proportionate to the part
of the purchase price contributed by the decedent.
[IRC Section 2039(b»).
(2) Any portion contributed by the employer of
decedent by reason of his employment is considered
to be contributed by the decedent. [IRC Section
2039 (b») •
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(b) Exclusions from retirement distributions
EXCISE TAX ON EXCESS DISTRIBUTIONS AND EXCESS ACCUMULATIONS.
(IRC Section 498lA).
considered to compute excess distributions,
include:
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Plan qualified under 40l(a);
Section 403(a) annuity plan;
Annuity contract or account described
I
in Sections 403 (b) (1) , (7) or (9); and
IRA under Section 408. (Temp. Reg.
Sec. 54.498lA-lT,a-3).
(i v)
( i)
(ii )
( iii)
aggregate amount of distributions received by or
with respect to an individual during a calendar
year over the greater of $150,000 (unindexed) or
$112,500 [indexed for cost-of-living increases;
$117,529 in 1988 pursuant to I.R. 88-23(Feb. 5,
1988)]. (Temp. Reg. Sec.54.498lA-lT,a-2A).
(a) Retirement distributions aggregated for
purposes of computing excess distributions
include distributions from:
(1) Tax equal to 15% of excess distributions with
respect to individual during any calendar year.
(2) Term "Excess distributions" refers to excess of
A. Excess distribution tax imposed on individual during
lifetime.
v.
r
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(i) Distribution received as a result of the
death of another individual;
(ii) Distribution received by and taxable to
an alternate payee pursuant to a QDRO;
(iii) Distribution attributable to an
individual's investment in an annuity or
insurance contract such as after-tax
nondeductible employee contributions;
(iv) Distribution which has been rolled over
to another qualified plan or IRA such
that excludible from income; and
(v) Distribution of medical benefits. (Temp.
Reg.Sec.S4.4981A-lT,a-4,a-7) •
(3) Special grandfather election available to exempt
accrued benefits as of 8/1/86.
(a) Election available to individual with accrued
benefits on 8/1/86 of $S62,See or more. [IRe
Section 4981A(c) (S)].
(i) Benefits as of 8/1/86 include both
vested and nonvested benefits. (Temp.
Reg.Sec.S4.498lA-IT,b-6).
(ii) Defined contribution plan- use account
balance; defined benefit plan- use
present value of accrued benefit. (Temp.
Reg.Sec.S4.4981A-IT,b-S) •
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(b) Individual must elect to use special
grandfather rule by filing Form 5329 (copy -
Attachment No.2) with individual's income
tax return for a taxable year beginning after
12/31/86 and before 1/1/89; personal
representative of a deceased individual may
file as part of final income tax return.
[Temp. Reg. Sec. 54.4981A-IT,b-3A(a»).
(c) Grandfather rule exempts from excise tax
portion of distributions treated as recovery
of individual's total benefits accrued on or
before 8/1/86 (grandfathered amount); Note,
however, that distributions treated as
recovery of grand fathered amount are taken
into account in determining extent to which
other distributions are excess distributions.
(Temp. Reg. Sec. 54.4981A-1T, b-l)
(d) Two methods of recovery:
(i) Discretionary method - 10% of total
distributions received by individual
during any calendar year is treated as
recovery of grand fathered amount;
Individual may accelerate to 100% in any
K-l8
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year and then required for all years
thereafter (Temp. Reg. Sec. 54.498IA-IT,
b-12).
(ii) Attained age method - (for use by
individual whose 35th birthday occurs on
or before 8/1/86) compute portion of
total distributions received during any
year that is treated as recovery of
grandfathered amount by multiplying
aggregate distributions for year by
fraction, numerator of which is
difference between individual's attained
age in completed months on 8/1/86 and
individual's attained age in months at
age 35 (429 months) and denominator of
which is difference between individual's
attained age in completed months on
12/31 of calendar year and individual's
attained age in months at age 35 (429
months). (Temp. Reg. Sec. 54.4981A-1T,
b-l3)
(e) If an individual does not elect to use
the special grandfather rule, the
$112,589 limitation will be replaced by
$159,999 limitation (unless $112,599 as
K-19
B.
indexed exceeds $150,000 limitation}.
[ IRS Se c • 4981 A(c) (5) ]
(f) Special rule where taxpayer elects
income averaging. [IRS Sec. 498l(c}(4}]-
Individual may exempt lump sum
distribution amount up to five times of
the applicable limitation ($150,000 for
threshold exempt amount of $750,000 or
$112,500 as indexed for threshold exempt
amount of $562,500). (Temp. Reg. Sec.
54.4981A-1T, c-1)
(SEE EXAMPLES - ATTACHMENT NO.3)
Estate tax imposed equal to 15% of decedent's excess
retirement accumulation [IRS Sec 4981A(d}].
(1) Excess retirement accumulation refers to excess,
if any, of value of decedent's interests in all
qualified employer plans and IRA'S as of date of
decedent's death over amount equal to present
value of a hypothetical life annuity. [IRS Sec.
4981A(d} (3)]
(2) Hypothetical life annuity is a single life annuity
contract, providing for equal annual payments
commencing on the decedent's date of death for the
life of an individual who is the same age as the
decedent at date of death.
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VI.
(a) Amount of each annual payment is equal to
greater of $150,000 or $112,500 (as indexed
on date of death).
(b) However, if special grandfather rule had been
elected, amount of each annual payment is
equal to $112,500 (as indexed on the date of
death). (Temp. Reg. Sec. 54.4981A-1T,d-7)
(3) No credits allowable as offset. (Temp. Reg. Sec.
54.4981A-1T, d-8)
(4) Estate is liable for excise tax on excess
retirement accumulations, so need some provision
in Will to enable executor to recover amount from
property to which Section 4981A applies. (Temp.
Reg. Sec. 54.4981A-1T, d-8A)
(SEE EXAMPLES - ATTACHMENT NO.4)
TAX ON EARLY DISTRIBUTIONS FROM QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS -
[IRC SECTION 72(t)]
A. 10% excise tax on early (pre-age 59 1/2) distributions
from qualified plans (including IRA's).
B. Exceptions include -
(1) Distribution on or after employee's age 59 1/2.
(2) Distribution due to employee's disability.
(3) Distribution to a beneficiary or estate on or
after an employee's death.
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(4) Distribution paid in substantially equal
installments over life of employee (who had
separated from service) or beneficiary.
(5) Distribution to terminated employee meeting early
retirement under plan after age 55 (N/A to IRA's)
(6) Distribution of deductible dividends from tax
credit ESOP.
(7) Distribution to employee for deductible medical
care expenses (N/A to IRA's).
(8) Distribution before 1990 from ESOP if assets have
been invested in employer stock for five prior
plan years.
(9) Distribution to alternate payee pursuant to QDRO.
K-22
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
1987 IRS FORM 4972 and INSTURCTIONS:
TAX ON LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTIONS
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ATTACHMENT 1
If you quality to use thiS form, you may elect to use Part II. Part III, or Part IV: or elect to use Part II and Part III. or Part II and Part IV.
I2:%iIII Use Part II to make the capital gain election
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I 3 !
~ak Yes I No
1""1 I I
ll®87
Atac"~nl
S.OUf'nct Nc. 28
OM8"'o.1~~·0193
i 'oentlt)'inc nurn....
Tax on lump-Sum Distributions
(Use This form Only for Lump·Sum Distributions from
Qualified Retirement Plans)
~ Attach to Form 10-0 or Form 1041. ~ See n~r.te instructions.
Did you rollover any part of the distribution?
If ·yes.· 00 not complete rest of thiS form.
Were you age 50 or over on January 1. 1986? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Was thiS a lump sum distribution from a Qualifying pension profit·sharlng or stock bonus plan?
2
3
1
o Check this box if you elect to treat the part of your distribution from pre·74 participation. as capital gain. 1 ~I
1 Capital gain part from box 2 of Form 1099·R. If you did not check the box above. enter zero • . . . j---::.-+- _
2 Multiply line 1 by 20% (.20) and enter here. If you do not elect to use Part 11\ or Part IV. also enter the I
amount on Form 1040. line 38 or Form 1041, line 22b . . . . , . . . . . . . , . .. 2.
.
If you answered "no· to 2 or 3. do not complete rest of this form. Wf4 I~ Was the participant a member of the plan for at least 5 years preceding the year of the distribution?
5 Is this a distribution paid to a beneficiary of an employee who died? I 5 !
If you answered· no· to 4 anc 5. do not complete rest of this.form. ~t4
6 Did you Quit, retire. get laid 011. or get fired from your job before receiving the distribution?
I
7 Were you self·employed or an owner·employee and became disabled? (see instructIons) 7 I i
8 Were you 59lf2 or over at the time of the distribution? . 8 I
If you answered ·no· to ALL ouestions 5 through 8. do not complete rest of this form. ~%$,
4972
~1lI"~nt of tht , .e.~u'y
Imemal Revenue s.rvlCe
[mJ Complete this part to see If you qualify to use Form ~972
I
IimiJIII Use Part III to elect the S·year averaging method
1 Ordinary income part from box 3 of Form 1099·R. If you did not check the box in Part II. enter the I
amount from box 1 of Form 1099·R (ordinary income plus capital gain) ~1~~ _
2 Death benefit exclusion (see instructions) . • • . • . . . . . . 1---l2r..-f-i - __
3 Total taxable amount (subtract line 2 from line 1). . . . . . . . • ~3__+-1 _
4 Current actuarial value of annuity. if applicable (from Form 1099·R. box 9). t-4.....+-, _
5 Adjusted total taxable amount (add lines 3 and ~). If this amount is $70.000 or more, skip lines 6 I
through 9, and enter this amount on line 10. . . • . . • . . • . • . br.iSm,-_------_1
6 Multiply line 5 bj' 50% but do not enter more than SI0.000. . . . . . j;,1-::6~1~ -fjj.~
7 Subtract 520.000 from line 5. Enter difference. I I ~. ;:7.'~
If line 5 is 520,000 or less. enter zero. .. 7 ~ ~I' I
8 Multiply line 7 by 20% (.20). . . . . . . I 8 ~~I
9 Minimum distribution allowance (subtract line 8 from line 6) . . . . . . . . . . 1....;.9~ _
10 Subtract line 9 from line 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . '...1:,:0=:....;1 _
11 Federal estate tax attributable to lump·sum distribution. 00 not deduct on Form 1040 or Form 1~1 I I I
the amount attributable to the ordinary income entered on line 1. (see instructions) . . ...1~1=-; _
12 Subtract line 11 from line 10 . . . . . • . . . . • • • . • . . . • • •• ..,:1:,:2:.....;.1 _
13 Multiply line 12 by 20% (.20) . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • .. 113 I1~ Tax on amount on line 13. Use Tax Rate Schedule X (Single Taxpayers) in Form 1040 Instructions ..,:1:.;4;....;1 _
15 Multiply line 14 by 5. If no entry on line 4, skip lines 16 through 21. and enter this amount on line 22 +-'.::.1::-5~1~-------
16 Divide line 4 by line 5 (carry to four decimal places) 1-1.::.1::.6..1:- 117 Multiply line 9 by line 16. . 11~978 :,',18 Subtract line 17 from line ~ • . . . . . • • ,..::.;:'-:- _
19 MUltiply line 18 by 20% (.20) • • . • • • . ...::.::;...:.. _
20 Tax on amount on line 19. Use Tax Rate Schedule X (Single Taxpayers) in Form 1040 Instructions :-=20,;:,..;..! 1
21 Multiply line 20 by 5 . • • . . • • • • . • • . . . . . • . • • . . •• 1-112::.:1:-:-' _
22 Subtract line 21 from line 15 • . . • • • . . . . • . . • • . . . . • .• 122 I
23 Tax on lump-sum distribution (add Part II, line 2 and Part III. line 22). Enter on Form 1040, line 38. or I I
:--:-F_o_rm--.;1~04~1;..'l_in~e..;;;2;.;;2.;;.b_._ . .-;..'.-;..'.-;..'.-;..'.-;..'.-;..'_.;......;......;......;.....;.;.....;.......;:.......;:.......;:.......;:.......;:......;.......;.. .....;.. .....;.. ....;.. ....;.. ....;.. .::~:..,.;.~2:.:3~ ~~__
For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice. ne separate Instructions. Form ~972 (1987)
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r otal taxable amount (subtract line 2 from hne 1)
~ Current actuarial value 01 annuity if applicaole (from Form 1099·R. box 9) .
f Adjusted total taxable amount (add lines 3 and 4). 11 this amount is S70.000 or more. skip lines 6
ttlrough 9. and enter ttllS amount on hne 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r~~'ijll.~,'l'/l"~~'fi11;
f.. Multiply hne 5 by 50% (.50). but do not enter more than S10,000 . . . . r...'"'"6;,..,;1 ~rf74ifm
. I~~"~ -~
1
I 'I /,'Wh: ~W;~7 SUbtract $20.000 1rom line 5. Enter difference. I v,~ I~~
r.. 11 hne 5 is S20,000 or less. enter zero. . . . . "~7......:.. ~~l~ ~$~" I ·~I.7r~~I ~7/1~8 Multiply line 7 by 20% (.20) . . . . . . . . S rl.~///h
! 9 I
~__u_s_e_p_a_rt_IV_to_e_le_c_t_t_h_e_1_0_.'1_e_a_r_a_v_e_r_ag_i_"_g_m_et_h_O_d -:-_ooor-. _
1 Ordinary income part from box 3 of Form l099·R. If you did not checl< the box in Part II. enter the I I
r:mount from box 1 01 Form 1099·R (ordinary Income plus capital gain) . . . . 1Death benefit excluSion (see instructions) .. '" .. I 2 I
I 3 I
f Minimum distribution allowance (subtract line 8 from line 6)
10 Subtract line 9 from line 5 . . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . • . • . .
1( Federal estate tax attributable to lump·sum distribution. Do not deduct on Form 1040 or Form 1041
the amount attributable to the ordinary income entered on line 1. (see instructions) •
IfSubtract line 11 from line 10
IfMUltiPty line 14 by 10. If no entry on line 4, skip lines 16 through 21, and enter this amount on line 22
16 Divide line 4 by line 5 (carry to four decimal places)
1f Multipl}' line 9 by line 16. .
18 Subtract line 17 from line 4 .
IfMUltiply line 18 by 10% (.10)
13 Multiply line 12 by 10% (.10) . • • . • . • . • • . . • . . .
II Tax on amount on line 13. Use Tax Rate Schedule in Form 4972 instructions
21Tax on amount on line 19. Use Tax Rate Schedule in Form 4972 Instructions21 MUltiply line 20 by 10. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
2fSubtrac1 line 21 from line 15
23 Tax on lump-sum distribution (add Part II, line 2 and Part IV, line 22). Enter on Form 1040. line 38. or
fForm 1041. line 22b • . • • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . . ..
r
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<ll'O'l87 ~~ Department of the TreasuryU@ ~/JI Internal Revenue Service
Instructions for Form 4972
Tax on Lump-Sum Distributions
(S~ction ,~ferenc~sare to the Int~rnal R~venLie Code.)
General Instructions
Paperwork Reduction Act Notice.-We ask for this information
to carry out the Internal Revenue laws of the United States. We
need it to ensure that taxpayers are complying wIth these laws and
to allow us to figure and collect the nght amount of tax. You are
required to give us this information.
Changes You Should Note
• The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the tax computation for
lump·sum dlstnbutions from Qualified retirement pla.ns. The
computation is now made by averaging over 5 years Instead of 10
years. However, if you were age 50 or over on January 1. 1986.
and otherwise Qualify, you may elect the 10·year averaging
method, using the tax rates in effect for 1986. (See Part IV of the
form.) In addition. if you were age 50 or over on January 1. 1986.
you can elect a capital gain method. to tax at a 20% rate that part
of your distribution attributable to your particIpation In the plan
from before 1974. To make this election, check the box in Part II
and complete that part. 00 not use Schedule 0 for that election.
• Part III from last year, which was used to combine prior year
dIstributions with current year distributions, has been eliminated.
See instruction Gfor more information.
• Form 5544. Multiple Recipient Special10-Year Averaging
Method, has been eliminated. If you shared a lump-sum
distribution from a qualified retirement plan when not all
recipients were trusts. use Form 4972 to figure your tax, together
with the special computation and worksheet in Instruction H.
Items To Note
• If you received a lump·sum distribution after December 31.
1986, and before March 16, 1987, because you left your;Ob or
became disabled in 1986, you may elect to treat such lump-sum
distribution as if received in 1986. 00 this by filing a Form 1040X
(individuals) or an amended return (estates and trusts) for 1986,
and attach 2 Form 4972 for that year. On the dotted line of line 3
of Parts II or III, ofthat Form 4972, write ·Section 1124 Election.-
You must file the Form 1040X or amended return by the due date
of your 1987 tax return (including extensions).
• Instead of the 20% capital gain method mentioned in the
instructions under Changes You Should Note, you may elect to
treat as a long·term capital gain that part of your distribution from
participation in the plan before 1974. This is shown in box 2 of
Form 1099·R.lfthls capital gain method is elected, enter the
amount from box 2 of Form 1099·R on Schedule D, Part II. Enter
the amount from box 3 on Form 1040, line 1Gb. 00 not use Form
4972 for this election.
Purpose of Form.-You may find Form 4972 helpful if you
receIved a lump·sum distribution and can make the capital gain
election, or 5 or 10-year averaging election to figure some of your
tax at a lower rate. With the 5 or 10-year averaging method, the
ordinary income part of the lump sum is taxed as if you were to
receive it in equal parts over 5 or 10 years.
Form 4972 is for use with Form 1040 (if you are an individual)
or Form 1041 (if you are an estate or trust). Form 4972 is used for
three purposes:
(1) To choose, by filing the completed form, to use the 5 or 10-
year averaging method;
(2) To choose the 20% capital gain method by checking the box
in, and completing Part II;
(3) To figure tax with the 5 or 10-year averaging method.
If you use any method mentioned above. you must use it for all
lump-sum distributions you receive in one tax year.
If you do not use the 5 or 1o-year averaging method, report the
ordinary income part ofthe lump sum on Form 1040, line 1Gb, or
on Form 1041. line 8. If you do not make either capital gain
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election for the capital gain part of the distributIon (pre·74 I
participation), combme the capital gam amount from Form
1099·R. box 2 WIth the ordinary income amount. If you are us.ng
the 5 or Ie-year averaging method, add the capital gain part to
the ordinary income part for purposes of Parts III or IV.
The payer should have given you a Form 1099·R or other I
statement that shows the separate parts of your distribution. The
amounts you will use from Form 1099·R in filling out Form 4972
are capital gaIn (box 2); ordInary income (box 3): total of ordinary
income plus capital gain (box 1); and, if it applies, the current I
actuarial value of an annuity (box 9). If you do not have a
statement that shows this informatIon. ask the payer for one that
does show it. Also. if applicable. get the Federal estate tax
attributable to the taxable part of the lump·sum dIstribution from I
the person administering the deceased employee's or self·
employed individual's estate.
If you need more information. get Publication 575. Pension
and AnnUity Income. This publication IS available from the Internal
Revenue Service. I
A. Filing Form 4972 After Employee's Death.-If a lump,sum
distribution is paid out after the employee's death, the recIpient of
the distributIon chooses the capital gam, or 5 or lO·year averaging
m~od. I
B. Oistributions That Quallfy.-For you to use the 5 or lO·year
averaging method. the lump sum must have been distributed
under all the following circumstances.
(1) It came from a Qualified pension. profit·sharing, or stock I
bonus plan.
(2) It came from all the employer's qualified plans of one kind
(pension, profit·sharing, or stock bonus) in which the employee
had funds.
(3) It was for the full amount credited to the employee. For I
this purpose. the balance to the credit of the employee does not
include the accumulated deductible employee contributions under
the plan or amounts payable to an alternate payee under a
Qualified domestic relations order. I
(4) It was paid within a single tax year.
(5) It was paid in any of the following cases:
a. The employee dIed.
b. The employee was age 591h or over at the time of the I
distribution.
c. The employee, who was a common·law employee, quit.
retired. was laid off. or w2sfiredfromthejob. A common·
law employee is anyone who performs services that an I
employer has the right to control (what will be done and
how) and whom the employer has the right to fire.
d. The self·employed individual or owner-employee
became disabled as defined in section 72(m)(7).
C. Distributions That Do Not Quallfy.-The following I
distributions do not qualify for the 5 or 10-year averaging method:
(1) U.S. Retirement Bonds distributed with the lump sum:
(2) Any distribution made before the employee has been a
participant in the plan for 5 tax years before the tax year of tne I
distribution. unless it was paid because the employee died;
(3) The current actuarial value of any annuity contract
included in the lump sum (the payer's statement should show this
amount. which you should use only to figure tax on tne ordinary I
income part of the distribution); .
(4) Any distribution to a 5·percent owner which is subject to
penalties under section 72(m)(5)(A); .
(5) A distribution. described in section 402(a)(6)(£), from any I·
other pension plan maintained by an employer. if the recipient
elected after December 31,1978. to roll over a total distribution
from the employer's money Durchase plan into an Individual
Retirement Arrangement (IRA) or another qualified plan;
(6) A distribution from an Individual Retirement Arrangement I
(IRA);
(7) Redemption proceeds of bonds rolled over tax free to a
Qualified pension. etc., plan from a qualified bond purchase plan;
and I(8) A distribution from a Qualified pension or annuity plan
when the employee orthe employee's surviving spouse received a
partial distribution from the same plan (or another plan of the
employer required to be aggregated for the lump-sum distribution
rUles), and the proceeds of the previous distribution were rolled I
over tax free to an Individual Retirement Arrangement (IRA).
I
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Part II
Line I.-If you have no capital gain from the lump sum. or if you
are using the 5 or 1o-year averaging method to figure tax on the
capital gain part. enter zero on line 1.
If you take the death benefit excl,:,sion ~nd are making the
capital gain electIon, reduce the capital gain on Part II. line 1 as
follows: Divide the capital gain part from box 2 of Form 1099·R by
thE- capital gain plus ordinary income part from box 1 of Form
109S·R. and multiply the result by the death benefit exclusion. The
balance of the death benefit exclusion should De entered on Itne 2
of Part III or IV, if you elect the 5 or 10·year averaglns method.
If you paid Federal estate tax on the lump·sum distributio~, and
are making the capital gatn election, fIgure the amount you Will
have to reduce your capital gain and your entry on line 11. In the
same manner as above. If the capital gain election is not made. the
FeCieral estate tax attributable to it. and the Feaeral estate tax
attnbutable to the ordtnary income part 01 the lump·sum
distribution is entered on line 11.
$-0-
1,190
2,270
4.530
6.690
9.170
11,440
13.710
17.160
22,8BO
28.600
34,320
42.300
57.190
25,790
Enter on Part IV, line 14 or20
of the
amount
over-
•••••••••• 1196
S130.90 + 1296
260.50 + 1496
576.90 + 1596
900.90+ 1696
1.297.70 + 1896
1.706.30 + 2096
2.160.30 + 2396
2.953.80 + 2696
4.441.00 + 3096
6.157.00 + 34%
8.101.80 + 3896
11.134.20+42%
17,388.00 + 4896
31.116.00 + 5096
But Not Over-
Sl.190
2.270
4,530
6,690
9,170
11.440
13,710
17.160
22.880
28,600
34.320
42.300
57,190
85,790
Parts III and IV
Line 1.-Community"property laws do not apply to figuring tax on
the amount you report on line 1.
Line 2.-lf you received the distribution because of the
employee's death. you can exclude up to 15.000 of th~lump sum
from your gross income. If the trust for which you are flhng shared
the lump sum With other trusts, it will share the exclusion In the
same proportion as it shared the distribution. This exclusion
applies to the beneficiaries or estates of common·law employees.
self·employed individuals. and shareholder·employees who owned
more than 296 of an S corporation. Publication 575 gives more
information about the death benefit exclusion.
Line 11.-A beneficiary who receives a lump·sum distribution
because of an employee's death must reduce the taxable part of
the distribution by any Federal estate tax on the part included in
the estate. The reduction is made by entering on line 11 the
Federal estate tax attributable to the lump-sum distribution.
However, see the instructions for Part II, line 1.
Part III, Lines 14 and 20.-Use Tax Rate Schedule X(single
taxpayers) in Form 1040 instructions for this purpose no matter
what method you use to figure the tax on your other income. and
no matter whether you are filing Form 1041.
Parts III and IV, Line 16.-Decimals should be carried to four
places. For example, if you divide $10.000 by $30.000, the result
would be .3333.
Part IV, Lines 14 and 20.-Use this tax rate schedule to
complete Part IV, lines 14 and 20:
If the amount on
Part IV. line 13 or lS is:
Over-
$-0-
1.190
2.270
4.530
6,690
9.170
11,440
13,710
17.160
22,B80
28,600
34.320
42.300
57,190
85.790
h.~.' D....'" Man; Times the Capital Gain or 5 or 10·Year AveragihC
~ MeJod Can Be Chosen.-If you make an election th.s year, you! cannot make an election another yea; ",ith respect to anotner
Jlump·sum distribution. For example, if you elect the ~ or 10·year~ aVlj.'.ing method this year, you cannot elect the capital gain or 5
II' or ·.····year averaging method another year.with r~spect to another
. dis ..,",utlon. Similarly, if you make the capital gain election only,
I·you.ca.nnot make the capital gain or 5 or 10·year averaging~::iI':~!~:.nother year with respect to. another lump·sumI E. '~en To Choose.-To choose the 5 or 10·year averaging
"I method file Form 4972 with your origtnal or amended return.
Generaliy•you have 3 years from the later of the due date of your
taf.·.turn or the Oate you filed your return to choose thiS method.
I F. pital Gain Election for Pre·74 Participation.-If your
IdlStrlbutlon includes both ca.pltal gain a.nd ordtnary tncome. s:ethe Instructions above for maktng an election to treat thE- capl,alI ga3J.. art (pre·74 participatIon) as capital gain. You have the same
I tt •.• 10 make the capital saIn election as you do the ~ or 10'year
I av .. J8mg election. This election applies to all QuallfytngIdistributions received for a particular employee.
I G~.x on Prior Year lump·Sum Distributions.-If you receIved
, an .. ler lump·sum distribution or an annuity contract for an.y year
a .. 1981 and before 1987, and used Form 4972 or Form 5544
for that year. add those distributions to your 1987 distributIon and
figure your tax on Form 4972 for 19B7. using the combined
dlf.'..butions. From that result, subtract the tax you pelld on the
lu .··sum distributions on Forms 4972 or 5544 for the earlier
ye .... Show the subtractIon under the applicable line. For
example, subtract the tax you tlaid for the earlier years from the
tar.. ported on the combined distributions on Part III or Part IV,
lin ..3.
H. ultiple Recipient of lump-Sum Distribution.-If you
shared a lump·sum distribution from a Qualified retirement plan
~hr.•.•. nl~:~~11 recipients were trusts. figure your t2:'< on Form 4972
St l.-On a separate sheet of paper. divide each of the
amounts shown on Form 1099·R. boxes 1.2.3. and 9
by your percentage of total distribution shown on Form
r 1099·R under box 10;St ..•. 2.-Complete Form 4972. However, where amount fromboxes 1.2.3. and 9 of Form 1099·R are reQuested on
Form 4972, use the results obtained in step 1 for those
r amounts.St •. 3.-Complete the worksheet below:(a)~ubtract your percentage of total distribution til
from 10096 and enter the result • • • • • 7ll,2(b)r.ultiply line (a) by the amount on line 2, Part
• ,Form4972. Enter the result here. • • • _
(t) Multiply line (a) by the amount on line 23,
Part III or IV, Form 4972. Enter the result
(dr'~~~r~ct'lin~ (~) fro:n t~e ~~ou~t ~n iin~ 2: -----
. ;art II, Form 4972. Enter the result here • • _
(e) Subtract line (c) from the amount on line 23,
rart III or IV, Form 4972. Enter the result(t) .•~~\~.;(d) a~d <e)."E~ter' he~e ~nci o~ F~rm' -----
1040, line 38, or Form 1041, line 22b •
r
L(e-bY-Line Instructions
In General
Ifr. received more than one distribution, add them and figure the
ta , n the total amount.
•. you and your spouse are filing a joint return and each has
received a lump-sum distribution, complete and file 8 different
i~~~~23fS~each spouse's election, and combine them on Form
1 'yOU are filing for a trust that shared the distribution only with
other trusts, figure the tax on the whole lump sum first. The trusts
then share the tax in the'same proportion that they shared the·
dirbution.
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Form 5329
Depaf'lment of tM Trusury
Internal Rewnue ServICe
AGorelS (numoer ano slfeet)
Return for Individual Retirement Arrangement
and Qualified Retirement Plans Taxes
(Uncler Sections 72••973•.,7. and .911A of the Internal Revenue CocIe)
... Attach to form 1040.
OMB No 1S4f>·0203
Form 5329 (1987>
6
10e
11.
lle
2
3
4b
4.
9c I Ie Investments in collectibles treated as distributions
K-29
II Total (add lines 91 through 9c). • • • • • •
1 Excess contributions for 1987 (see instructions). Do not include this amount on Form 1040. lines 242 or b
I
b Section 72(q) tax (see instructions)
e Total section 72 tax due (add lines 111 and b). Enter here and on Form 1040. line 52
e Balance (subtract line lOb from lOa)
2 Earlier year excess contributions not previously eliminated (see instructions) •
3 Contribution credit. (If your maximum allowable deduction for 1987 is more
than your actual contribution. see instructions for line 3: otherwise. enter zero.)
4a 1987 distributions from your IRA account that are included in taxable income.
b 1986 tax year excess contributions (if any) withdrawn after the due date
(including extensions) of your 1986 income tax return. and 1985 and earlier
tax year excess contributions withdrawn in 1987 . • • • • • • • •
e Add lines 3 through 4b • . • . • • • . • • • • • • . • • •
5 Adjusted earlier year excess contributions (Subtract line 4c from line 2. Enter the result. but not less than
zero.). . • . • • • • • • • • •
City or town. Slate. ancl ZIP cooe
9a Distributions received that are attributable to prohibited transactions
b Distributions received that are attributable to the pledging of account as
security for 1 loan. • . • • . • . • •• •.•••
Im:J Excess Contributions Tax for Individual Retirement Arrangements (Section 4973)
Complete this part if, either in this year or in e~rlieryears. you have contributea more to your IRA than is or
was ~lIowable as a deduction anayou h~vean excess contributIon subject to tax.
8 Amount of premature distributions you received from a qualified retirement plan included in gross income
9a I I
6 Total excess contributions (add lines 1 and 5)
7 Tax (Enter 6% of line 6 or 6% of the value of your IRA on the last day of 1987. whichever is smalier).
Enter here and on Form 1040. line 52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7IDID Tax on Premature Distributions (Section 72)
Complete this psrt ifyou received a distribution from your IRA. other qualified retirement plans ana annuity contracts
before you reached age 59*. Also, enter the amount of the distribution on Form 2040, line 26a.
For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, Me pace 1 of IlIStructions.
lOa Total amount of premature distributions included in gross income (add lines 8 and 9d) •
b Amount excluded from additional tax (Complete Question 1 in Part t.V under I
-Other Information-). • • • • • • • • • • l.,.;l;;.,;O;,.;b;...:.. ...I-_
11. Section 72(t)tax (multiply line 10c by 10% (.10».
r
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r
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r
r·
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
form 5329 (1987)
IDIIII Tax on Excess Accumulation In Individual Retirement Plans (Section 4974)
12 Minimum required distribution.. "".."."".............
If e trensition method was used to determine the minimum required distribution, check the appropriate
box: 0 Life expectancy method; 0 Percentage method
13 Amount actually distributed to you . . • • . • . . " " • . .
14 Subtract line 13 from line 12, If line 13 is greater than line 12. enter zero.
15 Tax due (multiply line 14 by 50% (.50». Enter here and on Form 1040, line 52
P.,. 2
1-:1",;- .-_
~
•13
14
15
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
ILines J 6 through J9c are to be completed for regular distributions ONLY. ~;»I.~'
Enter the 8ggregate amount of regular retirement distributions . • . 1:'7J67?Ji- --r__
~~~~~;i~~S:ppl:c:a~le.t~re~ho~d "a~ou~t .($~1~.5~0.or. $.15~.O~0~ (~ee j...:l:..:7;.:.:.+I -+-_-leRlI
1
;
b Recovery of grandfather amount (Complete Question 2 below under -Other ~
Information-) • . . • . . . • • . • . " L.::l:...:..7~b!....------"'---f~
Enter the greater of line 17a or 17b. . • . • . F:.=..;------+--
Excess distributions (subtract line 17c from line 16) " t-=:1:=.8-:' ~--
Tentative tax. (multiply line 18 by 15% (.15» . 1-=1:.:9;.:8+- '-_
Section 72(t) tax offset (see instructions) • • " . rl~9~b!..1I -+__
16
17.
c Tax due (subtract line 19b from line 19a). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 52
Lines 20 through 23c are to be completed for lump·sum distributions ONL Y.
20 Enter the aggregate amount of your lump-sum distributions • • •
218 Enter the applicable threshold amount ($562.500 or $750.000) (see
instructions) ..........."........
b Recovery of grandfather amount (Complete Question 2 below under -Other
Information-) • • • • • • • • " • • • •
c Enter the greater of line 21a or 21b" • • • . •
22 Excess distributions (subtract line 21c from line 20) •
23. Tentative tax. (multiply line 22"by 15% (.15»
b Section 72(t) tax offset (see instructions) • • • •
c Tax due (subtract line 23b from line 232). Enter here and on Form 1040. line 52
c
18
19.
b
Iiim&II!J Tax on Excess Distributions From Qualified Retirement Plans (Section 4981A)
Other Information
I
I
I
I
I
IPreplrer'S SOCII' security no.
UnDer .DeIllItIlS of perJury. I DeClare tllll IllIve exemmed this return, intluch"€ accomPlln)'lni sClleOules ana staternell'oS, ano to tile Ilest of my know... ancl
lIeilef. it IS true. coRect, and complete. DecilImlon of prelllrer (othertlllln taxpayer) 15 baRD on all InformatIOn of whicl'l prePllrer IllIs any~le08e.
~ Your signlture ~ Olte
Did you receive any premature distributions from a qualified retirement plan (as defined in section .11974(c) that ere
excludable from the additional tax? • • • • • " • • • • • • • • • " • • • • • • • • • • • •
H·Yes.· enter the amount to'be excluded on line lOb and the appropriate No. for the corresponding code section contained in
the instructions that allows the exception here~ •••••••••••••••••••••
00 you elect the special grandfather rule under Regulations section 54..II981A-1T to exempt from tax the portion of
distributions treated as a recovery of benefits accrued on or before August 1, 1986? (See Part IV Instructions)" • •
If ·Yes,· enter: (2) your initial grandfather amount ~ $ ••••••••••••••••••••• ; and (b) check the grandfather recovery
method you ere electing: 0 Discretionary method; 0 Attained age method
2
1
Paid ~reJ)8rer's ~ Date Check if self· 0
signature ,. employed ~
Preparer', t-i'=mn:::'~slII=rne=7:(o:"'r---:-~-------------L.-------l,~..:....;~...;..~--L--~ __..:.. _Use Onl, yours.ifse"-employed) ~I...!E:,:;.I~.N:.::o~._~!:.. ..:.. _
and.Corns I ZIP code ~
Please
Sign
Here
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Changes You Should Note
• Beginning in 1987, ceruin U.S. gold and
silver coins may be used as IRA
investments.
• You may be subject to an additional 10
percent tax on dIstributions you receive
from a Qualified retirement plan if you are
under age 591h.
• Excess retirement distributions are
subJect to. new 15 percent excise tax.
General Instructions
Paperwork Reduction Act Notlce.- We
ask for this information to carry out the
Intema' Revenue laws of the United States.
We need it to ensure that taxpayers are
complying with these laws and to allow us to
figure and collect the right amount of tax.
You are required to give us this information.
Purpose of Form.-Use this form to report
any excise tax or additional income tax you
may owe in connection with your individual
retirement account or other qualified
retirement plan.
Who Must FlIe.-You must file a Form
5329 if.you owe taxes on:
(1) Excess contributions to your IRA;
(2) Premature distributions from your
IRA or other qualified retirement plan;
(3) Excess accumulations in your
individual retirement plan: or
(4) Excess distributions from qualified
retirement plans.
These items are explained in detail later
in these instructions.
Do not file Form 5329 to report your
deduction for contributions to your IRA.
Report this deduction on your Form 1040
or Form 1040A. U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return. If you make a nondeauctible
contribution to your IRA. you must file Form
8606. Nondeductible IRA Contributions.
IRA Basis, and Nontaxable IRA
Distributions.
If you need any information about your
IRA not covered in these instructions. see
Publication 590. Individual Retirement
Arrangements (IRAs).
Also, individuals who redeem their
individual retirement bonds, see
Publication 590.
When and Where To F1le.-Your 1987
Form 5329 should be attached to and filed
at the same time (including extensions) with
your 1987 Form 1040. If you are paying tax
for prior years, use a separate Form 5329
for the year you are paying tax.
" you do not have to file Form 1040
because you do not have enough income to
require filing an income tax return or you
are filing for prioryears. file only a
completed Form 5329 with the Internat
Revenue Service It the time and place you
are reQuired to file Form 1040. Include a
check or money order payable to the
Internal Revenue Service for any tax due
shown on lines 7.11c,lS. 19c. or 23c.
Sien anc! Date Form 5329.-This form
must be signed if it IS being filed separately.
Preparer's Number.-The paid preparer's
number is needed only if you owe a tax on
premature distributions. For further
information about a paid preparer's signing
responsibilities. see instructions for Form
1040.
Definitions
Compensatlon.-Compensation includes
wages, salaries, professional fees, and
other pay you receive fQr services you
perform. It also includes sales commissions,
commissions on insurance premiums, pay
based on percent of profit. tips. and
bonuses. It includes net earnings from
seH-employment, but only for a trade or
business in which your personal services
are I material income-producing factor. In
addition for IRAs. all taxable alimony
received by a former or current spouse
under a decree of divorce or separate
maintenance is treated as compensation.
The term -compensation- does not
include any amounts received as a pension
or annuity and does not include any amount
received as deferred compensation.
Rollover Contribution.-A rollover
contribution is a contribution of assets that
comes from one Qualified retirement plan to
.nother. Generally, a Qualified distribution
that is rolled over is treated IS I tax-free
distribution, only if such distribution is
contributed to another qualified retirement
plan within 60 days following the
distribution. For more information (and
'dditional requirements) regarding rollover
contributions to an IRA. distributions made
pursuant to a -qualified domestic relations
order. - and rollover of partial distributions
from Qualified plans. see Publication 590.
Note: Ifyou instruct tM trustee ofyour IRA
to t,..nsfer funds directly to another IRA, tM
transfer is not considered. rollover. Do not
include the .mount t,..nsferred in income
.nddo not deduct the amount t,..nsferred
• s • contribution toyour IRA.
Premature Dlstrlbution.-Generally. any
distribution from your IRA or other qualified
retirement plan that you receive before you
attain age 59~ is a premature distribution.
See Specific Instructions, Part II, for the
tax on premature distributions and
exceptions.
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Prohibited Transactions.-Generally.
transactions such as borrowing from your
individual r~tirementaccount or annuity or
using your IndiVidual retirement account as
a basis for obtaining a benefit are
prohibited transactions. They cause the
individual retirement account or annuity to
no longer be considered an indiVidual
retirement account or annuity under
section 408 as of the first day of your tax
year in which the transaction occurs.
Further, the entire value of your account or
annuit~ is considered distributed to you as
of the first day of your tax year. See Specific
Instructions, Part 1I,line 9a.
Pledeine of Account.-
(1) If, during the tax year, you use any
part of your account as security for 8 loan.
that part is treated as be4ng distributed to
you.
(2) If, during the tax year, you use III or
any part of your individual retirement
annuity contract as security for I loan, the
total value of that contract is treated as
being distributed to you as of the first day of
your tax year.
Also, if you are under age 591h It the time
the account or annuity is treated as being
distributed to you, these distributions are
subject to the tax on premature distributions.
See Specific Instructions, Part II, line 9b.
Note: Report .nydistributions received Dr
considered to be received from your IRA as
• fully t6uble pension on Form J040, line
J6b, except:
(.) Rollover contributions to another plan
Dr IRA.
(b) Excess currentyear contributions
th.t you withdr.w from your IRA before the
due date ofyour income tax return for the
year the excess contributions were made
.nd for which you took no deduction.
(c) Any excess contributions from earlier
years that you withdr;,w, if the tot.1
contributions for tMyear in which the
excess contributions were rMd~ lIre not
mort than $2.250 (Dr if th~ totl/I
contributions for the year include employer
contributions to. SEP. increased by tM
lesser of the ;,mount of the employer
contributions to the SEP Dr $30. 000) .nd
you took no deduction for the excess
contributions.
(d) Amounts t,..nsfe"ed (by t"msfer of
ownership of.n IRA) to • formerspous~
under. divorce decree Dr current spouse
under II sepa,..te maintenance IIgreement.
(e) Any indillidual retirement annuity
cont,..ets distributed to you. However,
.report on your income tl/x return .ny
payments you received from these IInnuities
.5 fully taxable .nnuity payments.
J Contribution credit-subtract line 2 from line 1. Enter this .mount on line 3 of
Form 5329. Also include on line 4 Of 8. IRA worksheet 1: or line 9, IRA worksheet
2, whichever is .pplicable, contained in Form 1040 Instructions for line 24
either: (i) this amount: or (ii) your urlier years' excess contributions not
previously eliminated. whichever is smaller (see sectiOn 219(f)(6» • • • • • • •
Worksheet for line 3
1 Enter amount from line 2. IRA worbheet I, or line ?,IRA worksheet 2. in Form
1040 Instructions for line 24, but not more than S2.ooo (S2.250 tf 10U
contributed to your non-workifli spouse's aecount). • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ....----
2 Enter .mount that is deductible under sectiOn 219 and is contributed either to
your account or to your and your nonworkifli spouse's accounts. (Do not include
contributions under section 219(fX6) or .ny cses.,nated nondeductible
CDntrib&ltions.). • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1- _
Specific Instructions
Part I-Excess Contributions
Tax for Individual
Retirement Arrangements
If you have contributed. either this ye.r or
in elrlier yelrs, more to your IRA th.n IS
.1I0wlble.s. deduction on your Form
1040 or Form 1040A. you may hive to PlY
an excess contributions tlx.
However, if you withdrew your current
yelr excess IRA contributions before the
due date (Including extensions) of your
current yelr's income tlx return. tne excess
will not be tldble IS excess IRA
contributions if:
(1) you do not cllim I deduction for the
amount of the excess contributions
withClrlwn. and
(2) the withdrawal from your IRA
includes Iny income elrned on the excess
contributions.
Do not include such withdrawn excess
contributions on line 1. Form 5329.
However, you must include the income
earned on the excess contributions
withdrlwn before the due dlte of your
income t.x return on Form 1040 for the
year in which the contribution w.s mlde.
Also report the income on line 8. Form
5329. for the year of the distribution if you
have not reached age S91h at the time you
received the distribution of income.
Line I.-Enter the excess contributions
you made in 1987. You can figure this
amount from the worksheet in the
instructions for line 241 or 24b of Form
1040. The amount of tadble excess
contributions is the difference you get by
subtracting your limitation. as computed
from either IRA Worksheet 1 or 2. from your
actual contributions. Do not include on this
line any rollover contributions or any
contributions designated IS nondeductible
contributions on Form 8606. Any
distribution of current yelr excess
contributions will not be subject to the tax
on premlture distributions (see Part II) if
you withdraw it and Iny income earned on it
before the due dlte of your income tax
return and you do not tlke a deduction for
it. The income earned on the excess
contributions must be included in your gross
income in the year the excess contribution
was made. Also. such income. is subject to
the 1090 additional tlx and is to be included
in line B. Part II.
All other withdnlwals of excess
contributions will not be subject to the tax
on premature distributions if the total
contribution for the year in which the excess
contributions were made is not more than
52.250 (or if the total contributions for the
year include employer contributions to a
SEP. increased by the lesser of the amount
of the employer contributions to the SEP or
530,000) and you did not take a deduction
for the excess contributions.
Un. 2.-Enter the amount of 1986 excess
contributions not withdnlwn from your IRA
before the due dlte of your 1986 income
tlx return. Also enter 1985 and earlier
excess contributions not withdnlwn or
otherwise eliminated before J1nulry 1.
1987. .
Line 3.-lf your limitatIOn is more than the
amount actually contributed to your IRA,
and you have excess contribUtIOns from
earher years which have not been
eliminated. complete the worksheet below
to see Hyou have a contributIOn credit.
Line 4•.-lf you have withdrawn any
money from your IRA in 1987 that must be
included in your income for 1987, write the
amount on line 41. Do not include in this
amount any excess contributions withdrlwn
that will be reported on line 4b.
Line 4b.-Enter on this line any excess
contributions to your IRA for 1976 through
1985 that you withdrew in 1987 and also
enter any 1986 excess contributions that
you withdrew atter the Clue date (includIng
any extensions) for your 1986 income tax
return.
Do not inclutle any withdrawn excess
contributions for which:
(1) you did not claim I deduction, and
(2) the total contributions to your IRA for
the tax yeer for which the excess
contributions were made were not more
than 52,250 (or if the total contributions for
the year include employer contributions to a
SEP. increased by the lesser of the amount
of the employer contributions to the SEP or
$30,000).
Part II-Tax on Premature
Distributions (Section 72)
In general, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
extended the 10 percent additional tax on
premature distributions from IRAs to
include any -Qualified retirement plan.·
Such plans include a Qualified pension.
profit·sharing or stock bonus plan. Qualified
annuity. or section 403(b) tlx sheltered
. annuity contract. The tlx does not apply to
amounts distributed from unfunded
deferred compensation plans of tlx-exempt
. or State and local government employers.
See the instructions for line lOb tor
distributions which are excluded from the
ux.
Une 8.-Enter the amount of distributions
you received from a Qualified pension plan,
including your IRAs, before you reached age
591h. Also. be sure to include on line 168.
Form 1040.
The following distributions are not to be
uken into account on line 8:
(1) 1987 excess contributions withdnlwn
during the year or 1986 excess contributions
withdnlwn in 1987 before the filing date
(including extensions) of your 1986 income
tax return;
(2) "Rollover contributions" to another
retIrement arrangement or plan;
(3) Amount from an arrangement tor
whICh you make an entry on line 9 below;
(4) Amount chstributed from an
arraneement because it was pledged as
securIty for a loan (use this amount for line
9b purposes):
(5)1976 and 1977 excess contributions
withdrawn in 1987 if no deduction was
allowed for the excess contributions; or
(6) 1978 through 1985 excess
contributions withClrawn in 1987 and 1986
excess contributions withdrawn after the
due date (Including extensions) of your
1986 income tax return if no oeductlon was
allowed for the excess contributions, and
the total IRA contributions for the tax year
for which the excess contributions were
made were not more than $2.250 (or if the
total contributions for the year include
employer contributions to a SEPt increased
by the lesser of the amount of the employer
contributions to the SEP or $30.000).
Une 9•.-lf you englge in a prohibited
trannction (see description on page 1).
such as borrowing any amount from your
individual retirement annuity or pledging any
or all of your annuity contract as security for
a loan, the account or annuity ceases to be
an IRA as of the first day of the tax year, You
are considered to have received a
distribution of the entire value of your
account or annuity as of the first day of the
year in which any of these transactions take
place. If you are under age S91h on the first
day of the year. report the entire distribution
on line 9a. If you enter an amount on line h.
do not fill in line 8 or 9b tor this IRA.
Line 9b.-1f you pledged any portion of
your individual retirement account as
security for a loan, enter the amount
. pledged here and on Form 1040, line 16b.
Une 9,,-The cost of any collectible
(defined beloW) in which you invested funds
of your IRA in 1987 is deemed to be a
distribution to you in 1987. The cost is
includible in your 1987. income. Enter the
total cost of the collectible on Form 1040.
line 16b. If you are under age S91h when the
funds were invested. enter the cost of the
collectible on line 9c.
For this tax a collectible is:
(1) any work of art,
(2) any rug or antique.
(3) any metal or gem.
I
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Special Grandfather Rule.-If your total
accrued Denefits In all QualifIed plans and
IRAs on August 1.1986. h.lve a value of at
least 5562.500. you may elect to use a
special grandfather rule which el.empts
from the excise tax the portion of
, dIstributions treated .5 a recovery of
benefits accrued on or before August 1
1986. •
To make the election.•nswer Question 2
u~der -Other Information. M Enter your
Inlttal grandfather amount in the space
provided••nd Check the grandfather
recovery method you are electlnE
(discretionary or attained age),
See Regulations section 54,4981A·1T
for an explanation of when to make the
special grandfather election. how to
determine your initial grandfather .mount,
the two grandfather recovery methods. and
recordkeeping requirements.
If you are electing the dIscretionary
method and wish to accelerate the rate of
recovery beginning with calendar year
1987. attach a statement to form 5329
stating that you .re making such
acceleration.
Unes 16 and 20.-AII retirement
distributions are divided into two
categories: (1) regUlar retirement
distributions: and (2) lump-sum
distr!but!ons. To be treated.s a lump·sum
dlstrtbutlon. you must make certain
elections under section 402 or 403. such as
5-yeer averaging. with respect to that
distribution. See Form 4972. Tax on
Lump·Sum Distributions.
The following distributions are not to be
included on lines 16 or 20:
(1) distributions excluded from income
because of rollover contributions;
(2) distributions which are. return of
employee contributions or nondeductible
IRA contributions; .
(3) certain payments made to a spouse
or former spouse under a Qualified
domestic relations order; and
(4) distributions made as a result of
death.
See section 4981A(c)(2).
Lines 17aand 21a.-The threshold
amount depends on whether you have
made a ,randf.ther election. If you do not
elect to use the speci.1 grandfather rule.
use the $150.000 threshold .mount.1f you
make a special grancltather election. enter
$112.500 for 1987. For lump·sum
distributions. enter 5 times the applicable
threshold amount.
Unes 19b and 23b.-The 15 percent
excise tax on excess distributions rnay be
o!fs~t by. the 10 percent tax on eerly
dlStrtbutlOns under section 72(t) (line l1a.
Part II) to the extent that the 10 percent tax
is applied to excess distributions. If you
have an amount entered on line 11a.
subtract line 17c, or 21c. from line 10c.lf
the result is zero or less. you are not eligible
for an offset. If the result is gre.ter than
zero. multiply the' result by 10% (the rate of
the section 72(t) tax), and enter that result
on line 19bor 23b.
Part III-Tax on Excess
Accumulations in Individual
Retirement Accounts and
Annuities (Section 4974)
Genera"Y. if you have an IRA and your 70th
birthday was before July 1. 1986. you must
begin to receive dIstributions in 1987.If you
are the beneficiary of an IRA owner who
died before January 1. 1987. you rnay also
have to receive minimum distributions in
1987. If you do not receive the minimum
reQuired distribution. you must pay an
additional 50 percent tax on the amount of
any excess accumulatIons in your IRA. In
additIon. minimum dIstributions under
section 401(a)(9) received dUring 1987 for
calendar years 1985 and 1986 are taken
into account in determining excess
retirement distributions under section
4981A.
Publication 930. 1987 Required
Distributions from Individual Retirement
Arrangements (IRAs). highlights some of
the rules concerning required dIStributions
from IRAs for 1985. 1986. and 1987.
DIstributions for these years rnay be made
either under the regular method. or
according to special transition rules.
Under the regular method. the account
balances for 19B5. 19B6. and 19B7. with
appropriate adjustments. are determined
separately for each of your IRAs.
Under the special transition rules. there
are two alternative methods: (1) the life
expectancy method: and (2) the percentage
method. Both methods require you to
aggregate all of your IRAJ as of December
31.1986.
You rnay also be .ble to take credit for
amounts distributed to·you during 1985
through 19B7 if you were at least7~ in
the year of the distribution.
To determine the minimum required
distribution to be entered on line 12. see
Publication 930.
Note: The IRS may ~ille this t6x on excess
.ccumumtions. The ~iver of the gX is
conditiOMI upon ~"id~nce you submit tMt
.nyshorttall in the amount of withdra~Js
from your IRA was due to reasoMble error.
.nd tMt .ppropri.te steps have been or.re
being t.ken to remedy the shortt.II. Ifyou
believe you Qualify for this ~iver. file Form
5329. pay this excise gX, .nd.tt.chyour
letter ofellPlaMtion. Ifyour w.iver request
is6r.nted. we will sendyou. refund.
Part IV-Tax on Excess
Distributions From Qualified
Retirement Plans
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 imposes a new
excise tax of 15 percent on individuals who
receive excess distributions from Qualified
employer plans and IRAs. Generally. an
excess distribution is the amount of
retirement distributions that you receive
during the calender year over the applicable
threshold amount (see lines 17a and 21a).
A Qualified retirement plan includes a
Qualified pension. profit-sharing or stock
bonus plan. annuity plan described in
section 403(a). section 403(b) tax-
sheltered annuity contract or custodi.1
account. or an IRA (including. SEP-IR\).
720X2XAXv)
72(tX2)(B)
720)(2)(D)
72(tX2XCl
05
06
07
bce"tion
Dts"ibulton maCk! after Math
of tile emllloyft
02 72(tX2XAXiil) DlSt,ibutlOflmaCk! Due to
CbNbihtl'
03 72ltX2XAXIV) Dtst,ibutlOfl _ ".n of a
aeheDuleCl ..,oe. of
lubStantlalll' eoual periodic
".ymenb for tile life of tile
".rtici".nt (or joint ltwes of
the pan,cipant anc! the
pan,tlpanl'. belleflClary) or
the life expectancy Of the
panlcipant (0' the JOint life
expectanc.. of the
panicipant aflll the
panlCilNlftt's beneficiary)
DIst,ibution maoe to an
employee wIlo lIaS anainecf
aee 55. separated from
service, aflll maeu the
,eouwemenb fo' eal'l)'
..'"ement Ul'Cle' tile plan
(not applicable to IRAI)
Distribution lIMO to pal'
medical upe_ to the
utenlil/Cfl expenses are
Deauctible UIlller seetlOfl 213
(not applicable to IRAI)
Can-in Cliviclencl CliItributiofti
f,om emlllo)lee stock
_rshlp piaN (£SOPs) (not
applicable to tRAI)
Dist,ibutions maCk! lIUfauant
to • Qualified CIOtneStic
..lalions orae,
Une 11b.-If you receive any amounts·
under an annuity contract before reaching
age 59 1h. such amount may also be subject
to an additional 10 percent tax on the
portion which is includible in ,rOSS income.
The additional tax does not apply to
certain distributions (e.g.• distributions
allocable to investment in the contract
before August 14. 1982).
See section 72(q) for details.
Also. enter the amount of any
distributions excluded from the tax to the
left of the entry space with the notation.
-Amount excluded.·
·r bel~'2)~ny stamp or COin ($H -Exception-
(5) any alcoholic beverage. or
(6) any other tangible personal property
specifltd by regulatIOns under section
408(m).
Eateptio": for .CQuisit'ons nvd~ .ft~r
1986. th~ r.x R~form Act of1986 .1I0ws
.n IRA to ,nllest in one. on~·Nff. one·
Qu.rt~r. or one·t~nth ounc~ ,old coins. or
on~ ounc~sil~rcoins th.t lN~r~ mmt~dby
th~ U.S. belinni", Octob~r1. 1986.
Line 10b.-The 10 percent additional tax
does not apply to cen,ln distributions which
are specifically excepted by the Code. Enter
the amount which is excluded from the
additional tax on line lOb, Also. be sure to
answer Question 1 under -Other
Information.- In the space provided next to
Question 1. enter the number of the
applicable Code section from the chart
below:
.... CMe MCtieft
01 72ltX2XAXii)
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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ATTACHMENT 3
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
]32.500
132.500
19,875
2~5.0::>~
2~.!-O~
~C.SO:>
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r.
r
r·
r
r :;
'r~
·r
r
.'.
E.umpJr J. (~) An indi,oicua' (A) ""ho panicipatu 1n 1"'0Cl retircmcnt pla.m. ~
Qua.lifled cieiincd contrlb1.nio:: plaJ'l ..no 1 Cl1.aJifiec cieHnec benefit plu. hu I toal
"~lue o! .ttruec bendla 0:: Aurun 1. 1986 unoe~ bo:.r. pianl o! $1.oo::l.0::>::l. »ecu:st
t.hil amount cxceeci.s S')G2.0:>O. A il elirible to elect to use the speci..l f~andil.:'he~ ruit
to ulculau: the pcr.1ior. o! subsequent distribution! thal art cxemp: fron; ax. A eitca
to un the discretionary' rr~ncli.theT rcCO\'try' method ant ..mathel I ,·.lie eleC1ior. 10
tht 39Si into:ne :.u nu.::n. A ooe! no~ elect to .cceie:-a.u the rau o! reto\'e~' io= ]9S;.
Or. O:lober 1 ) 955. 1-. rccei''tl I. cis:.ributior. o! ~20::.0::>::>. Or. f Cb:-~2~' 1. ~95;, .t..
recei\'e~ I. cis~rib\,l:'iono! ~.(: .OJ~ anc. or. NO\'embt~ I, ] 9Si. receh'cl I. clis:riD~:.ior. c!
~O:,l.O::>::>. Tilt L~ j)erccn: ntlSC tu a.pplicable 1(\ &£pe~att dinnbu1.ionl it. ]95i is
ulculucd 1.1 folio"''!:
(J ) " ..lut o! fTanciuher amount orl Sf] /86 •••••••• $1,0:>::>,0::>::>
c:n G:-I.ndi..the~ unounu recoveree in 1986 but ahcr
8/1/86 t 20::l,O::>::>
(3) y ..lut o! p-anc:l.:.her amount on !2!3] /86 «]) -
C.2» •••••••••••••••••••••••••.' •••••••••••• ~ 80::>.0::>::>
(0<) Gra.ndia:.he:- retO\'t'" ptrcenart . . • • • • • . • . • • • • 3~
(5) Distributions bt1"''ttJ'l 1/l/&i a.nd 12/31/&i
(~3.0::>::>';' SZO::>,O:>:» ••••••••••••••••••••••• S
(6) Fonion Dr (5) exempt iron; ax «0<) xeS» t-
(i) J..onount p01ential!\'subiecto u:; «:,) - (6» .••. t-
(8) Portion of aggregate distribution" in exces~ of
~112,5oo ($4:',000 + $200,000 - $112.:;00), $
(9) Amount subject 10 tax (Jesser of (7) and <8n $
(10) Amount oftax(1~~of(9» ~
(11) Remaining undistributed \'alue of grandfather'
amount as of 12/3]/87 «3) - (6» $ 775,500
(b) In 1988, A receh'es no distributions from either plan. On February I, ]989, A
receh'es a distribution of $300,000 and on December 31.1989, recei\'es a distribution of
$75,000. A makes a valid acceleration election for the 1989 taxable year, whereby A
accelerates the rate of grandfather recovery that will apply for calendar ~'ears aiter
1988 to 100 percent. Assume the annual threshold amount fur the 1989 calendar vear is
$125,000 (i.e., 112,500 indexed). The 15 pertent excess tax applicable to distributions
in 1989 is calculated as foUows:
(1) Value of grandfather amount on 1/1/89 $775,500
(2) Grandfather reCO\'ery percentage designated for
I 1989 calendar year .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100%
(3) Distributions between 1/1/89 and 12/31/89
($300,000 + $75,000) $375.000
(4) Portion of (3) exempt from tax (2) x (3) $375,000
(5) Amount potentially subject to ta.X «3) - (4» $ 0
(6) Ponion of aggregate distributions in excess of
$125,000 ($300,000 + $75,000 - $125,000) $250,000
(7) Amount subject to tax (Jesser of (5) and (6» ••.••... $ 0
(8) Amount of tax (15% of (7» .•................... $ 0
(9) Remaining undistributed value of grandfather
a.mount as of 12/31/89 «1) - (4» ...•........... $400,500
The entire amount of an)' distribution for subsequent calendar )'e&rs \\in be treated as
• recovery of the grandfather a.mount and applied against the grandfather amount
until the unrecovered gra.ndfather amount is reduced to zero.
,; ~968K Reg. § 54.49B1A-lT
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.2~: .O:>:J
U::S.750
61~5j
tv "=pJe 2. 'Tnt facu z.rt tht IU"t as iJ: :£nmpie 1U~~~ that .:.. clew 10 use the
~:ai"ct i.fe ncovc." mto.ho: a'" A 2T'..kUI \'&.iic c1tc-..ic:. 10:' tht ~9Si a.u..bit "CC.
fu~.he:' usumc 1.hI.t A's l~ai"tc aft in mon:.h! 0:: O~U~US. 1, J9B6 is 46:? mon:.hi &De
o~ De~mbt:, SJ, J9Si is .(76 mon:.iu. 'Tnt l~ ptrct2): ocist 1.U lp~llr:abit ttl &'~~i.1.t
ciis:.rih~tio~ir. J9Si is cz.lc~:uct So! io1io~.'t:
(1) 'V&JUt 0: p-&nC:IUlcr L"noo:n~ or. S/J /86 00 ••• 0 •• 0 ••••• 0 0 ~JoO:>;j.O:>j
(2) G:-z.nc:..:.nt:' ~::'lo~"'l:SuCO\'crcc ir. 1986 bu: ~~lt:' £1J/86 00 $ 2:>;j.O:>j
(~) Ya.lue 0: ~ncil:.nc:' f.moo:r.: 0:; 12/3J /85 «J) - (2» 0 0 0 0 0 $ S:>:',Ojj
CO;) Co:npie:.tt montil! c: f.~t ir, ocu! 0: .(:W or. 6/j /85 ... 0 0 • • .;2
(:.) Co~;>it1tC mon:.n! 0: f.re ir. ocw 0: .;20 c::. :2/3J lEi 0 • 0 0 • ~5
(6) G:i.nc:..:.h::, ::'i.c-.io:: So! c: ~2/~1/85 (~.() choic:: by (.5» • 0 0 ~/~
(i) D:s:.rib1Jlio:u b::wc:r. l/l/Si lone ~2/3J/Ei (~: .Oj~-+-
!2~.O:>::» .••••.••• 0 ••••• 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 • 0 ••• 0 ••••• 0 0 • 0 0 •• ~
(8) ro::.io:: 0: (i) c.xt:::.;.~ ::--e=~ «6) x (7)) ••• 0 0 •• 0 •••• 0 00 $
(9) Amo~n: Ptlltr.ti~jy ll:bj::'lC.:.t.: {iiI - (8») •••••.•• 0 .0' $
(J 0) Yorocr. 0: &bP'tP.1t cis-..ooihu:ionl in oem 0: SJ 1:2,500
(~:,Ojj+ UO~,Oj::> - SJl2.30j) 000.00. 0.000. 0 0 0 0 •• 00 S
OJ) o~moun. s:Jbj::. lC 12:: (ius::- c: (9) &one (J 0» 0 0 0 0 0 •••• 0 0 0 $
02) o£..mo~n. c: ax O:~ 0: (1» 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 • 0 •• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 $
(13) t':n:cco\'Crct ~nc:;.o.ht:' ;.:nOlJn~ &S o! l2,'31/Si ((S) -
(S)) o. 0 •• 0 •••••• 0 • 0 0 • 0 • 0 0 0 •• 0 0 •••••• 0 0 •• 0 o. s: 63 ~~50
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EXAMPLES OF ESTATE TAX/EXCISE TAX TREATMENT OF RETIREMENT
PLAN ACCUMULATIONS
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ATTACHMENT 4
Lamplt Z. cal An iDdhidual CA) diu on Fcbrua".' 1, 299>: al aft '0 and P
m~Uu. As D! ."'J CalC D! death, A has an iJucrcr: in • dtflncc! brndh J)1&n cirlCfibed in
RCltun "CHeaal ,1'111'1 Xl. Pin X ~J nMn ,trO\'idtc fl~ tmJlI~'f'f ronlrihUliunl. A has
no srC'ltUn ;"Jlf) jn\'l'~lmenl in r1:ln X. A dOC'. not b.1\T .n~· lnlcrc'l in an~' o:.her
qualifJrcll'mr11l\Tr p!:ln or indj\'iduaJ rrlirl'mrnl ,'lan. 'Tnt "ltt'""'lt' , ..IWltiun rblt in
.rcliot :!~ cJ~. nIl: :lJlrl~·. A did nOI dtCI III b.'\T lh.. f,,,'('illll::.:andf.lhC1 rule' .ppJ~'.
A'f inU'1l'FI in rUin X i. lht, fo~ o! II QUOIlifit'd .iuin: .tll~ tUl"'i\v: ~:lnl,li:~·.Tht "llllJt o!
lhC' rtr.'~ininf pa~'menu undtrlhr jolnl an~ JUf\'h'Or :lnnUil~'lIt o! A's dall' o! cellh
Cdr.lrrminrd under D·:) is U,O:')O.O~j.
lb) Bt'C'l\u,t' A is aft '0 .n~ 9 mur.lhJ em ."'. cialt fI: cit::l~h ..~:f li;t cXfJCctllnC'~' tiS
u~ ."'f Calt of dl::llh it· calrulalrd usin; Il:t '0 IA'- ,m:l:ncc a~f :~. ,,'holt ~'carf on A'J
&:bIt o! dealh). Tilr fliClor from "I':lblt." of f20.?03].;(i, used 11'1 ~tlcrmjnr lht prcsenl
,..11Jf of ••infJt lift annuil~' 10: an indi,'iciua) arf '0 i~ 6.~:::!2. 'Ttlf frcalcr of Sl!'-O,OX>
0: S.ll~..'OO inDexed fo: 299>: i~ S·150,O:>j. Tnr presenl ,,,jUt o! Itt tl~'J)O~elicallinrlt
Jifc annuit~' is fP:Ji.&30 (~l~O,O:>:>)C 6,O:~).
Ic) Thc amounl of A's CSC'tSl attumula1.;CII'l is $l,C'P~.1'O, Ot~crmined u foU~'S:
O.O:>~,O~ " ..11Jf of A's inlertSl in P~n X) minus ~Pji.£30 c',-:;ue of t1~'J'Olhe1.ical
6in;Jt life annui13' tCll'l1.racl) equal! $l,0S'2,l'O,
Cd) The inucalr in lhc CSlalC IU undC11etliCll'l .c9S1A(d) is Sl~.£2S (15 J)Crcen1.
D! ~l,0S'2,"O),
Inmp}t 2, (a) 'The faw 1ft lhc ame u ir. Izat::;J1t 1, exet;:: thal A's inlCTat in
PWl X consisu D! lhc fo1)em'in..
n) S2,O~,O~. ,,)Ufo or cmp)~'Cf·pl'O\idtd pcln.ior. o! I qUl.!:ficd joint and aurvi-
'oar I.nnuh~' dC1C:T.1inec IS of ."'s Date D! ciutb usm* t.hc inlt:'csl and mD:"'a&1h)'
usumptions in f 20.2031.7.
(2) $200,OO~. J)rocceds D! a ltml Jilc insurance co:nract Cno cas!: w.-render va.Juc
o bdo:'t dealb).
(3) $] OO,O~, L"zur.ml (mp1~"U.])TO\idec portion) ])I~,b)e :c A', fo:mer IJ'OUlC
pu:suanl 10 I QDRO,.
(4) $loo,lX)O, uDOlml o! A', Ul,:cr.meDl if: P~ X. .
(1» The va.Juc or A's in1.trU1 in PlaJl X 10: J)t::posu or ca.)tulati~ A's ucas
aCC\2Dn:lal.icm if ni1J S2,OX>,OXl. Tnc proceeds or the u::n Jifc w:=aJ)1:t ccnn:aC1, the
a.mOt:~l J)I~-abJc smoe: the QDRO, cd lhc &mOml1. or A's u2\'cr.:u::n =Plul X arc
exduded 171m) such '~uc.
. ~=;)}t 3, Ca) 'Tfte f,eu aft the SUM u in Enmplt I, txet;r. th&t A electcd the
IJICciaJ r:and!l1.hc: nUL A's irJiUaJ i:U~l1hu amoun: \\"I.S $] ,1 O:',~, AI or A's Gatt
Ii ciCltl4, ... hac reechoed 15oo,OXl irl Cisuibuticms WI we:e UUlte U I rc1.~ or A's
r-oanc:athc:' &mo~rn .. T~U1, A's unusec ~71~!ube: I.mO'.:r.: if S60~,O:>jC$l,l~00j -
UO~,Oj:>). ~ 1PPX, us\:."!)r Wl $112,500 inoexce is 1'.i1: $11~,50~. .
(b) A's excess retiremen: Iceumula1.icm if dnc:minrc u follcm·r: S2,OOO,OX> mmus
l.1tt rrult: D! C]) $~Oj.OOj cr. (2) lhe J':'CSCl \-a)uc 0: I p:rioe ccnam I.t:lml" of
$lU.,sOj a ~"CV fo:- 16 'u.-s. Tnt FCS:~: '-alut o! a sm~je liie &:Jluit~'o~ $112.500 I.~'U.r fo: u inCSh'ic5uaJ are '0 is odcwmined u foUD\\"I: $112.500 )( 6.0S22 •
$680,£27.25. S680W.:zs is puler WJl S~.o:n Tn1lS \hc .~O=1 or die aceD
m.11'tmU1t aCC\1mu1&uCIJl is $1,319,173 (U,=,O),1 minw $680.£%71.
(t) The &CSditicmaJ CS".a:e 1&1 mu,;e: amicm ~PS1."ld) is $lPi.&75 (1S pcrctDt or
$1,319,173). •
Zuz::ph 4, Ca) The {aN aft the lime u mEnz::p}t 3 uc:e;r. lhat. u or A's dale
or death. A reechoed SPO,O~ in dis'..ributicms thaI "''r.'C UU1CC U • relU1'll D! A',
r:-and!ather amount. TftUl, A's unuscd ,ran!alher &mo=: is n,010.0:>:> (Sl,2CO,=-
fPO,OX>). .
Ibl A·, am,. rrlirt"mrnt atC'U2':n:!:Itiun i" cirll'Tmint'd :l~ f,~lU\,'I' 5"' \\')0 en? minus
Iltt' ,min of (~) ~l"OJO,(~ I ..... ~~,.t'~ c~ndi:l:ht'r:amcnlnt t u:.2t it~~-S2i.2:' nhr
~ml ,,,=,JIJf o. I IQn:lr Jut' ~nDUI1~' at ~11:..~n..' ~ ~'n: fir.' :an indhic!:::al aJ(' '0). A'J
amw.~ ::':Ind!:l:ht-: :lfnUUDt IS' ;malr: sJo.a1l Ihl' ItrHml \":lIlX' oi lhto h\1'01htolira] lifl'
.n71ul1~'. Thlo!~. lht Imot:nt of sht C'SrtJ''' rrlirl"mt":n .l'l'umu1ali\~ » ,PPO=
IU.CYJO.O:>:> - ~1.0)O.ro.·». • ••
ttl TM addi1.iO:l&) ..-.alt u.s uncm Rniun oIPS••o\'d' if $2"~ ~~ ,.~-1 JSttPO,OO:U. : s .. Wo' •• ~__ IN
I
,4968K Rei. § 54.4981A-IT
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